SAKALA International · Partnership Proposal

Nigeria Gave You 13 Million Cards. The Caribbean Gives You 20 Million More.

A card network partnership proposal for the most underbanked market in the Western Hemisphere

20M+ Unbanked Population
344 Enrollment Sites
$32M Monthly Digital Payments
(MonCash Alone)
80% Haiti Informal Economy
Wesley Bertil, BARSS LLC · Daniel Tillias, SAKALA International · April 2026 · CONFIDENTIAL
Section One

The Nigeria Precedent


In 2013, the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) of Nigeria partnered with Mastercard to issue 13 million national ID cards with embedded prepaid payment functionality. The program combined biometric identity verification with Mastercard's payment infrastructure, creating a dual-purpose card that served as both government-issued identification and a financial instrument.

The Nigeria deal proved three things:

  1. Government ID + payment card = massive adoption. People need ID. People need payments. Combining them removes adoption friction entirely. You are not asking anyone to sign up for a card... they are coming to you for their national ID and leaving with payment capability.
  2. Underbanked markets are not charity... they are greenfield. Every card issued into an unbanked population creates a new node in the network. Every node generates interchange. Nigeria's 13M cards were not a CSR project. They were market entry.
  3. First mover locks the market. Mastercard's NIMC partnership created the infrastructure standard. Visa did not get a second chance. The rails, once laid, are the rails.
We are proposing the same deal. Same model. Same economics. Different geography. The Caribbean has 20M+ unbanked and underbanked people across CARICOM nations, anchored by Haiti's 11M+ population where 80% of economic activity is informal. SAKALA has the enrollment infrastructure. NIRA Jamaica has the identity standards. Bank of Jamaica has the CBDC. All we need is the card network.
Section Two

The Caribbean Market


CARICOM represents 20 million people across 15 member states with persistent financial exclusion. This is not sub-Saharan Africa's billion-person scale, but it is the most concentrated underbanked market in the Western Hemisphere, and it has characteristics that make it uniquely attractive for a card network.

Country Population Unbanked Rate Unbanked Population (Est.) Remittance Inflows
Haiti11.7M80%~9.4M$4.1B/year
Jamaica2.8M17%~476K$3.5B/year
Trinidad & Tobago1.4M~20%~280K$186M/year
Guyana808K~25%~202K$646M/year
Suriname618K~35%~216K$72M/year
Bahamas413K~12%~50K$50M/year
Other CARICOM~3M15-30%~600K$1.2B/year
CARICOM Total~20.7M~11.2M$9.7B/year

Why CARICOM Is Better Than It Looks

Section Three

Haiti Specifically


Haiti is the anchor market and the hardest proof point. If the model works in Haiti, it works anywhere in the Caribbean.

80% Informal Economy
20% Banking Penetration
$32M MonCash Monthly Volume
$4.1B Annual Remittances

The demand for digital payment infrastructure in Haiti is not theoretical. MonCash (Digicel's mobile money platform) already processes $32 million per month with limited merchant acceptance and no physical card. This proves that Haitians adopt digital payment tools when available... the constraint is infrastructure, not willingness.

Current Payment Landscape

ChannelMonthly Volume (Est.)UsersLimitations
MonCash (mobile money)$32M~3.5MPhone-only, no card, limited merchants
Western Union / CAM Transfer~$340MN/ACash pickup only, 5-10% fees
Formal banking (BUH, Sogebank, etc.)N/A~2.3M accountsPort-au-Prince concentrated, no rural reach
Informal (cash, tontine, susu)Majority~9M adultsNo record, no savings instrument, no insurance
The gap: Haiti has 3.5 million MonCash users proving digital payment demand, but no physical card infrastructure linking identity to payment. The proposed ID+payment card fills exactly this gap... biometric identity (solving the ID problem that excludes millions from formal services) combined with payment functionality (converting MonCash's phone-only model into a card-based ecosystem that works at market stalls, not just smartphones).

Why Haiti First

Section Four

SAKALA as Enrollment Partner


The Nigeria model worked because NIMC had enrollment infrastructure... government offices where citizens came to register. SAKALA provides the same function in Haiti and across CARICOM, except SAKALA's infrastructure is better positioned: it is embedded in communities, operated by trained local youth, and already serving populations that government offices do not reach.

What SAKALA Brings

AssetScaleRelevance
Franchise sites (Haiti)344Each site = enrollment station + merchant location
Trained youth operators3,44010 per site, trained in biometric enrollment and card issuance
Community trustDeepSAKALA operates through existing community structures (churches, cooperatives, schools)
Diaspora network (US)975K mappedRemittance senders = card top-up source
Church partnerships1,604 identifiedEnrollment locations in diaspora communities

Enrollment Scale

Phase 1: Pilot 10 sites 3,440 cards
Phase 2: Haiti National 344 sites 500,000 cards (Year 1-2)
Phase 3: CARICOM Jamaica + T&T + Guyana 5M+ cards (Year 3-5)
Key advantage: SAKALA does not need to build enrollment infrastructure from scratch. The 344 franchise sites already exist as physical locations with trained staff, power, and community foot traffic. Adding biometric enrollment stations to existing sites costs $500-2,000 per station... a fraction of building dedicated enrollment offices. Every franchise site doubles as a merchant acceptance point, meaning each card issued is immediately usable at its point of issuance.
Section Five

Revenue Model


Every card issued generates recurring revenue for the network partner. The Caribbean's transaction economics are particularly attractive because of the remittance corridor... high-frequency, cross-border, currently captured by wire services.

