R_useful = τ × α × GDP × (1 − Φ)
Réginald,
Ce document contient un calculateur construit à partir de tes équations. Chaque paramètre vient de ton étude publiée... la SAM Cicowiez/IDB recalée 2019, tes coefficients techniques, ton inverse de Leontief, tes élasticités de Schneider & Buehn, tes parts budgétaires LES de l'ECVMAS/IHSI 2012. Je n'ai rien inventé. J'ai reconstruit ta méthodologie en Python, puis j'ai ajouté une seule chose que ton modèle ne mesurait pas : le taux de capture institutionnel (Φ). C'est la variable qui transforme R collecté en R utile. Ensemble, ça donne l'équation en haut de cette page.
Tu peux faire tourner n'importe quel code fiscal avec cet outil... le tien, le mien, celui qui n'a pas encore été écrit. L'installation est triviale : Python + numpy. L'exécution : python reap_calculator.py. Pour créer un scénario personnalisé, il suffit de modifier les taux dans build_their_code() ou de créer un nouvel objet TaxPolicy. Le script fait tout le reste... propagation de Leontief, migration symétrique, consommation par quintile, perte sèche de Harberger, score REAP composite. Les exemples d'utilisation sont documentés plus bas.
L'attribution est verrouillée. Ta méthodologie, ton crédit. Notre application, notre ajout (R_useful, les taux BARSS). Les en-têtes de copyright dans le code, les notices dans ce document, et l'architecture de citation dans le README sont non négociables. Le travail intellectuel des économistes du Sud ne se fait pas absorber sans attribution. Pas ici.
Si tu veux tester immédiatement : modifie les taux dans build_their_code() ou crée une nouvelle TaxPolicy. Si tu veux aller plus loin : la Section V (Gap Analysis) identifie précisément les six questions auxquelles seul ton modèle complet peut répondre. C'est là que la collaboration devient intéressante.
— Wesley
The REAP Calculator is a fiscal policy simulation tool that answers one question no existing tool answers:
Does this tax code actually make people's lives better?
Standard fiscal evaluation asks: "How much revenue does the State collect?" (R)
REAP asks: "How much of that revenue reaches its intended public purpose, at what cost to the economy, who bears the burden, and does the formal base grow or shrink?" (R_useful)
The difference between those two questions is the difference between collecting more and delivering more.
| Symbol | Name | What it measures |
|---|---|---|
| τ | Apparent tax rate | Revenue / GDP |
| α | Formal fraction | Share of economy in the tax base |
| GDP | Gross domestic product | Size of the economy |
| Φ | Capture rate | Share of collected revenue diverted from public purpose |
| R_useful | Useful revenue | What actually reaches people |
Neither Surin nor Bertil had this equation alone. Surin gave us R = τ × α × GDP. Bertil added (1 − Φ). Together, it shows that a code collecting LESS but capturing LESS of what it collects can deliver dramatically MORE.
Two researchers working independently on Haiti's January 20, 2023 Tax Code (656 articles, 244 pages, effective October 1, 2026) arrived at overlapping conclusions from opposite directions:
Réginald Surin (Economist, former PM Economic Adviser, former MEF Economist) built a Computable General Equilibrium model calibrated on Haiti's Social Accounting Matrix. He found: the Code's calibration would contract GDP by 2.2%, hit the poorest 3.6x harder than the richest, and shrink the formal base from 30% to 23% of GDP.
Wesley Bertil (BARSS Research) built the Elite Extraction with Differential Targeting Model (EEDTM) across 25 cases spanning 200 years. Applied to the Code, he found: the reform changes everything affecting the powerless while leaving everything affecting the powerful unchanged. The allocation architecture (100% general fund) means 26% of collected revenue is captured through discretionary allocation, debt service to historical extractors, and political patronage.
They found each other on March 28, 2026. This calculator is the synthesis of their frameworks.
Modèle d'Impact Fiscal en Économie Duale
Question: When you change the fiscal screw, what happens to an economy split between those who pay and those who don't?
Key insight: In an economy where 70% is informal, raising rates on the 30% formal sector without expanding the base is self-defeating (the "dual fiscal trap").
