BARSS Research • Haiti Maritime Intelligence
Scorched Sea: Haiti's Maritime Domain Blindness
126,760 km² of ocean. $0.30 per km² in revenue. 64,008 hours of ghost ship activity. A coast guard with 8 boats for 1,535 km. 47 charts. 408 sourced facts. One night.
Wesley Bertil • BARSS LLC — Forensic Economics
Dr. Mac Archer • Field Research, Port-au-Prince
March 2026 • BARSS-2026-HTI-MARITIME
Part I
Executive Summary
What the OAS conference couldn't answer in two days
On March 17-18, 2026, the OAS convened a Maritime Security Conference in Panama City. 15 countries. Two days. Their opening question: "What is the current state of maritime and port security in Haiti?" Nobody in the room could answer it.
Their port security assessment for Port-au-Prince was 1,865 characters long. Its recommendation was to conduct the actual assessment.
This report is that assessment.
The headline numbers: Haiti generates $0.30 per km² from its Exclusive Economic Zone. Jamaica generates $741. The Bahamas: $1,832. The gap is 6,107x. Seven opacity-flagged states logged 64,008 hours of vessel time in Haiti's EEZ... including Bolivia, a landlocked country, with 10,488 hours. The IHO told Haiti in 2008 that $79,000 in equipment would let them begin mapping their own waters. Nobody wrote the check. Eighteen years later, still no check.
Key Findings
- Haiti's EEZ (126,760 km²) is the smallest per capita in the Caribbean at 0.011 km²/person
- Haiti earns ~$0.30/km² vs Jamaica's $741/km² and Bahamas' $1,832/km²
- Haiti has NO systematic foreign fishing license regime despite foreign vessels operating in its waters
- Four of six maritime boundaries remain unresolved (Jamaica, DR, Bahamas/TCI, Navassa/US)
- $79,000 in hydrographic equipment recommended in 2008 was never funded
- Haiti still has not deposited its IHO membership accession letter (annual fee: EUR 8,000)
- 64,008 hours of opacity-flagged vessel activity in Haiti's EEZ from 7 flag-of-convenience states
- A Tanzania-flagged vessel produced the largest cocaine seizure in Central American history ($165M) one month before our data snapshot... the same flag logged 3,527 hours in Haiti's EEZ
- $850M-$1B in institutional funds sit undisbursed across World Bank, IDB, and UNDP Haiti projects
- The charts Haiti navigates by are from the colonial era (French pre-1804 and US occupation 1915-1934 surveys)
Part II
Haiti's Exclusive Economic Zone
Comprehensive maritime analysis with Caribbean peer comparison
Purpose: Formal economic analysis of Haiti's maritime domain compared to Caribbean peers and global benchmarks. Data precision level suitable for EEDTM integration and Brattle report generation.
Created: 2026-03-20
Sources: VLIZ/Flanders Marine Institute (Marine Regions), CIA World Factbook, FAO WECAFC, UNCTAD, IMF, World Bank, Sea Around Us, UN DOALOS
PART I: HAITI'S MARITIME ZONES
1. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
| Metric | Value | Source |
| EEZ Total Area | 126,760 km2 (48,940 sq mi) | VLIZ Marine Regions (MRGID 8408) |
| EEZ Extent | 200 nautical miles (370.4 km) from baseline | Haiti Declaration 1977; UNCLOS Art. 57 |
| EEZ Declared | 1977 (Declaration by Haitian Government) | UN DOALOS HTI file |
2. Territorial Sea (12 NM)
| Metric | Value | Source |
| Territorial Sea Breadth | 12 nautical miles (22.2 km) | Haiti Constitution; UNCLOS Art. 3 |
| Territorial Sea Area | ~9,800-10,500 km2 (estimated) | Derived from coastline geometry |
| Marine Regions MRGID | 49128 | marineregions.org |
3. Contiguous Zone (24 NM)
| Metric | Value | Source |
| Contiguous Zone Breadth | 24 nautical miles (44.4 km) | UNCLOS Art. 33 |
| Contiguous Zone Area | ~19,000-21,000 km2 (estimated) | Derived; area between 12-24 NM |
4. Continental Shelf
| Metric | Value | Source |
| Continental Shelf Claim | To 200 NM or natural prolongation | UNCLOS Art. 76 |
| Extended Shelf Claim (CLCS) | NO SUBMISSION FILED | UN CLCS submissions register |
| CLCS Deadline | July 31, 2006 (10 years from accession) | UNCLOS + 1996 accession date |
| Status | Deadline MISSED; preliminary information also not filed | UN DOALOS |
NOTE: Haiti missed its 10-year CLCS deadline. Some states that missed the deadline filed preliminary information to preserve rights. Haiti did not file even that. This is a forfeited maritime asset.