Revenue StreamPer-Card EstimateAt 500K CardsAt 5M Cards
Domestic interchange (merchant POS) $2-5/year $1-2.5M/year $10-25M/year
Cross-border interchange (remittance) $8-15/year $4-7.5M/year $40-75M/year
Card issuance / program fees $1-3 one-time $500K-1.5M $5-15M
Merchant acquiring (new merchant onboarding) Per merchant 344 merchants (pilot) 5,000+ merchants
Government contract fees (ID program) Per country 1 contract (Haiti) 5+ CARICOM contracts
Estimated Annual Network Revenue $5.5-11.5M $55-115M

The Remittance Conversion Opportunity

Haiti receives $4.1B/year in remittances. Currently, 5-10% of that ($205-410M) goes to transfer fees paid to Western Union, CAM Transfer, MonCash, and informal couriers. A card-to-card remittance corridor (diaspora SAKALA card in the US → recipient SAKALA card in Haiti) reduces fees to 1-3% while generating interchange revenue for the network partner at both ends.

Conservative estimate: Capturing just 10% of Haiti's remittance volume ($410M/year) at 1.5% interchange generates $6.15M/year in network revenue from remittances alone. At 25% capture: $15.4M/year.
Section Six

What We Need from the Network Partner


RequirementDetailPrecedent
Card issuance platform Prepaid card program with BIN assignment, capable of NFC + chip, supporting multi-currency (HTG, JMD, USD) NIMC-Mastercard used Mastercard prepaid platform
BIN sponsorship or program manager A licensed issuer to sponsor the BIN if SAKALA's banking partner (BOJ or Haitian bank) is not yet licensed as direct issuer Standard for fintech-bank partnerships globally
POS terminal support Terminal deployment at 344 franchise sites (pilot: 10 sites). Can be basic NFC readers or smartphone-based POS. Mastercard deployed terminals as part of NIMC rollout
CBDC integration pathway Technical architecture for card ↔ JAM-DEX bridge and future CAPSS cross-border settlement integration Mastercard has active CBDC partnerships with multiple central banks
Co-marketing and government relations Joint approach to Haitian and Jamaican government for ID program endorsement NIMC partnership was a government-endorsed program
What SAKALA brings in return: 344 physical enrollment and merchant locations in Haiti. 3,440 trained youth operators. 975K mapped diaspora members in the US. A partnership with NIRA Jamaica for identity standards. A relationship with Bank of Jamaica for CBDC integration. The enrollment infrastructure is built. The card network is the missing piece.
Section Seven

Competitive Context


The Caribbean card market is uncontested. Neither Mastercard nor Visa has meaningful penetration in Haiti's informal economy. Neither has a national ID partnership in the Caribbean. This is a first-mover market.

If Mastercard Acts First

Mastercard replicates its Nigeria success in the Caribbean. Locks in Haiti, Jamaica, T&T as ID+payment card partners. Becomes the default rail for CARICOM financial inclusion. CBDC integration with JAM-DEX creates the template for every Caribbean central bank. Visa is locked out of the fastest-growing financial inclusion market in the Americas.

OR

If Visa Acts First

Visa enters a market where Mastercard has the Nigeria precedent but has not yet moved on Caribbean. Visa partners with SAKALA and NIRA to build the Caribbean's first integrated ID+payment system. Establishes government relationships across 15 CARICOM nations. Mastercard's Nigeria playbook is used against them.

The window is narrow. Jamaica's NIRA is actively building its national ID infrastructure. Bank of Jamaica is rolling out JAM-DEX. SAKALA's enrollment infrastructure is operational. The program architecture is ready. The only question is which network lays the rail. Whoever moves first locks the market for a generation.

Competitive Positioning

FactorMastercard AdvantageVisa Advantage
Government ID precedentNIMC Nigeria (13M cards)India Aadhaar ecosystem (indirect)
Caribbean presenceLimited (commercial cards)Limited (commercial cards)
CBDC partnershipsMultiple central bank pilotsMultiple central bank pilots
Financial inclusion mandateMastercard Foundation (Africa focus)Visa Foundation (global focus)
Fintech partnership modelStrong (Mastercard Send, etc.)Strong (Visa Direct, etc.)
Section Eight

The Ask


We are requesting a meeting with the Caribbean/Latin America division head (or equivalent regional leadership for financial inclusion) to present the full program architecture and discuss partnership terms.

Meeting Agenda (Proposed)

  1. Nigeria model review (15 min) ... lessons learned, what scales, what does not
  2. Caribbean market briefing (15 min) ... country-by-country opportunity, regulatory landscape, CBDC integration
  3. SAKALA enrollment infrastructure (15 min) ... 344 sites, biometric capability, community trust model
  4. Program architecture (15 min) ... card specs, CAPSS integration, multi-currency wallet, phased rollout
  5. Term sheet discussion (15 min) ... revenue sharing, BIN sponsorship, co-investment, timeline
  6. Next steps (15 min) ... pilot design, government introductions, due diligence
Timeline: Phase 1 pilot (3,440 cards, 10 sites) can launch within 6 months of agreement. Phase 2 national rollout (500K cards) within 18 months. Phase 3 CARICOM expansion within 36 months. The infrastructure is not theoretical... SAKALA's franchise network is operational. NIRA's ID standards are defined. BOJ's CBDC is live. The card network is the final piece.

Contacts

RoleNameOrganization
Program Architect / AnalyticsWesley BertilBARSS LLC
Enrollment InfrastructureDaniel TilliasSAKALA International