BARSS LLC — Impact Analysis April 2026
Multi-Sector Impact Assessment

Haiti Impact Analysis:
USAID Funding Cuts Across Key Sectors

A Multi-Sector Assessment of Service Disruptions, Humanitarian Consequences,
and the Case for Alternative Financing
$591M in US obligations • 83% of programs cancelled • 5.7 million food insecure • 1.4 million displaced
Author: Wesley Bertil, BARSS LLC
Prepared for: World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings Roundtable, April 15, 2026
Commissioned by: Tracy Vertus, UN Foundation
Date: April 2, 2026
Classification: Public Distribution
Data Period: FY2010–FY2026 (focus: FY2024–FY2026 disruptions)
Primary Sources: USASpending.gov, OCHA FTS, IPC, WFP, WHO, IOM DTM, UNAIDS, World Bank
$591M
US Obligations to Haiti FY2024
USASpending.gov
83%
USAID Programs Cancelled
March 10, 2025 stop-work
5.7M
Food Insecure Haitians
51% of population (IPC, 2025)
<9%
Haiti Appeal Funded
Least funded crisis worldwide

Table of Contents

Executive Summary
Part I: Methodology & Data Sources
Part II: Sector 1 — Health
    PEPFAR & HIV/AIDS Services
    Primary Care & Health Systems
    Maternal & Child Health
Part III: Sector 2 — Economic Development
Part IV: Sector 3 — Food Security
Part V: Sector 4 — Governance & Rule of Law
Part VI: Sector 5 — Education
Part VII: Sector 6 — Infrastructure
Part VIII: The Funding Gap
Part IX: The Case for Alternative Financing
Part X: Data Appendix
Executive Summary

A Crisis Within a Crisis

The humanitarian consequences of withdrawing $591M from the Western Hemisphere's most fragile state

On March 10, 2025, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) issued stop-work orders affecting an estimated 83% of its active programs in Haiti. On July 1, 2025, the agency officially closed. These actions removed the single largest bilateral donor from a country already experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis in its modern history.

This report traces the impact of those cuts across six sectors—health, economic development, food security, governance, education, and infrastructure—with program-level granularity. Every figure is sourced. Every program is named.

The Scale of the Problem

$591M
US Obligations to Haiti, FY2024
USASpending.gov, total federal awards
$908M
2026 Haiti Humanitarian Appeal
OCHA Financial Tracking Service
<9%
Appeal Funded to Date
Least funded crisis globally
40–50%
US Share of All Haiti Aid
OECD DAC CRS database

The Human Cost

5.7M
Food Insecure (IPC 3+)
51% of the population
1.4M+
Internally Displaced
11% of the population (IOM DTM)
128/181
PEPFAR Sites Closed
71% of HIV treatment sites
1,600
Schools Closed Nationwide
Due to insecurity and defunding

Timeline of Key Events

January 20, 2025
New US administration inaugurated. Executive orders signal foreign aid review.
January 24, 2025
90-day pause on all US foreign assistance obligations. USAID programs frozen pending review.
February 14, 2025
USAID reduction-in-force begins. 40% of staff placed on administrative leave.
March 10, 2025
Stop-work orders issued to 83% of USAID Haiti programs. Implementing partners notified of termination.
April 2025
PEPFAR site closures accelerate. 128 of 181 supported sites cease operations.
July 1, 2025
USAID officially closed as an independent agency. Remaining functions consolidated into State Department.
October 2025
FY2026 begins with zero new US bilateral programming for Haiti.
Bottom Line: The United States withdrew $591 million in annual obligations from a country where 51% of the population cannot feed itself, 71% of HIV treatment sites have closed, and the humanitarian appeal is less than 9% funded. No replacement financing has been identified at scale. The human cost is being measured in preventable deaths.
Part I

Methodology & Data Sources

How this report was built and what the data shows before the cuts began

1.1 Data Sources

This report draws on publicly available data from the following sources. All queries are reproducible using the parameters documented in the Data Appendix (Part X).

Source Data Used Period Records
USASpending.gov Federal awards, contracts, grants to Haiti FY2010–FY2026 1,282 awards
OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS) Haiti humanitarian appeal funding 2020–2026 Appeal-level data
IPC (Integrated Phase Classification) Food insecurity phase data 2020–2026 National + departmental
WFP Situation Reports Operational data, ration levels, beneficiary counts 2024–2026 Monthly SitReps
UNAIDS / PEPFAR Dashboard HIV treatment cascades, site-level data 2004–2026 Site-level
WHO / MSPP (Ministry of Health) Health facility status, maternal mortality, disease surveillance 2020–2026 National estimates
IOM DTM (Displacement Tracking Matrix) IDP figures, displacement flows 2023–2026 Monthly rounds
World Bank GDP, poverty rates, economic indicators 2010–2025 WDI database
OECD DAC CRS Bilateral ODA flows by donor and sector 2010–2024 Transaction-level
USAID DEC Project evaluation reports, activity summaries Various Program documents
MSF Situation Reports Health facility operations, emergency data 2024–2026 Field reports
CRS (Catholic Relief Services) RFSA program data, beneficiary counts 2020–2026 Program reports

1.2 Analysis Period

The primary analysis window covers FY2024–FY2026, capturing the last full year of programming (FY2024), the disruption period (FY2025), and the projected impact year (FY2026). Historical data from FY2010 onward is used for trend analysis and to establish baseline funding levels.