5. Coastline
| Metric | Value | Source |
| Coastline Length | 1,771 km (1,100 mi) | CIA World Factbook |
| Ranking (Greater Antilles) | 2nd longest (after Cuba) | CIA World Factbook |
| Coastline Character | Deeply indented; two major peninsulas (Tiburon, Nord-Ouest) | Geography |
6. Key Ratios
| Metric | Value | Calculation |
| Land Area | 27,750 km2 | CIA World Factbook |
| EEZ-to-Land Ratio | 4.57:1 | 126,760 / 27,750 |
| Population | ~11.7 million (2024 est.) | World Bank |
| EEZ per Capita | 0.0108 km2/person (10,800 m2) | 126,760 / 11,700,000 |
| Coastline per 1000 pop | 0.151 km | 1,771 / 11,700 |
PART II: UNCLOS & LEGAL STATUS
UNCLOS Ratification
| Metric | Value |
| UNCLOS Signed | December 10, 1982 (Montego Bay) |
| UNCLOS Accession | July 31, 1996 |
| Entry into Force (for Haiti) | August 30, 1996 |
| Party Status | FULL PARTY |
Maritime Boundary Agreements
| Agreement | Date Signed | Entry into Force | Type |
| Cuba-Haiti | October 27, 1977 (Havana) | January 6, 1978 | Equidistant line through Windward Passage |
| Colombia-Haiti | February 17, 1978 | December 16, 1999 | Single geodesic line ~65 NM |
| Haiti-Jamaica | NOT CONCLUDED | N/A | Blocked by Navassa Island dispute |
| Haiti-Bahamas/TCI | NOT CONCLUDED | N/A | No known negotiations |
| Haiti-Dominican Republic | NOT CONCLUDED | N/A | Land border disputed; maritime boundary unresolved |
EEZ Boundary Neighbors
| Neighbor | Direction | Status |
| Cuba | North (Windward Passage) | AGREED (1977) |
| Jamaica | Southwest | UNRESOLVED (Navassa Island) |
| Colombia | Southwest (distant) | AGREED (1978, in force 1999) |
| Bahamas | North/Northwest | UNRESOLVED |
| Turks & Caicos (UK) | Northeast | UNRESOLVED |
| Dominican Republic | East (Hispaniola) | UNRESOLVED |
| United States (Navassa) | West | DISPUTED |
The Navassa Island Problem
Navassa Island (La Navase) sits ~55 km west of Haiti's Tiburon Peninsula. The sovereignty dispute between Haiti and the United States has cascading effects:
- US Claim: Guano Islands Act (1856); administered by US Fish & Wildlife Service
- Haiti Claim: Treaty of Ryswick (1697); Haitian Constitution claims Navassa
- Impact: Prevents delimitation of Haiti-Jamaica maritime boundary; reduces Haiti's effective EEZ to the west
- EEZ Implication: If Navassa were recognized as Haitian, Haiti's EEZ could expand by an estimated 10,000-15,000 km2 to the west/southwest
- Strategic Note: Navassa generates an overlapping claim zone (Marine Regions MRGID 48951) involving US, Haiti, and Jamaica
PART III: COMPARATIVE EEZ DATA
A. Caribbean Nations
| Country | EEZ (km2) | Land Area (km2) | Coastline (km) | Population | EEZ:Land Ratio | EEZ/Capita (km2) |
| Bahamas | 654,715 | 13,878 | 3,542 | 412,000 | 47.2:1 | 1.589 |
| Cuba | 350,751 | 109,884 | 3,735 | 11,200,000 | 3.2:1 | 0.031 |
| Jamaica | 263,284 | 10,991 | 1,022 | 2,820,000 | 24.0:1 | 0.093 |
| Barbados | 186,898 | 430 | 97 | 288,000 | 434.6:1 | 0.649 |
| Haiti | 126,760 | 27,750 | 1,771 | 11,700,000 | 4.6:1 | 0.011 |
| Trinidad & Tobago | 77,502 | 5,131 | 362 | 1,530,000 | 15.1:1 | 0.051 |
| Guyana | 137,765 | 214,969 | 459 | 808,000 | 0.6:1 | 0.170 |
| Suriname | 127,772 | 163,820 | 386 | 618,000 | 0.8:1 | 0.207 |
| Dominican Republic | 263,598 | 48,671 | 1,288 | 11,230,000 | 5.4:1 | 0.023 |
| Belize | 35,295 | 22,966 | 386 | 441,000 | 1.5:1 | 0.080 |
| Antigua & Barbuda | 107,338 | 442 | 153 | 100,000 | 242.8:1 | 1.073 |
| St. Kitts & Nevis | 10,204 | 261 | 135 | 48,000 | 39.1:1 | 0.213 |
| Grenada | 26,060 | 344 | 121 | 125,000 | 75.8:1 | 0.208 |
| St. Vincent & Grenadines | 36,301 | 389 | 84 | 101,000 | 93.3:1 | 0.359 |
| Dominica | 28,824 | 751 | 148 | 73,000 | 38.4:1 | 0.395 |
| St. Lucia | 15,166 | 616 | 158 | 184,000 | 24.6:1 | 0.082 |
B. Regional Comparators (Latin America)
| Country | EEZ (km2) | Land Area (km2) | Coastline (km) | Population | EEZ:Land Ratio | EEZ/Capita (km2) |
| Mexico | 3,269,386 | 1,964,375 | 9,330 | 130,000,000 | 1.7:1 | 0.025 |
| Colombia | 928,660 | 1,141,748 | 3,208 | 52,000,000 | 0.8:1 | 0.018 |
| Venezuela | 471,507 | 912,050 | 2,800 | 28,400,000 | 0.5:1 | 0.017 |
| Panama | 330,470 | 75,420 | 2,490 | 4,400,000 | 4.4:1 | 0.075 |
| Liberia | 246,108 | 111,369 | 579 | 5,400,000 | 2.2:1 | 0.046 |
C. Pacific Island States (Large EEZ Benchmark)
| Country | EEZ (km2) | Land Area (km2) | Population | EEZ:Land Ratio | EEZ/Capita (km2) |
| Kiribati | 3,441,810 | 811 | 131,000 | 4,243:1 | 26.3 |
| Micronesia (FSM) | 2,996,419 | 702 | 114,000 | 4,269:1 | 26.3 |
| Marshall Islands | 1,990,530 | 181 | 42,000 | 10,997:1 | 47.4 |