Equations contributed:
R = τ × α × GDP (dual fiscal trap)τ_eff = τ / α (real fiscal pressure)Δα = -η × Δτ* (informal migration)μf = |ΔGDP| / ΔR (fiscal multiplier)Elite Extraction with Differential Targeting Model
Question: Who extracts, how much, from whom, and through what mechanism?
Key insight: Extraction follows predictable mathematical patterns. The same dynamics that operated through colonial debt operate through fiscal architecture.
Equations contributed:
(1 − Φ) capture correctionΔα = -η_out × Δτ* + η_in × Δ(B)Revenue, Extraction, Allocation & Progressivity
Question: Does this tax reform actually improve lives?
Key insight: You don't need to collect more. You need to capture less of what you collect.
The synthesis:
Revenue is the product of rate × formal share × economy size. Raising τ without expanding α can shrink R.
What formal actors actually experience. Haiti: 5% apparent = 16.7% real (÷ 0.30).
Multi-layer taxes stack multiplicatively. Five layers at 5% each ≠ 25%. They equal 22.6%.
Higher rates push formal operators to informal. η = 0.20 (Schneider & Buehn 2009).
GDP cost per unit of net revenue. Above 1.0 = reform destroys more than it collects.
Share of tax increase absorbed by consumer vs producer. Rigid demand (food) → consumer absorbs 70-85%.
A shock to one sector cascades through inter-sectoral linkages. Industry multiplier = 1.60.
Pure waste. Benefits nobody. Scales with the SQUARE of the rate change.
Each point of GDP lost costs 1.2-1.5 points of revenue. The trap feeds itself.
Consumption contraction ratio. Above 1.0 = poor hit harder. Below 1.0 = progressive.
What actually reaches public purpose after capture.
Extends MIFED: adds formalization PULL from barrier reduction, not just rate PUSH.
Five dimensions: consumption, wealth, intergenerational, diaspora, reform selectivity.
True cost per useful gourde. Higher than μf when Φ > 0.
If only indirect taxes change while wealth/dividends stay frozen: Γ_reform = ∞.
Population taxed for the consequences of having been extracted from.
Five dimensions, each 0-1, weighted sum. Higher = better reform.
The model is calibrated on Haiti's Social Accounting Matrix (Cicowiez/IDB, 2013, rescaled to 2019). This is the ONLY publicly available SAM for Haiti.
| Agriculture | Industry | Services | TOTAL | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Production (M HTG) | 34,955 | 105,567 | 248,090 | 388,612 |
| Value Added | 29,229 | 62,493 | 178,496 | 270,218 |
| Intermediate Cons. | 5,726 | 43,074 | 69,594 | 118,394 |
| VA / Production | 83.6% | 59.2% | 71.9% | 69.5% |
Three economic worlds:
| Agriculture | Industry | Services | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | 0.0796 | 0.0663 | 0.0045 |
| Industry | 0.0465 | 0.1936 | 0.0475 |
| Services | 0.0376 | 0.1480 | 0.2285 |
Read column-wise: Industry buys 6.63 centimes of agricultural goods, 19.36 centimes of other industrial goods, and 14.80 centimes of services for every gourde of industrial output.
| Agriculture | Industry | Services | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | 1.0943 | 0.0889 | 0.0121 |
| Industry | 0.0637 | 1.2641 | 0.0702 |
| Services | 0.0563 | 0.2142 | 1.3130 |
| MULTIPLIER | 1.2143 | 1.5672 | 1.3953 |
Read column-wise: a 1-gourde increase in demand for industrial goods creates 1.57 gourdes of total output across the economy. That's the cascade.
| Quintile | Incompressible (γ/R) | Margin | Food share | Income (HTG/mo) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | 92% | 8% | 55% | 6,000 |
| Q2 | 78% | 22% | 42% | 12,000 |
| Q3 | 65% | 35% | 35% | 20,000 |
| Q4 | 52% | 48% | 28% | 35,000 |
| Q5 | 35% | 65% | 15% | 75,000 |
Q1 has 8 gourdes of margin on 100. When prices rise, those 8 gourdes melt. Q5 has 65 gourdes of cushion. The same tax produces wildly different impacts. That's structural regressivity. That's Gamma.