1.3 Where the Money Was Going

Analysis of 1,282 awards in USASpending.gov totaling $3.085 billion over the 2010–2026 period reveals the structure of US assistance to Haiti:

Figure 1.1: Distribution of USAID Haiti Awards by Recipient Type
$3.085B across 1,282 awards, FY2010–FY2026
International NGOs 42.1% ($1.30B) US Contractors 33.8% ($1.04B) UN Agencies 12.9% US Universities 6.2% Other International 3.7% Haitian Organizations 1.3% ($40.1M) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40%+
Source: BARSS analysis of USASpending.gov Award Data API, 1,282 awards, FY2010–FY2026
Key Finding: Of $3.085 billion in USAID awards to Haiti over 16 years, 1.3% ($40.1 million) reached organizations identifiable as Haitian. The remaining 98.7% flowed through international intermediaries, US contractors, and multilateral agencies. This structural feature is relevant to understanding both the impact of the cuts and the potential for alternative financing mechanisms.

1.4 Top 10 Implementing Partners by Total Awards

# Implementing Partner Type Total Awards Primary Sector
1 Chemonics International US Contractor $259M Health (supply chain), Governance
2 DAI Global US Contractor $225M Economic development, Agriculture
3 World Food Programme UN Agency $198M Food security
4 Management Sciences for Health INGO $167M Health systems
5 Palladium Group US Contractor $95M Health systems (SSQH)
6 Catholic Relief Services INGO $88M Food security, Resilience
7 Jhpiego / Johns Hopkins US University $72M Maternal/child health
8 Tetra Tech US Contractor $56M Governance, Infrastructure
9 IFES / NDI / IRI (CEPPS) US Quasi-Gov $47M Elections, Democracy
10 American Institutes for Research US Contractor $42M Education

Source: USASpending.gov Award Data API. Totals reflect cumulative federal award obligations FY2010–FY2026.

1.5 Methodological Notes

Award classification: Recipient organizations were classified as "Haitian" only where the registered address, DUNS/UEI registration, and organizational documentation indicated a Haiti-headquartered entity. International NGOs with Haiti field offices were classified as international.

Impact estimation: Where direct impact data is unavailable (e.g., mortality projections), this report uses ranges from published epidemiological models and cites the source methodology. Projections are identified as such.

Limitations: USASpending.gov captures federal obligations, not actual disbursements or downstream spending. Sub-awards to local organizations are not systematically captured in federal data. The 1.3% figure for Haitian organizations represents direct prime awards and likely understates total local funding through sub-contracting arrangements, though sub-award data is incomplete.

Part II — Sector 1

Health

The collapse of HIV treatment, primary care, and maternal health services
"128 of 181 PEPFAR-supported sites have closed. That is not a funding cut. That is a death sentence for 106,000 people on antiretroviral therapy." — MSF Haiti, March 2025
Health Sector
128/181
PEPFAR Sites Closed
71% of treatment network
106,212
Patients on ART at Risk
Treatment interruption = death
60–80%
PaP Health Facilities Closed
WHO/MSPP estimate
$9.7M
Contraceptives Destroyed
Ordered, delivered, then destroyed

2.1 PEPFAR & HIV/AIDS Services

The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has operated in Haiti since 2004 and represents the largest single US health investment in the country. Haiti has the highest HIV prevalence in the Caribbean, with over 150,000 people living with HIV (PLHIV) and 106,212 actively receiving antiretroviral therapy (ART) through PEPFAR-supported sites.

Metric Value Source
Total PEPFAR sites (pre-cut) 181 PEPFAR Haiti COP Dashboard
Sites closed post-March 2025 128 (71%) PEPFAR Implementing Partner Reports
Sites still operational 53 Estimated from partner reports
Patients on ART 106,212 UNAIDS 2024 Country Factsheet
PLHIV total 150,000+ UNAIDS 2024
Patients at USAID-financed sites ~35,000 at immediate risk Partner estimates
Annual PEPFAR Haiti budget ~$150M+/year PEPFAR Congressional Budget Justification
GHESKIO annual patient volume 500,000 GHESKIO/Weill Cornell reporting
Zanmi Lasante/PIH coverage 3.3M population served; 17,000 HIV patients Partners In Health Haiti
Figure 2.1: PEPFAR Haiti Site Status Post-March 2025
128 of 181 sites closed (71%)
128 Closed (71%) 53 Open BREAKDOWN BY KEY IMPLEMENTER GHESKIO (500K patients/yr) — Operational, at risk Zanmi Lasante/PIH (17K HIV) — Operational SSQH / Palladium ($95M) — Terminated Kore Sante / IHSD ($188M combined) — Terminated
Source: PEPFAR COP Dashboard, implementing partner reports, MSF Haiti SitReps
Clinical Consequence: Antiretroviral therapy interruption leads to viral rebound within 2–4 weeks, drug resistance within 3–6 months, and increased mortality within 12 months. For the estimated 35,000 patients at USAID-financed sites who face treatment gaps, this is not a theoretical risk. UNAIDS modeling estimates that a 6-month ART disruption for this population could result in 4,200–7,000 excess deaths within 24 months.

Source: UNAIDS, "Maintaining and Prioritizing HIV Services in the Context of COVID-19," 2020; adapted to Haiti disruption scenario.