| Palau | 603,978 | 459 | 18,000 | 1,316:1 | 33.6 |
| Tuvalu | 749,790 | 26 | 12,000 | 28,838:1 | 62.5 |
PART IV: HAITI'S EEZ IN CONTEXT
Haiti's Maritime Disadvantage
Among Hispaniola neighbors and Greater Antilles:
| Metric | Haiti | DR | Jamaica | Cuba | Bahamas |
| EEZ (km2) | 126,760 | 263,598 | 263,284 | 350,751 | 654,715 |
| Population | 11.7M | 11.2M | 2.8M | 11.2M | 0.4M |
| EEZ/Capita | 0.011 | 0.024 | 0.093 | 0.031 | 1.589 |
| Rank (EEZ/capita) | LAST | 4th | 2nd | 3rd | 1st |
Haiti has the smallest EEZ per capita of any Caribbean nation and one of the smallest in the world among island states. Despite sharing Hispaniola with the Dominican Republic, Haiti's EEZ is roughly HALF the DR's (126,760 vs 263,598 km2), largely because:
- The DR has coastline on both the Atlantic and Caribbean, while Haiti's northern coast faces the Windward Passage (shared with Cuba)
- The Navassa Island dispute shrinks Haiti's western EEZ claim
- Unresolved boundaries with Jamaica, Bahamas, TCI, and DR compress Haiti's effective zone
- Haiti's two peninsulas create a deep bight (Golfe de la Gonave) that is largely internal waters, not EEZ
The EEZ Compression Effect
Haiti's 126,760 km2 EEZ is constrained on ALL sides:
- North: Cuba (Windward Passage, equidistant line agreed 1977)
- West: United States (Navassa dispute)
- Southwest: Jamaica (unresolved, blocked by Navassa)
- South/Southwest: Colombia (agreed 1978, distant)
- East: Dominican Republic (no maritime boundary)
- Northeast: Turks & Caicos/Bahamas (no agreement)
This means Haiti's theoretical 200 NM zone is compressed to an effective radius much smaller than 200 NM in most directions.
PART V: MARITIME REVENUE COMPARISON
What Haiti Earns from Its EEZ
| Revenue Source | Haiti Annual Revenue | Status |
| Foreign fishing licenses | Near zero / unknown | No systematic licensing regime for foreign vessels |
| EEZ transit fees | $0 | Haiti charges no transit fees |
| Seabed mining royalties | $0 | No exploration or extraction |
| Marine biotechnology | $0 | No program |
| Fisheries production value | ~$30-50M (estimated) | Almost entirely artisanal, domestic consumption |
| Total estimated maritime revenue | ~$30-50M | |
| Revenue per km2 of EEZ | ~$0.24-0.39/km2 | |
Haiti Fisheries Profile
| Metric | Value | Source |
| Annual marine catch | ~5,000 tonnes (official); ~20,000-30,000 tonnes (estimated incl. unreported) | FAO, UNCTAD |
| Fisheries employment | 115,000 direct; 416,000 livelihoods | UNCTAD |
| Artisanal share | >82% of total production | UNCTAD |
| Fleet | ~30,000 small boats, mostly unpowered | FAO |
| Processing infrastructure | Near zero | UNCTAD |
| Monitoring/enforcement | Near zero; no coast guard capacity | Multiple |
| Fishing sector % of GDP | <1% | World Bank |
| Agriculture+forestry+fishing % GDP | ~20% (2023: $2.19B total ag sector) | World Bank |
What Caribbean Peers Earn
Jamaica
| Metric | Value | Source |
| EEZ Area | 263,284 km2 | VLIZ |
| Annual fisheries production | 14,583 tonnes (2023) | Jamaica NFA |
| Fisheries value | US$195.3M (2023) | Jamaica NFA |
| Fisheries % GDP | 1.04% (2023) | Jamaica NFA |
| Blue economy % GDP | 7% (potential to double) | CaPRI 2024 |
| Revenue per km2 EEZ | ~$741/km2 (fisheries only) | Derived |
Bahamas
| Metric | Value | Source |
| EEZ Area | 654,715 km2 | VLIZ |
| Fishing industry value-added | US$1.2B GDP contribution | Multiple |
| Fishing industry employment | 26,917 jobs | Economic impact study |
| Fishing total sales | US$2.2B | Economic impact study |
| Fishing % GDP (broad measure) | ~20% (incl. recreational, full value chain) | Economic impact study |
| Key species | Spiny lobster, Queen Conch, Nassau Grouper | FAO |
| Revenue per km2 EEZ | ~$1,832/km2 (fisheries value-added) | Derived |
Barbados
| Metric | Value | Source |
| EEZ Area | 186,898 km2 (432x land area) | VLIZ |
| Fishing employment | ~6,600 | UNCTAD |
| Tuna fishery value | BDS$6.6-10M (~US$3.3-5M) | UN/FAO |
| Blue bonds | Active (TNC partnership) | TNC |
| Revenue per km2 EEZ | ~$18-27/km2 (tuna only; other species additional) | Derived |
Kiribati (Gold Standard for EEZ Revenue)
| Metric | Value | Source |
| EEZ Area | 3,441,810 km2 | VLIZ |
| Fishing license revenue (2015 peak) | US$207.1M (91% of GDP) | IMF/Kiribati MoF |
| Fishing license revenue (2020) | ~US$150-170M (~70% of govt revenue) | IMF |
| Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) | Implemented 2012; revolutionary pricing mechanism | PNA |
| Revenue growth | $29.1M (2011) to $207.1M (2015) = 711% increase in 4 years | Kiribati MoF |
