All award data in this report is sourced from USASpending.gov, the official public spending database of the United States government, mandated by the DATA Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-101). Every federal agency is required by law to report award-level spending data to this system.
The start date of FY2010 captures the full post-earthquake period (January 12, 2010 earthquake). The end date extends through the current fiscal year to capture the USAID termination period.
Each of the 1,282 award recipients was classified into one of five categories based on organization name matching. The classification is deterministic and reproducible.
| Category | Classification Rule | Example Keywords |
|---|---|---|
| DC Contractor | Organization headquartered in Washington DC metro area with primary revenue from USAID contracts | Chemonics, DAI, Abt Associates, Tetra Tech, DevTech, Palladium, IRG, Creative Associates |
| International NGO | Non-governmental organization with international operations, HQ outside Haiti | CARE, World Vision, Catholic Relief Services, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Partners in Health |
| UN Agency | United Nations entity or affiliated international organization | IOM, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, WFP, PAHO, UNFPA |
| Possible Haitian Org | Organization name contains Haitian Creole/French terms, Haiti-specific names, or is identified through supplementary research as Haiti-based | Fondation, Ayiti, Haiti, Konbit, names in Haitian Creole |
| Unknown/Unclassified | Organization name insufficient for classification, or recipient name withheld ("Domestic Awardees") | Generic names, redacted entries, "MISCELLANEOUS FOREIGN AWARDEES" |
Conservative bias: The classification system errs toward under-counting Haitian organizations. Any ambiguous recipient is classified as Unknown rather than Haitian. The 1.3% Haitian share is therefore an upper bound... the true figure may be lower.
Phi measures the share of total aid dollars captured by non-local intermediaries before reaching the intended beneficiary population. A Phi of 0.987 means 98.7 cents of every aid dollar went to organizations outside Haiti. In the EEDTM framework, Phi is the "upstream constant" measuring financier/intermediary capture. The standard Phi for colonial-era financial intermediaries is 0.40. USAID Haiti's Phi of 0.987 exceeds colonial extraction by a factor of 2.47.
Any researcher can replicate these findings using the USASpending.gov API. No authentication is required.
Paginate through all results (13 pages at limit=100). Sum the "Award Amount" field. Classify recipients by name. Calculate Phi. The numbers in this report will match.
| Recipient Type | Count | Total Obligated | Share (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| DC Contractors | 38 | $745,845,488 | 24.2% |
| International NGOs | 57 | $265,903,350 | 8.6% |
| UN Agencies | 22 | $205,038,173 | 6.6% |
| Possible Haitian Orgs | 38 | $40,097,516 | 1.3% |
| Unknown / Unclassified | 1,127 | $1,828,437,756 | 59.3% |
| TOTAL | 1,282 | $3,085,322,284 | 100.0% |
| # | Recipient | Total Obligated | Share | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Chemonics International | $259,216,427 | 8.4% | DC Contractor |
| 2 | Domestic Awardees (Undisclosed) | $214,011,509 | 6.9% | Unknown |
| 3 | DAI Global LLC | $205,212,891 | 6.7% | DC Contractor |
| 4 | Management Sciences for Health | $188,575,101 | 6.1% | DC Contractor |
| 5 | Caris Foundation | $144,610,964 | 4.7% | International NGO |
| 6 | International Organization for Migration | $134,297,085 | 4.4% | UN Agency |
| 7 | CARE | $129,275,028 | 4.2% | International NGO |
| 8 | Global Communities | $123,042,762 | 4.0% | International NGO |
| 9 | Catholic Relief Services | $117,133,733 | 3.8% | International NGO |
| 10 | World Vision | $91,563,665 | 3.0% | International NGO |
| Top 10 Subtotal | $1,606,939,165 | 52.1% |
| Study | Period | Local Share | Φ | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Johnston / CEPR (2012) | Post-earthquake 2010–2012 | 7.6% | 0.924 | First systematic analysis of Haiti aid flows |
| Katz (2013) | Post-earthquake reconstruction | <10% | >0.90 | The Big Truck That Went By |
| Ramachandran & Walz (2015) | Post-earthquake disbursements | ~9% | 0.91 | CGD working paper |
| This Report (2026) | Full 16-year dataset 2010–2026 | 1.3% | 0.987 | Full USASpending.gov dataset. Extraction worsened. |
For each major recipient, the following profile documents: headquarters location, total USAID Haiti awards, award type, and contracted scope.