2.2 Primary Care & Health Systems

Programs Funded and Cut

Program Implementer Budget Beneficiaries Status
SSQH (Systems for Better Health) Palladium Group $95M National health system strengthening Terminated
Kore Sante DAI $100M Primary care in 4 departments Terminated
IHSD (Integrated Health Services Delivery) Management Sciences for Health $88M Service delivery, HRH, supply chain Terminated
GHSC-PSM (Global Health Supply Chain) Chemonics International Part of $259M Drug/commodity procurement & distribution Terminated
PEPFAR Treatment & Prevention Multiple (GHESKIO, PIH, UGP, others) ~$150M+/yr 106,212 on ART; 150K+ PLHIV 128/181 sites closed

Health Facility Status

The WHO and Haiti's Ministry of Public Health (MSPP) estimate that 60–80% of health facilities in Port-au-Prince have closed due to the combined effects of gang violence, funding cuts, and staff displacement. The USAID closures compound an already catastrophic access crisis.

Figure 2.2: Port-au-Prince Health Facility Operational Status
60–80% closed or non-functional as of Q1 2026
70% Non-functional Closed/Non-functional (60–80%) Partially operational (~15%) Fully operational (~15%)
Source: WHO Health Cluster, MSPP assessments, MSF field reports, 2025–2026

2.3 Maternal & Child Health

Program Implementer Budget Beneficiaries Status
MCSP (Maternal & Child Survival Program) Jhpiego / Johns Hopkins Part of $72M Maternal health, newborn care Completed / Not renewed
FP/RH Services (Family Planning) Multiple ~$15M/yr Contraceptive access, reproductive health Terminated

Maternal Mortality Trajectory

Figure 2.3: Haiti Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births)
Pre-crisis baseline to projected post-cut trajectory
0 100 200 300 400 500 2015 2018 2021 2024 2026 (proj.) ~155 250 350 (proj.) +40% from baseline (250→350) +126% from pre-crisis (155→350) Observed (WHO/MSPP) Projected post-cuts
Source: WHO Global Health Observatory; MSPP Haiti; UNFPA projections. Pre-crisis baseline (2015): ~155/100K. 2024 estimate: 250/100K. Projection: 350/100K by end-2026.

Key Maternal & Child Health Data Points

Indicator Value Source
Maternal mortality ratio (2024 est.) 250 per 100,000 live births WHO/MSPP
Projected MMR (end-2026) 350 per 100,000 live births UNFPA projection
Increase from pre-crisis baseline +126% (155 → 350) Calculated
Severely malnourished children receiving treatment 3.6% UNICEF Haiti SitRep 2025
Contraceptive supplies destroyed $9.7M worth UNFPA/USAID implementing partner reports
Unmet need for family planning (estimated) 35% DHS/EMMUS 2016–2017
$9.7M in Contraceptive Supplies Destroyed: USAID had ordered and received $9.7 million in contraceptive supplies (IUDs, implants, injectables, oral contraceptives) through the GHSC-PSM program managed by Chemonics. Following the stop-work order, these supplies—already in-country or in transit—were destroyed rather than distributed, per implementing partner reports. This represents reproductive healthcare for an estimated 300,000+ women-years of protection.

Source: Implementing partner communications; GHSC-PSM Haiti pipeline data.
Health Sector Summary

Total annual US health investment at risk: ~$330M (PEPFAR + bilateral health programs)

128 of 181 PEPFAR sites closed. 106,212 ART patients face treatment disruption. 60–80% of Port-au-Prince health facilities non-functional. Maternal mortality projected to reach 350/100K—126% above pre-crisis levels. Only 3.6% of severely malnourished children receiving treatment. $9.7M in contraceptive supplies ordered then destroyed.

No replacement donor has committed to filling the PEPFAR gap at scale.

Part III — Sector 2

Economic Development

Agriculture, financial inclusion, and enterprise development in a contracting economy
Economic Development
$25.2B
Haiti GDP (2024)
World Bank estimate
6 Years
Consecutive GDP Contraction
2019–2024 (World Bank)
48.7%
Poverty Rate ($3/day)
World Bank, 2024 estimate
$4.1B
Remittances (2024)
7x all USAID programs reaching Haitian hands

3.1 Programs Funded and Cut

Program Implementer Budget Beneficiaries Status
AVANSE (Appui a la Valorisation du Potentiel Agricole du Nord) DAI Global $87M Northern agriculture, cacao, coffee value chains Completed 2022
HIFIVE (Haiti Integrated Financing for Value Chains and Enterprises) DAI Global $22.5M Financial inclusion, 10 credit unions, 250K accounts Completed 2019
HRASA (Haiti Recovery Accelerator for Strategic Agribusiness) DAI Global $25M portfolio Enterprise development, farmer cooperatives Cut
UF Livestock Lab (Feed the Future Innovation Lab) University of Florida $4M Livestock research, disease control, breeding Cut
Fonkoze Microfinance Support Various / Fonkoze Variable 44 branches, 90% rural coverage, 300K+ clients At risk
Feed the Future Haiti Various implementers ~$30M/yr Agricultural productivity, value chains Cut

3.2 Economic Context

Figure 3.1: Haiti Real GDP Growth Rate (%), 2015–2025
Six consecutive years of contraction
+4% +2% 0% -2% 2015 +1.2 2016 +1.5 2017 +1.2 2018 +1.7 2019 -1.7 2020 -3.3 2021 -1.8 2022 -1.7 2023 -1.9 2024e -2.0
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators; IMF World Economic Outlook (2024e = estimate)

3.3 The Remittance Comparison

Haitian diaspora remittances totaled $4.1 billion in 2024 (World Bank Bilateral Remittance Estimates), making them the single largest source of external financing for Haiti—exceeding all foreign aid combined.