| Revenue per km2 EEZ | ~$44-60/km2 | Derived |
Revenue Per km2 Comparison
| Country | EEZ (km2) | Est. Maritime Revenue | Rev/km2 EEZ | Haiti Multiple |
| Haiti | 126,760 | ~$30-50M | ~$0.30/km2 | 1.0x |
| Barbados | 186,898 | ~$5-15M | ~$27-80/km2 | ~90-267x |
| Kiribati | 3,441,810 | ~$150-207M | ~$44-60/km2 | ~147-200x |
| Jamaica | 263,284 | ~$195M | ~$741/km2 | ~2,470x |
| Bahamas | 654,715 | ~$1,200M (value-added) | ~$1,832/km2 | ~6,107x |
Haiti generates roughly $0.30 per km2 of EEZ. Jamaica generates $741. The Bahamas generates $1,832. Haiti's maritime capture rate is approximately 0.02-0.04% of what comparable Caribbean nations achieve.
PART VI: THEORETICAL REVENUE POTENTIAL
Scenario Analysis: If Haiti's EEZ Were Managed Like Peers
| Scenario | Benchmark | Revenue/km2 | Haiti Potential Revenue | Current Revenue | Gap |
| Kiribati model (fishing licenses only) | $50/km2 | $50 | $6.3M | ~$0.3M | $6.0M |
| Barbados model (mixed fisheries) | $80/km2 | $80 | $10.1M | ~$0.3M | $9.8M |
| Jamaica model (developed fisheries) | $741/km2 | $741 | $93.9M | ~$30-50M | $44-64M |
| Bahamas model (full blue economy) | $1,832/km2 | $1,832 | $232.2M | ~$30-50M | $182-202M |
Conservative Estimate: Fishing Licenses Alone
If Haiti simply issued fishing licenses to foreign vessels at rates comparable to Pacific Island states:
- Kiribati VDS rate: ~$8,000-12,000 per vessel-day
- Haiti EEZ tuna potential: Caribbean tuna fisheries are smaller than Pacific, but ICCAT data shows significant yellowfin and bigeye tuna transit through Haiti's EEZ
- Conservative licensing revenue: 50-100 vessel-days/year at $5,000/day = $250K-$500K from licensing alone
- Current licensing revenue: Effectively $0
Medium-Term Blue Economy Potential
| Revenue Stream | 5-Year Potential | Notes |
| Foreign fishing licenses | $2-5M/year | Requires monitoring capability |
| Domestic fisheries modernization | $100-200M/year | UNCTAD roadmap exists |
| Marine tourism (EEZ-based) | $10-30M/year | Whale watching, sport fishing, diving |
| Seabed mineral exploration fees | $1-5M/year | Requires geological survey |
| Carbon credits (blue carbon) | $5-15M/year | Mangrove/seagrass restoration |
| Shipping lane transit fees | $0 (politically infeasible) | Would require UNCLOS amendment |
| Total potential | $118-255M/year | vs current ~$30-50M |
PART VII: EEDTM INTEGRATION
Haiti's Maritime Extraction Theta
The maritime domain represents another vector of extraction from Haiti:
Current State:
- Haiti's EEZ generates ~$0.30/km2 in revenue
- Caribbean average (Jamaica/Bahamas weighted) is ~$1,000+/km2
- Haiti captures approximately 0.03% of the value its Caribbean peers extract from equivalent maritime space
IUU Fishing as Extraction:
- Foreign vessels (primarily from neighboring countries) fish Haiti's EEZ without licenses
- IUU fishing globally captures 20-50% of total catch in poorly governed waters
- Estimated IUU catch in Haiti's EEZ: 5,000-15,000 tonnes/year
- Value of IUU extraction: $10-50M/year taken from Haiti's waters without compensation
The Maritime Theta:
If we model total EEZ value (fish + minerals + services) and compare what Haiti captures vs what is extracted:
- Total value in Haiti's EEZ (caught/extracted): ~$50-100M/year (including IUU)
- Haiti's government capture: ~$0-2M/year (no licensing, no enforcement)
- Maritime Theta: ~0.96-0.98 (Haiti captures 2-4% of its own maritime value; 96-98% is extracted by foreign actors or simply forfeited)
The Navassa Extraction
The US claim on Navassa Island is itself an act of maritime extraction:
- Navassa generates a potential 10,000-15,000 km2 of EEZ for its controller
- At Caribbean average revenue rates, this is worth $10-15M/year
- The US has controlled this since 1857 under the Guano Islands Act (a colonial-era resource extraction statute)
- Haiti has claimed Navassa since independence (1804) and through its Constitution
Continental Shelf: A Forfeited Asset
Haiti's failure to file a CLCS submission by the 2006 deadline means it has potentially forfeited extended continental shelf rights. While the legal effect of missing the deadline is debated, Haiti's failure to even file preliminary information suggests either:
- No institutional capacity to conduct the required geological survey
- No awareness of the deadline
- No political will to assert maritime claims
This is consistent with the broader EEDTM pattern: extraction-weakened states lose the institutional capacity to assert their own rights, creating a self-reinforcing cycle.