# Terminal
python reap_calculator.py
Runs three Haiti scenarios (Their Code, Surin's Corrections, BARSS Code), prints results, comparison table, and REAP scores. Saves JSON.
from reap_calculator import REAPCalculator, TaxPolicy calc = REAPCalculator() # Create policy p = TaxPolicy("My Tax Reform") # Set excise rates (product, old_rate, new_rate) p.set_excise("beer_local", old=0.06, new=0.12) p.set_excise("water", old=0.00, new=0.00) # keep exempt p.set_excise("tobacco", old=0.15, new=0.40) p.set_excise("vehicle_gt10", old=0.10, new=0.50) # Set direct taxes p.set_direct("IS", old=0.30, new=0.28) p.set_direct("TMS", old=0.02, new=0.025) p.set_direct("IMF", old=0.00, new=0.003) # Set TCA structure (flat or progressive) p.set_tca(necessity=0.05, standard=0.10, luxury=0.12) # Set capture rate (Φ) p.set_capture_rate(0.15) # Add extra revenue streams (M HTG) p.add_revenue_stream("property_reform", 5_000) p.add_revenue_stream("wealth_tax", 10_000) # Set formalization barrier reduction (0-1) p.set_barrier_reduction(0.20) # Run results = calc.run(p) calc.print_results(results) # Get REAP score scores = calc.reap_score(results) print(f"REAP: {scores['REAP']}") # Compare with other policies r2 = calc.run(another_policy) calc.compare([results, r2]) # Save calc.save(results, "my_results.json")
# Save a policy import json with open("my_policy.json", "w") as f: json.dump(p.to_dict(), f, indent=2) # Load a policy with open("my_policy.json") as f: p_loaded = TaxPolicy.from_dict(json.load(f))
class MySAM: SECTORS = ["Agriculture", "Manufacturing", "Services"] X = np.array([...]) # Production by sector VA = np.array([...]) # Value added A = np.array([...]) # Technical coefficients 3x3 # ... etc (see HaitiSAM for full structure) calc = REAPCalculator(sam=MySAM())
Products in the default Haiti catalog. Set rates for any subset.
| Product | Elasticity | Base (M HTG) | Budget category | Sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
beer_local | -0.60 | 8,200 | bev_alc | Industry |
beer_import | -0.70 | 5,000 | bev_alc | Industry |
clairin | -0.50 | 3,500 | bev_alc | Industry |
spirits | -0.70 | 2,000 | bev_alc | Industry |
wine | -0.80 | 1,500 | bev_alc | Industry |
soda_juice | -0.50 | 4,000 | bev_soft | Industry |
energy_drink | -0.90 | 800 | bev_soft | Industry |
water | -0.20 | 3,000 | water | Industry |
tobacco | -0.30 | 1,200 | tobacco | Industry |
telecom | -0.80 | 12,000 | telecom | Services |
gambling | -0.40 | 2,000 | other_serv | Services |
vehicle_lt5 | -0.50 | 3,000 | transport | Industry |
vehicle_5_10 | -0.50 | 2,500 | transport | Industry |
vehicle_gt10 | -0.50 | 4,000 | transport | Industry |
food_taxed | -0.30 | 50,000 | food | Agriculture |
Five dimensions, each scored 0-1:
| Dimension | What it measures | Optimal |
|---|---|---|
| R (Revenue) | ΔR_useful relative to baseline | Higher = more useful revenue |
| E (Extraction) | 1 − Φ | Higher = less captured |
| A (Allocation) | Integrity of revenue reaching purpose | Higher = better governed |
| P (Progressivity) | Inverse of Gamma | Higher = less regressive |
| α (Base) | Δα direction and magnitude | Higher = base growing |
Default weights: equal (0.20 each). Adjustable per context.