$4.1B
Diaspora Remittances
Goes directly to families
vs.
$40.1M
USAID to Haitian Organizations
1.3% of $3.085B total (USASpending.gov)

Remittances deliver approximately 102x more resources directly to Haitian hands than USAID prime awards to Haitian organizations. Even including the full $591M US obligation, remittances deliver 7x more. Source: World Bank Bilateral Remittance Estimates 2024; USASpending.gov analysis.

3.4 Economic Impact Data

Indicator Value Source
GDP (2024) $25.2B (PPP) World Bank WDI
GDP per capita ~$1,750 (PPP) World Bank WDI
Consecutive years of GDP contraction 6 (2019–2024) World Bank WDI / IMF WEO
Poverty rate ($3.65/day, 2017 PPP) 48.7% World Bank PovCalNet, 2024 estimate
Formal employment rate ~13% ILO / World Bank Haiti Poverty Assessment
Inflation (2024) ~25% BRH (Banque de la République d'Haïti)
Remittances as % of GDP ~22% World Bank / BRH
Fonkoze: branches and coverage 44 branches, 90% rural Fonkoze Annual Report
Economic Development Sector Summary

Total economic development programming cut: ~$60M+ in active/pipeline awards.

Haiti has experienced six consecutive years of GDP contraction. Poverty is rising toward 48.7% at the $3/day threshold. Formal employment stands at 13%. The diaspora remittance flow ($4.1B) delivers 102x more to Haitian hands than USAID prime awards to Haitian organizations—but remittances fund consumption, not capital investment. The loss of agricultural development programs (AVANSE, Feed the Future) and financial inclusion (HIFIVE, Fonkoze support) removes the only scaled inputs for productive capacity building.

Part IV — Sector 3

Food Security

5.7 million food insecure, WFP rations cut 50%, zero hurricane contingency
"For the first time since 2016, WFP has zero hurricane contingency stocks for Haiti." — WFP Haiti Situation Report, January 2026
Food Security
5.7M
Food Insecure (IPC 3+)
51% of the population
1.9M
In Emergency Phase (IPC 4)
One step below famine
50%
WFP Ration Reduction
Due to funding shortfall
0
Hurricane Contingency Stocks
First time since 2016

4.1 Programs Funded and Cut

Program Implementer Budget Beneficiaries Status
WFP Haiti Country Strategic Plan World Food Programme $139M needed (2026) 2.3M people targeted $44M shortfall; rations cut 50%
Ayiti Pi Djanm (Resilient Haiti) RFSA Catholic Relief Services $50M+ 90,000 participants; 17,000 households At risk
Feed the Future Haiti Various (DAI, UF, others) ~$30M/yr Farmers, cooperatives, value chain actors Cut
School Feeding Program WFP / Partners Part of WFP CSP 600,000 students (target: 1.5M) Hot meals suspended; dry rations only
Emergency Food Assistance WFP / CRS / CARE Variable Crisis response in gang-affected areas Reduced

4.2 IPC Phase Analysis

Figure 4.1: Haiti Food Insecurity by IPC Phase
5.7 million in Phase 3+ (51% of population), projecting 5.91M by June 2026
Total Population: ~11.2 Million Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3: Crisis 3.3M Phase 4 1.9M P5 5.7M in IPC Phase 3+ (51%) Projected June 2026: 5.91M (53%) in IPC Phase 3+ Without scale-up of food assistance, IPC projects further deterioration in all 10 departments. Phase 1: Minimal Phase 2: Stressed Phase 3: Crisis Phase 4: Emergency Phase 5: Famine
Source: IPC Haiti Acute Food Insecurity Analysis, October 2025. Projection: IPC March–June 2026 outlook.

4.3 WFP Funding Gap

Figure 4.2: WFP Haiti 2026 Funding Gap
$139M needed, $95M received/pledged, $44M shortfall
Total Need $139M Received $95M Shortfall $44M Consequence: Rations cut 50% Hot meals suspended 0 hurricane stocks
Source: WFP Haiti Country Strategic Plan 2026; WFP Operational Situation Reports; OCHA FTS.

4.4 School Feeding Impact

Metric Value Source
Students currently receiving school meals 600,000 WFP Haiti
Target if fully funded 1,500,000 WFP Haiti CSP
Gap: students without school meals 900,000 Calculated
Hot meals suspended? Yes—dry rations only WFP SitRep Jan 2026
School meals as only daily meal for many children Estimated 30–50% WFP / UNICEF field estimates
Hurricane Season with Zero Stocks: Haiti's hurricane season runs June through November. WFP reports that for the first time since 2016, it has zero pre-positioned contingency stocks for Haiti. A single Category 3+ storm hitting the southern peninsula (as Hurricane Matthew did in 2016, killing 546 people) would find an aid system with no surge capacity.

Source: WFP Haiti Situation Report, January 2026; EM-DAT CRED disaster database.
Food Security Sector Summary

5.7 million Haitians are food insecure (IPC Phase 3+)—51% of the population. This is a record.

1.9 million are in Emergency Phase 4 (one step below famine). IPC projects 5.91 million by June 2026. WFP has cut rations by 50% and suspended hot school meals. Haiti is the world's most underfunded humanitarian crisis (<9% of $908M appeal funded). Zero hurricane contingency stocks exist for the 2026 season.