PART VIII: KEY FINDINGS & STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
10 Key Findings
- Haiti's EEZ (126,760 km2) is the smallest per capita in the Caribbean at 0.011 km2/person
- Haiti earns ~$0.30/km2 from its EEZ vs Jamaica's $741/km2 and Bahamas' $1,832/km2
- Haiti has NO systematic foreign fishing license regime despite foreign vessels operating in its waters
- Four of Haiti's six maritime boundaries remain unresolved (Jamaica, DR, Bahamas, TCI)
- The Navassa Island dispute with the US costs Haiti 10,000-15,000 km2 of EEZ
- Haiti missed its CLCS extended continental shelf deadline (2006) and filed no preliminary information
- IUU fishing extracts an estimated $10-50M/year from Haiti's EEZ without compensation
- Haiti acceded to UNCLOS in 1996 but has not built the institutional capacity to exercise its maritime rights
- Maritime Theta ~0.96-0.98: Haiti captures only 2-4% of the value in its own EEZ
- If managed like Jamaica, Haiti's EEZ could generate ~$94M/year vs current ~$30-50M (mostly artisanal, domestic)
Strategic Implications for BARSS
- New Extraction Vector: Haiti's maritime domain is a previously unquantified extraction vector in the EEDTM framework
- Navassa as Active US Extraction: The US Guano Islands Act claim on Navassa is a live, ongoing extraction that could be quantified and litigated
- CNHRR Application: Haiti's maritime rights (EEZ, continental shelf, Navassa) should be part of any comprehensive restitution claim
- Comparison with Liberia: Liberia's EEZ (246,108 km2) is nearly double Haiti's, but LISCR controls Liberia's ship registry (world's 2nd largest). Haiti has no comparable maritime revenue capture mechanism
- Phoenix Zone / SAKALA Integration: Any sustainable development plan for Haiti must include maritime domain management as a revenue source
SOURCES
Primary Data Sources
- [Marine Regions - Haiti EEZ (MRGID 8408)](https://www.marineregions.org/gazetteer.php?p=details&id=8408)
- [Marine Regions - Haiti Territorial Sea (MRGID 49128)](http://marineregions.org/mrgid/49128)
- [UN DOALOS - Haiti State File](https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/HTI.htm)
- [UN CLCS Submissions Register](https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm)
- [CIA World Factbook - Haiti](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/haiti/)
- [Haiti Maritime Claims (Index Mundi)](https://www.indexmundi.com/haiti/maritime_claims.html)
Fisheries & Revenue Sources
- [UNCTAD - Unlocking Haiti's Fisheries Potential](https://unctad.org/news/unlocking-potential-haitis-fisheries-and-aquaculture-sectors)
- [Jamaica Fisheries Quarterly Statistics Report](https://www.fisheries.gov.jm/)
- [Jamaica Information Service - Fisheries GDP](https://jis.gov.jm/fisheries-sector-contributes-over-30-billion-to-gdp/)
- [Kiribati Fishing License Revenue Report 2018-2022](https://mfed.gov.ki/node/87)
- [FAO WECAFC - Land vs Sea](https://www.fao.org/wecafc/data/landversussea/en/)
- [ICES Journal - Blue Economy Review, Caribbean](https://academic.oup.com/icesjms/article/80/8/2233/6988643)
- [Barbados Blue Economy](https://bluconomy.com/)
Maritime Boundary Sources
- [Cuba-Haiti Maritime Boundary Agreement (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuba%E2%80%93Haiti_Maritime_Boundary_Agreement)
- [Colombia-Haiti Maritime Boundary (Sovereign Limits)](https://sovereignlimits.com/boundaries/colombia-haiti-maritime)
- [Navassa Island (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navassa_Island)
- [Haiti's Claim over Navassa Island (WMU)](https://commons.wmu.se/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1473&context=all_dissertations)
- [Marine Regions - Navassa Overlapping Claim (MRGID 48951)](https://www.marineregions.org/gazetteer.php?p=details&id=48951)
UNCLOS Sources
- [List of UNCLOS Parties (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea)
- [Haiti 1977 EEZ Declaration (UN)](https://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/HTI_1977_Declaration.pdf)
Comparative Data
- [Geography of Haiti (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Haiti)
- [Geography of Jamaica (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_Jamaica)
- [Geography of Bahamas (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geography_of_the_Bahamas)
- [Exclusive Economic Zone (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exclusive_economic_zone)
- [EEZ vs Land Area (ssz.fr)](https://ssz.fr/eez/)
- [WorldAtlas - Largest EEZs](https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/countries-with-the-largest-exclusive-economic-zones.html)
- [Caribbean Maritime Boundary Delimitations (Durham/IBRU)](https://www.durham.ac.uk/media/durham-university/research-/research-centres/ibru-centre-for-borders-research/maps-and-databases/publications-database/Maritime-Briefings-(Vol.-2-no.-5).pdf)
Haiti EEZ Maritime Comprehensive Analysis | Created: 2026-03-20
For BARSS Case Integration: This document supports Case #XX (Haiti Maritime Extraction)
Part III
Opacity Flags
64,008 hours of ghost ship activity in Haiti's EEZ
Purpose: Document the opacity flag states whose vessels concentrate in Haiti's EEZ at non-commercial locations, building the statistical case for illicit activity.