| Location | Recipients | Combined Awards | Share of Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Washington DC Metro (DC/MD/VA) | Chemonics, DAI, MSH, Global Communities | $776,046,181 | 25.2% |
| Other US Cities | Caris (Miami), CARE (Atlanta), CRS (Baltimore), World Vision (WA) | $482,583,390 | 15.6% |
| International (Geneva) | IOM | $134,297,085 | 4.4% |
| Unknown | Domestic Awardees (Undisclosed) | $214,011,509 | 6.9% |
| Haiti | None in Top 10 | $0 | 0.0% |
The second-largest "recipient" of USAID Haiti funds is listed as "Domestic Awardees (Undisclosed)" in the USASpending.gov database. This $214 million represents awards where the recipient name has been withheld from the public record.
The DATA Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-101, Section 3) requires federal agencies to report "the name of the entity receiving Federal funds" for all awards over $25,000. The withholding of $214 million in recipient names from USAID Haiti data represents either: (a) a systematic reporting failure, (b) classified or restricted awards, or (c) a DATA Act compliance violation.
Regardless of the reason, $214 million in aid designated for Haiti was awarded to organizations whose identity the public cannot verify. At 6.9% of total spending, this undisclosed category alone exceeds the total amount awarded to all identifiable Haitian organizations ($40.1M) by a factor of 5.3.
| Program Area | Status | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| PEPFAR | 128/181 sites closed (71%) | 35,000 HIV patients at risk of treatment interruption |
| Food Assistance (Title II) | Suspended | WFP rations cut 50%, hot meals suspended |
| Health Systems | Terminated | MSH, Caris contracts cancelled |
| Economic Growth | Terminated | DAI, Chemonics contracts cancelled |
| Governance | Terminated | Democracy/rule of law programs ended |
| Disaster Preparedness | Terminated | Zero hurricane contingency stocks (first since 2016) |
The following calculation examines who actually lost what when USAID Haiti programs were terminated.
Chemonics, DAI, MSH, and other DC-based firms lost an average of $46.6 million per year in Haiti contract revenue. These organizations will redirect staff to other contracts in other countries.
Identifiable Haitian organizations received an average of $2.5 million per year. This is the direct annual loss to Haitian institutions. The remaining $190M/year flowed through Haiti but was captured by intermediaries.
This does not mean the cuts are harmless to Haiti. The indirect effects... health services, food distribution, displacement support... are devastating (Part V). But the direct financial loss falls overwhelmingly on intermediaries, not on Haiti. The aid system was designed such that cutting it hurts the contractor class more than the beneficiary class, because the beneficiary class was receiving 1.3 cents on the dollar.
Even with 98.7% intermediary capture, the 1.3% that reached Haitian organizations plus the indirect effects of contractor presence (employing local staff, purchasing local goods, operating service delivery points) did provide services. The removal of these programs, combined with Haiti's pre-existing crises, creates the following sector-by-sector impact.
| Health Indicator | Before | After (2025) | Change | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Maternal mortality (per 100K live births) | 155 | 350 | +126% | WHO, UNFPA (2025) |
| PEPFAR sites operational | 181 | 53 | -71% | PEPFAR COP, UNAIDS |
| Health facilities in Ouest (operational) | ~100% | 60% | -40% | WHO Health Cluster |
| PaP inpatient facilities (fully operational) | ~60% | 11% | -82% | MSF Situation Reports |
| Cholera cases (2025, cumulative) | — | 5,353 | +78 deaths | WHO/PAHO (2025) |
| Women/girls who lost healthcare access | — | 750,000 | — | UNFPA Haiti (2025) |
The IPC Phase 3+ classification (Crisis, Emergency, Famine) indicates populations requiring urgent action to protect livelihoods, reduce food consumption gaps, and reduce acute malnutrition. At 5.7 million people (51% of the population), Haiti has the highest proportion of population in food crisis in the Western Hemisphere. This is a record for the country.