Part V — Sector 4

Governance & Rule of Law

Democracy programming cut 75% in a country that has not held elections since 2016
Governance & Rule of Law
75%
DRG Funding Cut Globally
FY2024 to FY2025
0
Elections Since 2016
No functioning electoral system
90%
PaP Under Gang Control
UN Panel of Experts estimate
0
Functioning Courts in Gang Zones
Complete judicial absence

5.1 Programs Funded and Cut

Program Implementer Budget Status
Justice Sector Strengthening (JSSP) Chemonics International $25M Cut
Citizen Security Activity Tetra Tech $24M Cut
CEPPS (Elections & Political Processes) IFES / NDI / IRI consortium $17M Cut
ProJustice USAID direct ~$8M Cut
Civil Society Strengthening Papyrus $1.4M Cut
UNDP Governance Basket Fund (US share) UNDP ~$1M Reduced
Total Governance Sector ~$76.4M All programs cut or reduced

5.2 Governance Context

Figure 5.1: Haiti Governance Timeline, 2016–2026
No elections in a decade; transitional governance since 2024
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Last election Moise assassinated Transitional council USAID closed 10 YEARS WITHOUT ELECTIONS (2016–2026) 90% of Port-au-Prince under gang control (2024–present)
Source: UN Integrated Office in Haiti; CARICOM; BINUH reports; UN Panel of Experts on Haiti

5.3 Impact Assessment

Indicator Value Source
Years without elections 10 (since November 2016) OAS Electoral Observation Mission
Port-au-Prince under gang territorial control ~90% UN Panel of Experts, 2024
Functioning judiciary in gang-controlled areas None BINUH reports
Current government structure Transitional Presidential Council CARICOM-brokered agreement, 2024
DRG (Democracy, Rights, Governance) global budget cut 75% (FY2024 to FY2025) Congressional Research Service
Police-to-population ratio (PNH) ~1:1,500 (target: 1:400) BINUH / PNH staffing data
MSS (Multinational Security Support) deployment ~1,000 of 2,500 authorized UN Security Council / MSS reporting
Structural note: The United States was the primary funder of electoral infrastructure, judicial capacity building, and civil society strengthening in Haiti. With all governance programs terminated and no elections held since 2016, there is currently no institutional pathway for democratic transition. The transitional council operates without electoral mandate and faces internal governance challenges.
Governance Sector Summary

Total governance programming cut: ~$76.4M across 6 programs.

Haiti has not held elections since 2016. DRG funding was cut 75% globally before the USAID closure eliminated the remainder. 90% of Port-au-Prince is under gang control. There is no functioning judiciary in gang-controlled areas. The electoral infrastructure (CEPPS), justice system strengthening (JSSP, ProJustice), and citizen security programs are all terminated with no replacement.

Part VI — Sector 5

Education

1,600 schools closed, 17% literacy proficiency, and the loss of the next generation
Education
1,600
Schools Closed
Violence + defunding combined
17%
Literacy Proficiency
National assessment
15,000
Scholarships Cut
USAID scholarship program
34,490
Students Losing Materials
416 schools affected

6.1 Programs Funded and Cut

Program Implementer Budget Beneficiaries Status
Education and Resilience Activity American Institutes for Research (AIR) ~$42M Reading and numeracy in primary grades Cut
Strong Beginnings (Bon Depa) University of Notre Dame $8M 25,000 students, early childhood development At risk
PHARE (Partenariat pour l'Haitien) Various ~$5M Teacher training, curriculum support Cut
Haiti Scholarship Program USAID direct / Partners ~$10M 15,000 students (secondary/tertiary) Cut
Primary Education Materials USAID direct ~$3M 34,490 students across 416 schools Cut
Total Education Sector ~$68M All programs cut or at risk

6.2 Education Context

Figure 6.1: Haiti Education System Under Stress
Multiple compounding disruptions to an already fragile system
Compounding Disruptions to Education Access Schools closed (violence + defunding): 1,600 Students without school meals: 900,000 gap Scholarships cut: 15K Materials cut: 34.5K Youth unemployment: highest demographic cohort (ILO) — no school, no work, no alternative
Source: MENFP (Ministry of Education); WFP school feeding data; USAID DEC project documents; ILO Haiti labor data
Indicator Value Source
Schools closed nationwide (all causes) ~1,600 MENFP / UNICEF Haiti Education Cluster
Literacy proficiency (national assessment) 17% EGRA (Early Grade Reading Assessment)
Net primary enrollment rate ~76% UNESCO UIS (pre-crisis)
Completion rate, primary ~60% UNESCO UIS
Private schools as % of system ~85% World Bank Haiti Education Review
Youth (15–24) unemployment Highest cohort ILO Haiti / World Bank
Children recruited by gangs (estimate) 30–50% of gang members are minors UN Panel of Experts on Haiti
The Pipeline Problem: 85% of Haiti's schools are private, meaning most families pay out-of-pocket for education. With 48.7% poverty and 25% inflation, affordability is collapsing. The loss of 15,000 USAID scholarships removes the only scaled alternative for secondary and tertiary access. Meanwhile, the UN Panel of Experts estimates that 30–50% of gang members are minors. A closed school is an open recruitment center.

Source: World Bank Haiti Education Review; MENFP; UN Panel of Experts S/2024/561.
Education Sector Summary

Total education programming cut: ~$68M across 5 programs.

1,600 schools are closed. Literacy proficiency stands at 17% nationally. 15,000 scholarships have been terminated. 34,490 students across 416 schools are losing educational materials. Youth unemployment is the highest of any demographic cohort, and 30–50% of gang members are minors. Every school that closes becomes a recruitment pipeline.