Date: 2026-03-20
Status: Research compilation
Executive Summary
Seven flag states in our Haiti EEZ vessel tracking data are confirmed ITF Flags of Convenience, Paris MOU black/grey-listed, or both. All seven share characteristics that make them attractive to operators seeking to avoid detection: minimal due diligence, no genuine link requirements, poor inspection regimes, and in several cases, administration by private companies in third countries with no connection to the flag state. The concentration of these flags at Ile de la Gonave... an island with no commercial port, only a basic ferry wharf, and documented as a human trafficking hub... constitutes strong statistical evidence of illicit maritime activity.
1. BOLIVIA (10,488 hours in Haiti EEZ)
The Absurdity: A Landlocked Flag State
Bolivia lost its coastline to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884). It maintains maritime registration rights under the 1921 Barcelona Declaration recognising the Right to a Flag of States having no Sea-coast.
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | Registro Internacional Boliviano de Buques (RIBB) |
| Administrator | Government (Defense Ministry technical organization) |
| Established | 1975 |
| Registry Type | Open registry |
| ITF FOC Status | YES - Listed as Flag of Convenience |
| Paris MOU Status | Not on Paris MOU list (too few inspections to rate), but US Coast Guard: HIGH RISK |
| Fleet Size | ~42 vessels (27 general cargo, 1 oil tanker, 14 other) |
| Registration Cost | ~$3,195-$3,555 (incorporation), plus annual flag taxes |
| Recognized Organizations | DromonClass (Greek classification society), Sing-Lloyd |
Why Bolivia's Flag Is a Red Flag
- No coastline = no inspections. Bolivia cannot physically inspect vessels flying its flag. It has no ports, no coast guard presence, no maritime infrastructure. Flag state obligations under SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW are effectively unenforceable.
- Minimal fleet, minimal oversight. With ~42 registered vessels globally, the registry generates negligible revenue and has no institutional capacity for compliance monitoring.
- Recognized by obscure classification societies. DromonClass (Greece) and Sing-Lloyd are not among the major IACS classification societies. These are the societies that attract registries other societies won't touch.
- The "last resort" flag question. Bolivia's registry attracts vessels that need a flag but may not qualify with more regulated registries. A Bolivia-flagged vessel spending 10,488 hours in Haiti's EEZ raises the immediate question: what legitimate commercial purpose brings a Bolivia-registered ship to waters off a country with which Bolivia has no significant trade relationship?
Known Incidents
No specific Bolivia-flagged vessel incidents documented in Caribbean enforcement databases. This is itself significant... it suggests either (a) the vessels go unintercepted, or (b) the flag is used for activities that don't trigger standard maritime interdiction (e.g., fishing, anchoring/loitering rather than port calls).
2. TOGO (12,062 hours in Haiti EEZ, concentrated at Ile de la Gonave)
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | Togo Maritime Registry |
| Administrator | PRIVATIZED - International Registration Bureau (IRB), offices in Lebanon and Greece |
| Established | 2008 (current privatized form) |
| Registry Type | Open registry (privatized) |
| ITF FOC Status | YES |
| Paris MOU Status | BLACK LIST (Medium Risk category, 2025-2026 list) |
| Tokyo MOU | Listed negatively |
| Fleet Size | ~250 vessels |
| US Coast Guard | Targeted flag |
Why Togo Is Among the Worst Flags in the World
- Privatized registry run from Lebanon and Greece. The International Registration Bureau (IRB), founded 2008, operates as the exclusive registrar for Togo's flag from offices in Beirut and Athens. Togo's own government has limited direct control.
- US State Department intervention. There have been direct meetings between IRB, the Togo government, and the US Department of State "over the registry's failings, with several ships discovered trafficking drugs."
- "Embarrassing" violations. Lloyd's List reported "Togo turmoil over flag registry status after 'embarrassing' violations."
- Provisional certificate abuse. Togo issues provisional certificates of registry with minimal due diligence. Vessels obtain provisional registration, operate under Togo's flag, then "hop" to another flag before the provisional period expires... a technique specifically designed to avoid accountability.
- End-of-life flag. Togo is "excessively popular for end-of-life vessels broken in beaching facilities"... vessels at the end of their operational life that no legitimate registry will touch.
- Numerous vessel losses. Multiple deaths of ships flying the flag of Togo due to storms, reflecting the poor condition of vessels attracted to this flag.
KEY INCIDENT: Norma H II (Togo-flagged, $27M cash seizure in Caribbean)
Date: September 5, 2020
Location: Pier 10, San Juan, Puerto Rico
Vessel: M/V Norma H II (IMO 7228716, built 1974)
Flag: Togo (MMSI 671932000, callsign 5VFB9)
Seizure: $27 million in US currency found in 34 unmanifested cargo boxes
Destination: St. Thomas, USVI
Agencies: CBP, DEA, HSI, US Attorney PR
A CBP K-9 detected currency in un-manifested pallets. Officers discovered vacuum-sealed packages of US currency in moving boxes. This was described as a "historic" seizure. The vessel was a Togo-flagged freighter operating Caribbean cargo routes... exactly the profile of vessels in our Haiti EEZ data.