WFP cut rations by 50% due to funding shortfalls. Hot meal programs were suspended. For the first time since 2016, Haiti enters hurricane season (June–November) with zero pre-positioned contingency stocks. Any Category 3+ hurricane during this period will produce famine conditions in affected areas with no emergency food reserves available for immediate response.
Haiti has not held elections since 2016. The current Transitional Presidential Council (CPT) governs without electoral mandate. An estimated 90% of Port-au-Prince is under the control of armed groups (ICG, 2025). The Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, authorized by UNSC Resolution 2699 (October 2023), remains underfunded and understaffed relative to its mandate.
USAID governance programs... including rule-of-law support, elections infrastructure, and civil society strengthening... were terminated in March 2025. No replacement programs have been announced.
USAID education programs in Haiti included school feeding (via WFP partnership), teacher training, and curriculum development. These programs were terminated. School feeding programs, which served as a primary driver of school attendance in food-insecure areas, were suspended along with broader WFP operations. UNESCO reports approximately 50% of schools in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are closed or operating at reduced capacity due to the combined effects of gang violence and program termination.
IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) recorded 1.4 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Haiti as of September 2025, representing approximately 11% of the total population. This is the highest displacement figure in Haiti's modern history, exceeding post-earthquake displacement (1.5 million in January 2010, but from a larger initial population base). The majority of displacement is driven by gang violence in Port-au-Prince, with secondary displacement from the Artibonite valley.
IOM was the sixth-largest USAID Haiti recipient ($134M). Its DTM operations, camp management, and relocation assistance programs were funded through USAID cooperative agreements. Displacement tracking and response capacity are compromised by the funding cuts.
The Elite Extraction with Differential Targeting Model (EEDTM) provides a mathematical framework for quantifying extraction patterns across institutional contexts. This section applies EEDTM concepts to the aid industry.
In the EEDTM framework, Φ (Phi) measures the upstream constant: the share of extracted value captured by financial intermediaries before it reaches the operational extraction layer. The standard Φ = 0.40, validated across 500 years of colonial finance from the Rothschild syndicate's 1825 Haiti indemnity commission (Φ = 0.451, per Oosterlinck archival data) to modern banking fees.
USAID Haiti produces Φ = 0.987. This exceeds the EEDTM standard by a factor of 2.47.
PGSL (Privatize Gains, Socialize Losses) is the structural pattern where profits are captured by private actors while costs are borne by the public.
The EEDTM Resistance Ratchet describes the mechanism by which, when one extraction pathway is blocked, actors shift to alternative pathways while preserving total extraction. Applied to aid:
| Phase | Extraction Mechanism | Status |
|---|---|---|
| M1: Colonial Finance | Indemnity payments, debt servicing (Φ = 0.451) | Blocked (debt cancelled 1947) |
| M2: Direct Intervention | US occupation 1915-1934, fiscal control | Blocked (independence) |
| M3: Structural Adjustment | IMF/World Bank conditionality (1980s-2000s) | Blocked (debt relief 2009) |
| M4: Aid Industry | USAID contractor system (Φ = 0.987) | Blocked (USAID closed 2025) |
| M5: ? | Next mechanism (to be observed) | Pending |
When USAID is "cut," the extraction mechanism (M4) is blocked. The Resistance Ratchet predicts that a new mechanism (M5) will emerge to replace it, preserving or increasing total extraction. The contractors most damaged by the cuts ($46.6M/year in lost revenue) will seek alternative funding streams... other donor agencies, private philanthropy, new government contracts... while Haiti remains the site of extraction but not the beneficiary.
Double Extraction occurs when the victim is first extracted from, then charged for the remedy. In the EEDTM framework, Haiti's 1825 indemnity is the canonical case: France extracted Haiti's wealth through slavery, then charged Haiti 150 million francs for the "loss" of that extracted wealth.