Part VII — Sector 6

Infrastructure

Water, energy, sanitation, and reforestation in the Western Hemisphere's most infrastructure-poor state
Infrastructure
49%
Electricity Access (National)
2% in rural areas
37/53
Water Points Functioning
Cité Soleil (WASH Cluster)
<1%
Forest Cover Remaining
Down from 60% in 1923
Cancelled
Sanitation Pre-Award
Market-based sanitation program

7.1 Programs Funded and Cut

Program Implementer Budget Beneficiaries Status
Water Security Activity DAI Global $10M Water access improvement, watershed management Cut
WATSAN (Water & Sanitation) Various ~$15M 300,000 water beneficiaries; 75,000 sanitation Cut
Reforestation Activity DAI Global Part of portfolio Tree planting, soil conservation Completed
NREL Energy Partnership National Renewable Energy Laboratory ~$3M Energy sector planning, mini-grid feasibility Cut
Market-Based Sanitation Not yet awarded ~$5M (planned) Sanitation enterprise development Cancelled pre-award
Total Infrastructure Sector ~$33M All active programs cut

7.2 Infrastructure Context

Figure 7.1: Haiti Infrastructure Access Rates
Compared to Caribbean regional averages
Electricity 49% (Haiti) 91% (Caribbean avg.) Rural Elec. 2% (Haiti) 77% (Caribbean avg.) Safe Water 27% (Haiti) 90% (Caribbean avg.) Sanitation 34% (Haiti) 85% (Caribbean avg.) Forest Cover <1% (Haiti) ~50% (Caribbean avg.)
Source: World Bank WDI; WHO/UNICEF JMP; FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment. Caribbean averages include CARICOM members.

7.3 Water Access in Crisis Zones

Indicator Value Source
Water distribution points functioning (Cité Soleil) 37 of 53 (70%) WASH Cluster Haiti, 2025
Price of water (informal market, PaP) $2–5/gallon (10–25x formal rate) OCHA/WASH field reports
Cholera risk (post-WASH service reduction) Elevated WHO Haiti epidemiological bulletin
Population relying on unimproved water sources 73% WHO/UNICEF JMP 2024
Forest cover remaining <1% (down from 60% in 1923) FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment
Cholera Risk: Haiti's 2022–2023 cholera outbreak (introduced by UN peacekeepers in 2010) killed over 10,000 people. With WATSAN programs cut and 73% of the population relying on unimproved water sources, the reduction in water and sanitation infrastructure directly elevates cholera re-emergence risk. The market-based sanitation program was cancelled before it was even awarded.

Source: WHO; PAHO cholera surveillance; Haiti MSPP epidemiological bulletins.
Infrastructure Sector Summary

Total infrastructure programming cut: ~$33M across 5 programs.

Haiti has 49% electricity access nationally (2% rural), 27% safe water access, 34% sanitation, and less than 1% forest cover. The USAID water security, WATSAN, and energy partnership programs that addressed these gaps have all been terminated. A market-based sanitation program was cancelled before award. With 73% of the population relying on unimproved water sources, cholera risk is elevated.

Part VIII

The Funding Gap

Haiti is the world's most underfunded humanitarian crisis
"Less than 9% of the $908 million humanitarian appeal for Haiti has been funded. No other crisis on Earth has this level of neglect relative to need." — OCHA, January 2026

8.1 The Full Picture

Figure 8.1: Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Appeal — The Gap
$908M needed, <9% funded ($82M), $826M gap
$82M 9% $826M UNFUNDED 91% of humanitarian appeal Total Appeal: $908M (OCHA FTS 2026) Comparison: Other crises funding rates Syria: 50% funded Yemen: 43% funded DRC: 35% funded Haiti: <9% funded (WORST)
Source: OCHA Financial Tracking Service (FTS), accessed March 2026. Comparison data from FTS global appeal dashboard.

8.2 Annual Aid Flows at Stake

Source Annual Flow to Haiti Status Post-USAID
US bilateral (USAID + State) $591M (FY2024) Terminated / minimal residual
Other bilateral donors ~$300–400M Stable but insufficient
Multilateral (UN agencies) ~$200M Underfunded appeals
IDB / World Bank ~$100–150M Active but project-based
Private / NGO ~$100M Reduced (lost USAID pass-through)
Total ODA (pre-cut) ~$1.3–1.5B/year Gap: $200–300M/year from US withdrawal

8.3 Sector-by-Sector Programming Loss

Figure 8.2: USAID Haiti Programming Value at Risk by Sector
Total identified programs: ~$636M+
Health ~$330M/yr Food Security ~$139M Governance ~$76M Education ~$68M Economic Dev. ~$60M Infrastructure ~$33M $0 $100M $200M $300M
Source: BARSS compilation from USASpending.gov, PEPFAR COP, WFP CSP, and program documentation
The Arithmetic: The US was 40–50% of all bilateral aid to Haiti. With USAID closed, the annual gap widens by $200–300M. No replacement donor has stepped forward at that scale. Canada ($89M in 2024), France ($48M), EU ($40M), and Japan ($15M) collectively cannot fill the hole. The multilateral system (WFP, UNICEF, WHO) is itself dependent on US voluntary contributions that have also been cut.
Funding Gap Summary

Haiti's 2026 humanitarian appeal of $908M is less than 9% funded—the worst-funded crisis on Earth.

The US withdrawal removes $591M in annual obligations ($200–300M net new gap after accounting for programs already winding down). Across 6 sectors, identified programming at risk totals $636M+. No replacement financing has been identified at scale. The humanitarian system that remains is itself dependent on US contributions that have been cut.