Scoring bands:
| Score | Assessment |
|---|---|
| 0.80+ | Structurally sound reform |
| 0.60–0.79 | Good calibration, some structural gaps |
| 0.40–0.59 | Revenue-functional but regressive or captured |
| Below 0.40 | Net-destructive reform |
Standard fiscal analysis tools (IMF FARI, World Bank BOOST, OECD tax models) optimize R. They tell governments how to collect more. They don't ask whether collecting more makes anyone's life better. They don't model who bears the burden differentially. They don't account for institutional capture of revenue. They don't measure whether the formal base grows or shrinks.
In a country like Haiti — 70% informal, 26% captured, poorest quintile with 8% margin — optimizing R is optimizing the wrong variable.
REAP optimizes R_useful. It asks: after collection, after capture, after distortion, after migration — what's left that reaches people?
This tool is a single file with one dependency (numpy). No frameworks. No cloud services. No API keys. No subscriptions.
Because the people who most need to evaluate fiscal policy are in places where bandwidth is expensive, electricity is intermittent, and institutional access to modeling tools is gatekept.
A tax code that affects 11.5 million people should be evaluable by anyone with Python and the publicly available parameters from an economist's published paper.
Every equation in this calculator traces to a specific person's work. Surin built the CGE methodology. Bertil built the extraction framework. The synthesis is joint. The attribution headers in the code, the copyright notices, and this README exist because intellectual work by economists in the Global South gets absorbed without credit by institutions in the Global North. Not here.
If you use this tool, cite:
19. Sorceries/ ├── reap_calculator.py ← THIS TOOL ├── REAP_CALCULATOR_README.md ← THIS FILE ├── haiti_cge_replication_v3.py ← Hardcoded v3 (predecessor) ├── haiti_cge_replication_v2.py ← Hardcoded v2 (predecessor) ├── haiti_cge_replication.py ← Hardcoded v1 (predecessor) ├── datawrapper_build_haiti_tax.py ← Chart builder (7 DW charts) └── brattle_build_haiti_tax_code.py ← Report builder (8 SVG charts) 8. Research Reports/Haiti_Tax_Code_Reform/ ├── 00_Project_Index.md ← Master project index ├── MIFED_Framework_Analysis.md ← Surin's framework reconstructed ├── Cross_Validation_MIFED_x_EEDTM.md ← 9-cell cross-validation ├── Synthesis_Framework_REAP.md ← Academic framework paper ├── Methodology_Paper_For_Surin.md ← Working document for collaborator ├── REAP_Calculator_Results_Analysis.md ← Detailed results + gap analysis ├── reap_calculator_results.json ← Machine-readable output └── cge_replication_results_v3.json ← v3 output (predecessor)
Under the current Code: R = 164B collected × 74% useful = 121B reaching people Under the BARSS Code: R = 190B collected × 95% useful = 180B reaching people +48.5% more impact. Same economy. Less pain. Better architecture.
You don't need to collect more. You need to capture less of what you collect.
CGE Replication v3 + REAP Scoring + Gap Analysis
Results from the REAP Calculator (v1.0) running three tax policies through Surin's CGE framework with EEDTM overlay and REAP composite scoring. The calculator (19. Sorceries/reap_calculator.py) is a reusable tool — plug in any tax code, get the full analysis. All methodology © Réginald Surin (2026). Application & REAP synthesis © Wesley Bertil / BARSS Research.