Additional Incident: MV Raider
French naval forces intercepted the MV Raider with drugs on board. The vessel held a "Provisional Certificate of Registry" from the Togo Maritime Authority dated November 19, 2025... demonstrating the provisional certificate abuse pathway.
3. VANUATU (13,344 hours in Haiti EEZ)
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | Vanuatu International Shipping Registry (VISR) |
| Administrator | Government + private (New York office under investigation) |
| Established | 1981 |
| Registry Type | Open registry |
| ITF FOC Status | YES |
| Paris MOU Status | BLACK LIST (Medium to High Risk, 2025-2026) |
| US Coast Guard | HIGH RISK / Targeted Flag List |
| Commission of Inquiry | Active investigation into registry operations |
Why Vanuatu Is a Critical Opacity Flag
- Government Commission of Inquiry into its own registry. Vanuatu's Minister of Justice appointed a Commission of Inquiry (2023) to investigate "allegations of misconduct and irregularities, particularly in its New York office." The Commission (chaired by Markmon Batie, 6 members) is examining the vessel registration process, compliance with international maritime laws, financial management, and oversight mechanisms.
- Fraudulent registry impersonation. Unknown international operators established an "unauthorized and fraudulent website" copying the official registry's branding. Vanuatu became the third Pacific country in one month to report false flag operations... indicating systematic exploitation of Pacific island registries.
- Dark fleet participation. Vanuatu is "among registries that flagged vessels in the dark fleet" and is described as "a rare exception" among registries willing to flag Western-sanctioned ships. Tankers newly reflagged to Vanuatu demonstrate that "not all sanctions are equal."
- Self-described tax haven. Vanuatu's own Maritime Safety Commission acknowledged that shipping companies "really like Vanuatu" because it has become a "tax haven."
- US enforcement response. Placement on the US Coast Guard Targeted Flag List means ALL Vanuatu-flagged vessels receive additional inspections... making Vanuatu vessels costly for legitimate operators, which further concentrates the flag among non-legitimate operators.
4. COMOROS (84 hours in Haiti EEZ)
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | Union of Comoros Maritime Administration |
| Administrator | PRIVATIZED - Intershipping Services LLC (UAE/Dubai) + offices in Ukraine, India, Bulgaria, Greece |
| ITF FOC Status | YES |
| Paris MOU Status | BLACK LIST (High Risk... the ONLY flag in this category) |
| US Coast Guard | HIGH RISK |
| EU Sanctions | OPERATOR SANCTIONED (Intershipping Services LLC, EU 18th package) |
| Dark Fleet Role | 38% of sanctioned dark fleet tonnage (>20,000 dwt) |
Why Comoros Is the Gold Standard of Opacity
- EU-sanctioned registry operator. Intershipping Services LLC, the company that operates both the Comoros and Gabon registries, was directly sanctioned by the EU and UK... the first time any sanctioning body targeted a company behind a flag registry. The company is headquartered in a Dubai condominium tower and operates through family relationships and subsidiary offices in Mumbai.
- 38% of the dark fleet. Comoros flagged 38% of all sanctioned dark fleet tonnage over 20,000 dwt that was not falsely flagged. This is the single largest share of any flag state.
- 62+ false-flagged tankers. Comoros identified 62 tankers, 3 LPG carriers, and 1 tug as falsely flying its flag. All but one were sanctioned by the US, EU, or UK and engaged in Russian, Iranian, or Venezuelan trades.
- Crew abandonment. One of the three most commonly-encountered flags in crew-abandonment cases (ITF data).
- The ONLY "High Risk" flag on Paris MOU. While other flags are "Medium Risk" or "Very High Risk" on the black list, Comoros occupies its own unique category.
Even at only 84 hours in Haiti's EEZ, a Comoros-flagged vessel is an extreme outlier. There is no legitimate commercial reason for a vessel registered under the most opaque flag in the world... a flag whose own operator has been sanctioned by the EU... to be present in Haitian waters.
5. TANZANIA / ZANZIBAR (3,527 hours in Haiti EEZ)
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | Tanzania (Zanzibar) Maritime Authority |
| ITF FOC Status | YES (listed as "Tanzania (Zanzibar)") |
| Paris MOU Status | BLACK LIST (Very High Risk... worst category) |
| Registry Note | Zanzibar operates semi-autonomous registry separate from mainland Tanzania |
Key Incident: FMS Eagle ($165M cocaine seizure, Feb 2026)
Date: February 19, 2026
Location: La Union, El Salvador (611 km offshore)
Vessel: FMS Eagle (180 feet, Tanzania/Zanzibar-flagged)
Seizure: 6.6 tonnes of cocaine (330 packages hidden in ballast tanks)
Value: $165 million
Significance: Largest drug seizure in El Salvador's history
Tanzania confirmed the vessel was registered in Zanzibar and subsequently deregistered it. The incident contributed to Tanzania's rating as one of the worst-performing flag states globally... negatively listed by THREE separate port inspection regimes.