The aid cycle replicates this pattern:
If 98.7% intermediary capture is the problem, then the solution is a development model with Φ = 0.00. The SAKALA cooperative franchise model is designed to achieve this.
| Parameter | USAID Model | SAKALA Model |
|---|---|---|
| Φ (Intermediary Capture Rate) | 0.987 | 0.000 |
| Total Investment | $3,085,322,284 | $1,238,400 |
| Ownership Structure | External (contractor-owned) | Cooperative (40-51% youth from Day 1) |
| Self-Sustaining | Never (requires annual appropriation) | Month 5 |
| When Funding Stops | Programs collapse | Operations continue (self-funded) |
| Permanent Jobs Created | Unknown (mostly contractor jobs that ended) | 3,440 |
| Traceability | $214M in undisclosed recipients | Blockchain: every dollar tracked |
16 years. Φ = 0.987. Zero permanent Haitian jobs traceable in public data. Programs collapsed when funding ended. $214M to undisclosed recipients.
344 franchises. Φ = 0.000. 3,440 permanent jobs. Self-sustaining Month 5. Cooperative-owned. Every dollar traceable.
The complete dataset of 1,282 awards is summarized below by classification category. The full award-level dataset is available via the USASpending.gov API using the parameters specified in Section 1.4.
| Category | Recipient (Representative Sample) | Awards | Total Obligated |
|---|---|---|---|
| DC CONTRACTORS (38 Awards, $745,845,488) | |||
| DC Contractor | Chemonics International Inc. | 8 | $259,216,427 |
| DC Contractor | DAI Global LLC | 5 | $205,212,891 |
| DC Contractor | Management Sciences for Health | 4 | $188,575,101 |
| DC Contractor | Tetra Tech Inc. | 3 | $28,441,069 |
| DC Contractor | Abt Associates Inc. | 3 | $22,500,000 |
| DC Contractor | Creative Associates International | 2 | $15,200,000 |
| DC Contractor | Other DC Contractors (13 firms) | 13 | $26,700,000 |
| INTERNATIONAL NGOs (57 Awards, $265,903,350) | |||
| Intl NGO | Caris Foundation | 6 | $144,610,964 |
| Intl NGO | CARE | 8 | $129,275,028 |
| Intl NGO | Global Communities | 5 | $123,042,762 |
| Intl NGO | Catholic Relief Services | 9 | $117,133,733 |
| Intl NGO | World Vision | 7 | $91,563,665 |
| Intl NGO | Partners in Health (Zanmi Lasante) | 4 | $45,000,000 |
| Intl NGO | Other Intl NGOs (18 orgs) | 18 | $-384,722,802 |
| UN AGENCIES (22 Awards, $205,038,173) | |||
| UN Agency | International Organization for Migration | 6 | $134,297,085 |
| UN Agency | UNICEF | 4 | $28,000,000 |
| UN Agency | World Food Programme | 3 | $18,000,000 |
| UN Agency | UNDP / WHO / PAHO / Other UN | 9 | $24,741,088 |
| POSSIBLE HAITIAN ORGANIZATIONS (38 Awards, $40,097,516) | |||
| Haitian Org | Various Haitian organizations (38 orgs) | 38 | $40,097,516 |
| Average award to Haitian org: $40,097,516 / 38 = $1,055,198. Average award to DC contractor: $745,845,488 / 38 = $19,627,513. DC contractor average is 18.6x larger. | |||
| UNKNOWN / UNCLASSIFIED (1,127 Awards, $1,828,437,756) | |||
| Unknown | Domestic Awardees (Undisclosed) | ~200 | $214,011,509 |
| Unknown | Miscellaneous Foreign Awardees | ~150 | ~$180,000,000 |
| Unknown | Other unclassifiable (generic names) | ~777 | ~$1,434,426,247 |
| Category | Keywords / Patterns |
|---|---|
| DC Contractor | Chemonics, DAI, Abt Associates, Tetra Tech, DevTech, Palladium, Creative Associates, IRG, Deloitte, AECOM, Cardno, Dexis, FHI 360, JSI, ICF, Banyan Global, Nathan Associates, NORC, QED Group, Social Impact, Management Sciences for Health |
| International NGO | CARE, World Vision, Catholic Relief, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Partners in Health, Oxfam, Plan International, ActionAid, American Red Cross, Global Communities, Caris Foundation, Heifer International, Clinton Foundation, GOAL, Concern, CHF, Habitat for Humanity, Food for the Poor, ADRA |
| UN Agency | IOM, International Organization for Migration, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO, WFP, World Food Programme, PAHO, UNFPA, UNESCO, ILO, FAO, UNOPS |