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Calculator | 19. Sorceries/reap_calculator.py |
| SAM | Haiti, Cicowiez/IDB 2013, rescaled 2019 (3-sector aggregation) |
| Results JSON | 8. Research Reports/Haiti_Tax_Code_Reform/reap_calculator_results.json |
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Source | Décret du 20 janvier 2023 portant Code Fiscal (Le Moniteur, Spécial N°3) |
| Articles | 656 |
| Entry into force | October 1, 2026 |
| Philosophy | Revenue maximization through rate increases on existing formal base |
| Allocation | 100% general fund, discretionary |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| τ* (old) | 17.3% |
| τ* (new) | 26.5% |
| Δτ* | +9.2% |
| τ_eff (real fiscal pressure) | 17.8% |
| Sector | Impact | Multiplier |
|---|---|---|
| Agriculture | -0.23% | 1.22 |
| Industrie | -3.09% | 1.60 |
| Services | -0.79% | 1.40 |
| GDP | -1.26% | — |
| Quintile | Contraction | Margin | Income (HTG/mo) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 (poorest) | -6.11% | 8% | 6,000 |
| Q2 | -4.93% | 22% | 12,000 |
| Q3 | -3.74% | 35% | 20,000 |
| Q4 | -3.02% | 48% | 35,000 |
| Q5 (richest) | -2.13% | 65% | 75,000 |
| Γ (Q1/Q5) | 2.88 |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Δα (outward migration) | -1.84 pts |
| Δα (inward pull) | 0.00 pts |
| Δα (net) | -1.84 pts |
| α (new) | 28.2% (from 30%) |
| Component | Amount |
|---|---|
| Excise delta | +7,068 |
| Direct tax delta | +902 |
| Extra revenue | 0 |
| GDP feedback loss | -2,792 |
| Net revenue change | +5,178 |
| R collected | 169,178 |
| μf | 0.66 |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| DWL | 1,041 M HTG |
| DWL (% GDP) | 0.39% |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Φ (capture rate) | 26% |
| R_useful | 125,192 M HTG |
| vs baseline (121,360) | +3,832 (+3.2%) |
| R | E | A | P | α | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.53 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.50 | 0.10 | 0.51 |
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Source | Surin (2026), "Étude d'impact du nouveau Code fiscal haïtien," Section IX |
| Philosophy | Same revenue, less damage (better calibration within existing architecture) |
| Key changes | Phase excises 3 years, exempt mobile money, cap imports, e-invoicing |
| Allocation | Unchanged (100% general fund) |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| τ* (new) | 21.8% |
| Δτ* | +4.5% |
| τ_eff | 17.2% |
| Sector | Impact |
|---|---|
| Agriculture | -0.09% |
| Industrie | -1.23% |
| Services | -0.26% |
| GDP | -0.47% |
| Quintile | Contraction |
|---|---|
| Q1 | -2.41% |
| Q5 | -0.80% |
| Γ | 3.00 |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Δα (net) | -0.91 pts |
| α (new) | 29.1% |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Net revenue | +2,790 M |
| R collected | 166,790 M |
| μf | 0.45 |
| DWL | 165 M (0.06% GDP) |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Φ | 26% |
| R_useful | 123,425 M |
| vs baseline | +2,065 (+1.7%) |
| R | E | A | P | α | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.52 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.50 | 0.30 | 0.55 |
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Source | Bertil (2026), BARSS Code Draft v1 (129 articles) |
| Philosophy | Extraction-proof governance — collect less, capture less, deliver more |
| Key innovations | Progressive TCA (0/10/15%), net wealth tax, dividend reform, 7-channel allocation, Fonds 1804, citizen sections in Kreyol |
| Allocation | 7 channels with thermostat, 5% discretionary |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| τ* (new) | 21.1% |
| Δτ* | +3.8% |
| τ_eff | 14.7% |
| Sector | Impact |
|---|---|
| Agriculture | +3.51% (GROWTH — from TCA relief on food) |
| Industrie | -1.09% |
| Services | -0.11% |
| GDP | +0.05% (near-zero, effectively neutral) |
| Quintile | Contraction |
|---|---|
| Q1 | -1.38% |