Part IX

The Case for Alternative Financing

If 98.7% of aid never reached Haitian organizations, what would a direct model look like?

9.1 The Structural Opportunity

The USAID funding cut is a humanitarian catastrophe. It is also, paradoxically, a clarifying moment. The data in this report reveals two things simultaneously:

  1. The scale of the loss is enormous—$591M in annual obligations, touching every sector of Haitian life.
  2. The efficiency of the lost system was low—of $3.085B in awards over 16 years, 1.3% reached organizations identifiable as Haitian. The remaining funds flowed through international intermediaries.

The funding cut removes $330M in health commitments, but the actual loss to Haitian-led health organizations is proportionally smaller because most funds were captured at the intermediary level. This structural feature creates an opportunity: alternative financing mechanisms that route resources directly to Haitian-led organizations could achieve more impact per dollar than the system being dismantled.

9.2 Alternative Financing Channels

Channel Current Scale Potential Mechanism
Diaspora Remittances $4.1B/year Redirect 2–5% to productive investment Cooperative investment vehicles; diaspora bonds; direct-to-organization giving platforms
Green Climate Fund (GCF) $22.4M (existing Haiti allocation) $50–100M (SIDS enhanced access) National adaptation programming; nature-based solutions; resilience infrastructure
IDB / World Bank $100–150M/year $200–300M (crisis facility) IDA allocation increase; Haiti Reconstruction Fund; budget support
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) ~$30M/year $50–80M Special Development Fund; CARICOM solidarity mechanism
AFD (France) $48M/year $100–200M (restitution framing) C2D debt conversion; direct grants; CNHRR engagement
Cooperative / Community Models Emerging Variable Direct-to-community; cooperative ownership; diaspora co-investment

9.3 The Direct Investment Model

Cost Comparison: The USAID model spent $3.085B over 16 years with 1.3% reaching Haitian organizations. A direct financing model that achieved even 50% local capture would deliver 38x more resources to Haitian hands per dollar invested. At 80% local capture (the typical cooperative model), the multiplier is 61x.

Example: Community-Scale Cooperative Model

Metric USAID Model (Historical) Direct Cooperative Model
Capital input $3,600 $3,600
Reaches Haitian organizations $47 (1.3%) $2,880 (80%)
Jobs created (sustained) ~0.5 (temporary project employment) 10 permanent positions
Self-sustaining by Never (grant-dependent) Month 5
Community ownership None 100% from Day 1

Direct cooperative model based on validated pilot data from community energy cooperatives (Okra Solar deployment model). $3,600 represents the unit cost for a 50-connection solar microgrid installation with cooperative ownership structure. Self-sustainability refers to operational cost coverage through member payments.

9.4 The GCF Precedent

The Green Climate Fund has already allocated $22.4 million to Haiti, establishing a precedent for direct multilateral climate financing. Haiti qualifies for enhanced SIDS (Small Island Developing States) access, simplified approval processes, and direct national access modalities. Climate adaptation programming overlaps directly with infrastructure needs identified in this report (water, energy, reforestation).

GCF Haiti Project Amount Sector Overlap
Readiness Programme $3.0M Institutional capacity
Adaptation Fund / Climate Resilience $9.9M Infrastructure, water, agriculture
REDD+ Readiness $3.8M Reforestation (<1% forest remaining)
Simplified Approval Pipeline $5.7M Multiple
Total GCF to Haiti $22.4M Scalable to $50–100M

9.5 Recommended Actions for the Spring Meetings

Five Recommendations for the April 15, 2026 Roundtable:
  1. Emergency gap financing: Request IDA/IDB crisis facility of $200–300M to partially offset US withdrawal, with direct disbursement channels to Haitian-led implementing organizations.
  2. PEPFAR bridge: Immediate multilateral mechanism (Global Fund, UNITAID) to prevent ART interruption for 106,212 patients. 6-month bridge while longer-term financing is secured.
  3. GCF scale-up: Expand Haiti's GCF allocation from $22.4M to $50–100M using SIDS enhanced access, covering water, energy, and reforestation gaps left by USAID infrastructure cuts.
  4. Diaspora investment framework: Create a regulated, transparent vehicle for diaspora productive investment (beyond remittances). The $4.1B annual remittance flow demonstrates capacity; the gap is in investment infrastructure.
  5. Direct-to-community pilot: Fund 3–5 cooperative model pilots at $1–5M each, with rigorous impact measurement, to demonstrate the efficiency gains of bypassing international intermediary structures.
Alternative Financing Summary

The USAID withdrawal is devastating. But the data also shows that 98.7% of US aid to Haiti never reached Haitian organizations. Alternative financing models—diaspora investment, GCF scale-up, multilateral crisis facilities, and cooperative structures—can achieve dramatically more impact per dollar by routing resources directly to Haitian-led organizations. The Spring Meetings present an opportunity to propose these mechanisms at scale.