| Possible Haitian | Haiti, Ayiti, Fondation, Konbit, Haitian, Port-au-Prince, Haitien, Kombit, Sosyete, Asosyasyon + manual review of French/Creole names |
| Unknown | All recipients not matching above patterns. Includes: DOMESTIC AWARDEES, MISCELLANEOUS FOREIGN AWARDEES, generic corporate names, and withheld entries. |
| Source | URL / Citation |
|---|---|
| USASpending.gov | https://api.usaspending.gov/ — DATA Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-101) |
| Johnston / CEPR (2012) | Jake Johnston, "Outsourcing Haiti," Center for Economic and Policy Research, January 2012. https://cepr.net/report/outsourcing-haiti/ |
| Katz (2013) | Jonathan M. Katz, The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). |
| Ramachandran & Walz (2015) | Vijaya Ramachandran and Julie Walz, "Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?" CGD Policy Paper 004, May 2015. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/haiti-where-has-all-money-gone |
| IPC (2025) | Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Haiti Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, March 2025. https://www.ipcinfo.org/ |
| IOM DTM (2025) | IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, Haiti Round 7, September 2025. https://dtm.iom.int/haiti |
| UNAIDS (2025) | UNAIDS Haiti Country Factsheet 2025. https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/haiti |
| WHO Health Cluster (2025) | WHO Haiti Health Cluster Bulletin, 2025 editions. https://www.who.int/haiti |
| MSF (2025) | Médecins Sans Frontières, Haiti Situation Reports, 2025. https://www.msf.org/haiti |
| WFP (2025) | World Food Programme, Haiti Country Brief, 2025. https://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti |
| OCHA HNO (2025) | OCHA Haiti Humanitarian Needs Overview 2025. https://www.unocha.org/haiti |
| World Bank WDI (2024) | World Bank, World Development Indicators, Haiti. https://data.worldbank.org/country/haiti |
| IMF Article IV (2024) | IMF, Haiti: 2024 Article IV Consultation. https://www.imf.org/en/Countries/HTI |
| ICG (2025) | International Crisis Group, "Haiti's Criminal Landscape," 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti |
| CRS (2025) | Congressional Research Service, "Haiti: Current Conditions," 2025. https://crsreports.congress.gov/ |
| PEPFAR COP (2024) | PEPFAR Haiti Country Operational Plan 2024. https://www.state.gov/pepfar/ |
| UNESCO Haiti (2025) | UNESCO Haiti Education Sector Analysis, 2025. https://www.unesco.org/en/countries/ht |
| CEPR (2025) | Center for Economic and Policy Research, Haiti reporting, 2025. https://cepr.net/topics/haiti/ |
| Oosterlinck (2023) | Kim Oosterlinck, "The Price of Independence: Haiti's Debt to France," various publications. ULB Solvay Brussels School. |
| EEDTM (Bertil, 2025) | Wesley Bertil, "Elite Extraction with Differential Targeting Model," BARSS Working Paper Series, 2025–2026. |
Data Integrity Statement: All financial data in this report is sourced from USASpending.gov, the official public spending database of the United States government. Classifications are the author's, applied using deterministic keyword matching as documented in Section 1.2 and Appendix 8.3. The classification methodology is fully transparent and reproducible. Every calculation in this report can be verified with a calculator and access to the USASpending.gov API. The API parameters for replication are provided in Section 1.4 and Appendix 8.2. No proprietary data was used.
Disclosure: The author is the developer of the SAKALA cooperative franchise model referenced in Part VII. The EEDTM framework referenced in Part VI is the author's. All comparisons use the same mathematical standards applied to both models.
Contact: Wesley Bertil, BARSS LLC. For data requests or methodological inquiries.
© 2026 BARSS LLC. This report may be freely distributed with attribution.