| Q2 | -0.33% |
| Q3 | -0.06% |
| Q4 | -0.16% |
| Q5 | -0.46% |
| Γ | 3.00 |
The model Gamma of 3.00 for BARSS is higher than the back-of-envelope estimate of 0.375 because the simplified model doesn't fully capture the progressive TCA's differential impact across quintiles. The food_taxed product at -10% TCA delta helps Q1 significantly (-1.38% vs -6.11% under Their Code), but the remaining excise increases (vehicles, tobacco, gambling) still disproportionately affect Q1 through transport costs. A full disaggregation of TCA by product-quintile would likely show Γ closer to 1.0-1.5. This needs Surin's full model.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Δα (outward) | -0.77 pts |
| Δα (inward / formalization pull) | +4.80 pts |
| Δα (net) | +4.03 pts |
| α (new) | 34.0% |
| Component | Amount (M HTG) |
|---|---|
| Excise delta | -1,816 (rates LOWER than Their Code) |
| Direct tax delta | -466 (IS 25% vs 30%) |
| Wealth tax | +15,000 |
| Property reform | +2,100 |
| E-invoicing | +8,000 |
| Dividend reform | +3,000 |
| GDP feedback | -113 |
| Net revenue | +25,705 |
| R collected | 189,705 |
| μf | 0.01 |
| DWL | 297 M (0.11% GDP) |
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Φ | 5% |
| R_useful | 180,220 M |
| vs baseline | +58,860 (+48.5%) |
| R | E | A | P | α | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.98 | 0.95 | 0.94 | 0.30 | 0.90 | 0.81 |
| Metric | Their Code | Surin | BARSS |
|---|---|---|---|
| τ* (new) | 26.5% | 21.8% | 21.1% |
| Δτ* | +9.2% | +4.5% | +3.8% |
| τ_eff | 17.8% | 17.2% | 14.7% |
| GDP (%) | -1.26 | -0.47 | +0.05 |
| Q1 consumption | -6.11% | -2.41% | -1.38% |
| Q5 consumption | -2.13% | -0.80% | -0.46% |
| Γ (Q1/Q5) | 2.9 | 3.0 | 3.0 |
| Δα (net) | -1.84 | -0.91 | +4.03 |
| α (new) | 28.2% | 29.1% | 34.0% |
| μf | 0.66 | 0.45 | 0.01 |
| DWL (% GDP) | 0.39 | 0.06 | 0.11 |
| R collected (M) | 169,178 | 166,790 | 189,705 |
| Φ | 26% | 26% | 5% |
| R_useful (M) | 125,192 | 123,425 | 180,220 |
| vs baseline | +3.2% | +1.7% | +48.5% |
| REAP Score | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.81 |
| Finding | Confidence | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Direction of all sectoral impacts | High | Leontief matrix validated (Surin Tableau A.1) |
| Migration dynamics (Δα) | High | Matches Surin's published -1.9 pts |
| Q1 hit harder than Q5 | High | Structural from LES parameters |
| μf ordering (Their > Surin > BARSS) | High | Consistent across all model versions |
| R_useful advantage of BARSS | High | Driven by Φ difference (26% vs 5%), not parametric |
| Agriculture grows under BARSS | Medium | From TCA relief on food, plausible but needs validation |
| Gap | Impact | Required fix |
|---|---|---|
| GDP impact magnitude | Model: -1.26%, Surin: -2.2% | We model ~14 instruments, he models ~30. Missing instruments add ~1% contraction. |
| μf calibration | Model: 0.66, Surin: 0.30 | Because our GDP is smaller but revenue similar, ratio differs. With correct GDP, μf ≈ 0.30. |
| Gamma precision | Model: 2.9-3.0, Surin: 3.6 | Need full product-quintile TCA disaggregation. Our aggregation dampens Q1/Q5 differential. |
| Progressive TCA Gamma | Model: 3.0 for BARSS, estimate: 0.375-1.5 | The TCA 0% necessities effect isn't fully captured through the single "food_taxed" product. Need 10+ food products. |
| Wealth tax behavioral response | Assumed 15B revenue | Capital flight elasticity unestimated. Could be 10-20B range. |
| η_in (formalization pull) | Assumed 0.12 | No empirical basis. This is the parameter that doesn't exist in the literature. Survey data could estimate it. |
| Dynamic effects | Static single period | Year 3 and Year 5 projections are extrapolations, not simulations. |
| DWL magnitude | Model: 0.39%, Surin: 0.70% | Fewer instruments = fewer distortion sources in our model. |
| Insight | MIFED sees | EEDTM/REAP adds |
|---|---|---|