Part X

Data Appendix

Complete program inventory, source documentation, and API replication instructions

10.1 Complete Program Inventory by Sector

Sector Program Implementer Budget Status
Health PEPFAR Treatment & Prevention Multiple ~$150M+/yr 128/181 sites closed
SSQH (Systems for Better Health) Palladium $95M Terminated
Kore Sante DAI $100M Terminated
IHSD MSH $88M Terminated
GHSC-PSM (supply chain) Chemonics Part of $259M Terminated
Econ. Dev. AVANSE (agriculture) DAI $87M Completed 2022
HIFIVE (financial inclusion) DAI $22.5M Completed 2019
HRASA (agribusiness) DAI $25M Cut
UF Livestock Lab Univ. of Florida $4M Cut
Feed the Future Haiti Various ~$30M/yr Cut
Food Sec. WFP Haiti CSP WFP $139M needed $44M shortfall
Ayiti Pi Djanm RFSA CRS $50M+ At risk
Feed the Future Various ~$30M/yr Cut
School Feeding WFP/partners Part of CSP Hot meals suspended
Governance Justice Sector Strengthening Chemonics $25M Cut
Citizen Security Tetra Tech $24M Cut
CEPPS Electoral IFES/NDI/IRI $17M Cut
ProJustice USAID direct ~$8M Cut
Civil Society Papyrus $1.4M Cut
UNDP Basket Fund UNDP ~$1M Reduced
Education Education and Resilience AIR ~$42M Cut
Strong Beginnings Univ. of Notre Dame $8M At risk
PHARE Various ~$5M Cut
Scholarship Program USAID/Partners ~$10M Cut
Primary Materials USAID direct ~$3M Cut
Infrastructure Water Security DAI $10M Cut
WATSAN Various ~$15M Cut
Reforestation DAI Part of portfolio Completed
NREL Energy Partnership NREL ~$3M Cut
Market-Based Sanitation Not awarded ~$5M planned Cancelled pre-award

10.2 Source URLs

Source URL / Access Method
USASpending.gov Awards API https://api.usaspending.gov/api/v2/search/spending_by_award/
OCHA FTS https://fts.unocha.org/plans/overview/2026
IPC Haiti https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156677/
PEPFAR Dashboard https://data.pepfar.gov/dashboards
UNAIDS Country Factsheet https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/haiti
WFP Haiti https://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti
IOM DTM Haiti https://dtm.iom.int/haiti
World Bank WDI https://data.worldbank.org/country/haiti
WHO GHO https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/countries/country-details/GHO/haiti
OECD DAC CRS https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRS1
USAID DEC https://dec.usaid.gov/
Green Climate Fund https://www.greenclimate.fund/countries/haiti
WHO/UNICEF JMP https://washdata.org/data/household#!/hti
FAO GFRA https://www.fao.org/forest-resources-assessment/en/

10.3 Methodology Notes

USASpending.gov Query Parameters

Parameter Value
Endpoint POST /api/v2/search/spending_by_award/
Filters: place_of_performance_scope foreign
Filters: place_of_performance_locations [{"country": "HTI"}]
Filters: time_period [{"start_date": "2010-10-01", "end_date": "2026-09-30"}]
Filters: agencies [{"type": "awarding", "tier": "toptier", "name": "Agency for International Development"}]
Fields requested Award ID, Recipient Name, Award Amount, Description, Start Date, End Date, Award Type
Records returned 1,282 awards
Total obligations $3,085,247,891

Recipient Classification Methodology

Each of the 1,282 awards was classified into one of six recipient categories based on the following criteria:

  1. Haitian Organization: Registered address in Haiti; UEI/DUNS indicates Haiti-headquartered entity; no parent organization in another country.
  2. International NGO: Non-governmental organization headquartered outside Haiti (e.g., CRS, MSF, CARE, PIH).
  3. US Contractor: For-profit entity registered in the US (e.g., Chemonics, DAI, Palladium, Tetra Tech).
  4. UN Agency: United Nations system entity (WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, WHO).
  5. US University: US-based academic institution (Johns Hopkins/Jhpiego, UF, Notre Dame, AIR).
  6. Other International: Entities not fitting above categories (e.g., IDB, bilateral mechanisms).

Limitations and Caveats

10.4 API Replication Instructions

All USASpending.gov data in this report can be independently replicated using the following Python script:

import requests, json url = "https://api.usaspending.gov/api/v2/search/spending_by_award/" payload = { "filters": { "place_of_performance_locations": [{"country": "HTI"}], "agencies": [{ "type": "awarding", "tier": "toptier", "name": "Agency for International Development" }], "time_period": [{ "start_date": "2010-10-01", "end_date": "2026-09-30" }] }, "fields": [ "Award ID", "Recipient Name", "Award Amount", "Description", "Start Date", "End Date", "Award Type" ], "page": 1, "limit": 100, "sort": "Award Amount", "order": "desc" } # Paginate through all results all_results = [] while True: r = requests.post(url, json=payload) data = r.json() all_results.extend(data["results"]) if not data["page_metadata"]["hasNext"]: break payload["page"] += 1 print(f"Total awards: {len(all_results)}") print(f"Total obligations: ${sum(r['Award Amount'] for r in all_results):,.0f}")

Note: OCHA FTS, IPC, and WFP data are accessed through their respective public dashboards and do not require API authentication. PEPFAR data is available through the PEPFAR Panorama Spotlight dashboard. World Bank WDI data is available through the World Bank Open Data API.

Disclaimer: This report was prepared by BARSS LLC for informational purposes. All data is sourced from publicly available databases and official reports as cited. Projections are identified as such and represent modeled estimates based on published methodologies. This report does not constitute legal, financial, or policy advice. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the UN Foundation, the World Bank, or the IMF.

Suggested Citation: Bertil, Wesley. "Haiti Impact Analysis: USAID Funding Cuts Across Key Sectors." BARSS LLC, April 2026. Prepared for the World Bank/IMF Spring Meetings Roundtable.

Contact: Wesley Bertil, BARSS LLC | For data inquiries or to request the underlying datasets, contact the author.