| R_useful >> R | R collected (nominal) | Φ correction: 26% captured under current architecture |
| BARSS collects LESS but delivers MORE | Can't see (doesn't model allocation) | R_useful: 180B vs 125B despite lower rates |
| α can GROW | Only models outward migration | Symmetric equation: η_in × barrier_reduction adds formalization pull |
| Who benefits | Not asked | Their Code's selective non-reform: all changes on indirect taxes, none on wealth/dividends |
| τ_eff under BARSS = 14.7% | — | Below pre-reform level (16.7%) because α grew to 34% |
| Insight | EEDTM sees | MIFED adds |
|---|---|---|
| The 8-step transmission chain | Patterns and ratios | Exact magnitudes at each step |
| Sensitivity to elasticities | Not quantitative | S2 borne basse to borne haute range |
| Pass-through by product | General concept (Φ) | Specific rates: beer 62%, food 77%, telecom 56% |
| Leontief multipliers | Not modeled | Agric 1.22, Indust 1.60, Serv 1.40 |
| Revenue feedback loop | Qualitative (Resistance Ratchet) | ηr = 1.35 quantifies the GDP→revenue cascade |
| Question | Who can answer | Method |
|---|---|---|
| What is the BARSS Code's Gamma with full TCA disaggregation? | Surin (his LES + our TCA rates) | Full CGE run |
| What is η_in (formalization pull elasticity)? | Mac (survey Q9) + literature review | Natural experiment analysis |
| What is the wealth tax revenue after capital flight? | Research needed | Capital flight elasticity estimation |
| Does BARSS maintain 5% GDP floor during transition? | Surin (dynamic model if possible) | Multi-period CGE |
| What is Φ empirically? | Budget tracking | MEF CDMT + CSCCA audits |
| Does Γ < 1.0 survive full sensitivity? | Surin + Bertil | Monte Carlo over parameter ranges |
| Metric | Our Model | Surin Published | Match? | Explanation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDP (S2 central) | -1.26% | -2.2% | Directionally correct, magnitude low | We model 14 of ~30 instruments |
| Γ (Q1/Q5) | 2.88 | 3.6 | Close | Need finer product-quintile disaggregation |
| μf | 0.66 | 0.30 | Ratio differs | GDP underestimate inflates μf |
| Δα | -1.84 pts | ~-1.9 pts | Excellent | Migration equation well-calibrated |
| DWL (% GDP) | 0.39% | 0.70% | Low | Fewer instruments = fewer distortions |
| Agro-food contraction | -3.09% (industry) | -4.9% (agro-food) | Directionally correct | Our industry category is broader than his agro-food subset |
The model is directionally valid and captures the correct ORDERING of all three policies. Magnitudes are 40-60% of Surin's full CGE because we model fewer instruments. For RELATIVE comparison across policies, the model is reliable. For ABSOLUTE predictions, Surin's full model is needed.
The R_useful comparison is the MOST robust finding because it's driven by Φ (a structural parameter), not by parametric calibration. Even if all magnitudes were doubled, the conclusion holds: BARSS delivers more useful revenue because 95% reaches its purpose vs 74%.
| # | Name | Formula |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Dual fiscal trap | R = τ × α × PIB |
| 2 | Real fiscal pressure | τ_eff = τ / α |
| 3 | Effective integrated rate | τ* = 1 − Π(1 − τ_j) |
| 4 | Informal migration | Δα = −η × Δτ* |
| 5 | Fiscal multiplier | μf = |ΔPIB| / ΔR_net |
| 6 | Pass-through | PT = εs / (εs + |εd|) |
| 7 | Leontief propagation | ΔX = (I−A)−1 × Δd |
| 8 | Harberger DWL | DWL = ½ × ε × Δτ² × Base |
| 9 | Revenue feedback | ΔR/R = ηr × ΔPIB/PIB |
| 10 | Regressivity | Γ = ΔC_Q1 / ΔC_Q5 |
| # | Name | Formula |
|---|---|---|
| 11 | R_useful composite | R_useful = τ × α × GDP × (1 − Φ) |
| 12 | Symmetric migration | Δα = −η_out × Δτ* + η_in × Δ(B) |
| 13 | Multi-dimensional Gamma | Γ_REAP = Σ w_d × Γ_d |
| 14 | Extended multiplier | μf_useful = |ΔGDP| / [ΔR_net × (1−Φ)] |
| 15 | Selective reform test | Γ_reform = (Δτ on powerless) / (Δτ on powerful) |
| 16 | Double extraction test | DE = 1 if α < α_natural AND Δτ > 0 |