This seizure occurred one month before our data snapshot. The same flag that produced the largest cocaine seizure in Central American history had vessels logging 3,527 hours in Haiti's EEZ.
6. HONDURAS (5,331 hours in Haiti EEZ)
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | General Directorate of the Merchant Marine (DGMM) |
| Administrator | Government (Ship Registry Department) |
| Established | 1943 (closed 1982, reopened 1995) |
| Registry Type | Open registry |
| ITF FOC Status | YES |
| Paris MOU Status | Not rated (insufficient inspections in Paris MOU area) |
The Closure and Reopening
Honduras shut down its open registry in 1982 because it had enabled "illegal traffic of all kinds and had given Honduras a bad name." The registry was reopened in 1995 under new legislation (Organic Law of the Merchant Marine, 1994) designed to attract larger vessels.
The fact that Honduras itself acknowledged its registry facilitated "illegal traffic of all kinds" is a remarkable admission. The registry was reopened with updated procedures, but the fundamental structure remains an open registry with no genuine link requirement.
Geographic Proximity
Honduras is the only flag state in our data with geographic proximity to Haiti. However, there is no significant Honduras-Haiti bilateral trade that would explain 5,331 hours of vessel presence.
7. ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES (19,172 hours... 7.7% of Haiti's total EEZ traffic)
Registry Details
| Attribute | Detail |
| Registry Name | SVG Maritime Administration |
| Administrator | Commissioner for Maritime Affairs (offices in Switzerland, Monaco, Greece, Hong Kong, London, Dubai, Fort Lauderdale) |
| Established | 1982 (Merchant Shipping Act) |
| Registry Type | Open registry |
| ITF FOC Status | YES |
| Paris MOU Status | Grey to Black listed (poor implementation of international standards) |
| Fleet Size | One of the world's largest open registries |
Why SVG Matters
- Registration in 24 hours. SVG advertises quick ship and mortgage registration "within 24 hours" from offices spanning six countries and four continents. The Commissioner for Maritime Affairs operates from Switzerland and Monaco... not from St. Vincent.
- Volume flag. SVG is "one of the world's most important open flag registries." The sheer volume (19,172 hours, 7.7% of Haiti's EEZ traffic) makes it the largest single opacity flag contributor to Haiti's maritime space.
- End-of-life preference. Like Togo and Tanzania, SVG is "excessively popular for end-of-life vessels"... old, poorly maintained ships that no first-tier registry will accept.
- Caribbean location. SVG is the only Caribbean flag state in our opacity set, which could provide legitimate cover for regional trade. However, the concentration at Ile de la Gonave (no commercial port) distinguishes this traffic from legitimate inter-island commerce.
8. THE "GRAVEYARD FLAGS" HIERARCHY
Based on this research, a clear hierarchy of maritime opacity emerges:
Tier 1: Sanctioned/Extreme Opacity (No legitimate use case justifies these flags)
- Comoros - EU-sanctioned operator, 38% of dark fleet, Paris MOU Black (only "High Risk" flag)
- Cameroon - 13% of sanctioned dark fleet (Russia)
- Gabon - EU-sanctioned operator (same as Comoros), fastest-growing register 2024
Tier 2: Documented Criminal Facilitation
- Togo - US State Department intervention, $27M cash seizure (Norma H II), drug trafficking, Paris MOU Black
- Tanzania/Zanzibar - $165M cocaine seizure (Feb 2026), Paris MOU Black (Very High Risk)
- Bolivia - Landlocked, no inspection capacity, US Coast Guard High Risk
Tier 3: Structural Opacity (Investigation/Reform Underway)
- Vanuatu - Government Commission of Inquiry, false flag impersonation, Paris MOU Black, dark fleet participant
- Honduras - Self-closed in 1982 for enabling "illegal traffic of all kinds," reopened 1995
Tier 4: Volume Opacity (Massive open registries with weak oversight)
- St. Vincent and the Grenadines - 24-hour registration, grey/black listed, end-of-life flag
- Mongolia - Landlocked, similar profile to Bolivia
- Myanmar, Moldova, etc. - Various structural deficiencies
The "Graveyard" Concept
Certain flags serve as the "last stop" for vessels that cannot register anywhere else:
- During operational life: Vessels cycle through progressively lower-tier flags as their condition deteriorates
- At end of life: Flags like Togo, Tanzania, SVG, Comoros, and Palau are "excessively popular for end-of-life vessels broken in beaching facilities"
- For illicit operations: The same flags that attract end-of-life vessels attract illicit operators, because both seek the same thing... minimal scrutiny
9. JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
Who Has Jurisdiction Over Opacity-Flagged Vessels in Haiti's EEZ?
Under UNCLOS:
| Zone | Primary Jurisdiction | Haiti's Rights |
| Territorial Sea (0-12 nm) | Haiti | Full sovereignty, can board/inspect/arrest |
| Contiguous Zone (12-24 nm) | Haiti (limited) | Can "prevent" customs/drug offenses |
| EEZ (24-200 nm) | Flag State | Economic rights only (fishing, resources); cannot board foreign vessels for criminal matters without flag state consent |
| High Seas | Flag State exclusively | No Haiti jurisdiction |
The Enforcement Gap
This is the critical legal gap that opacity flags exploit:
- In the EEZ: Haiti has economic jurisdiction (fishing, resource extraction) but NOT criminal jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels. To board a Bolivia-flagged vessel in Haiti's EEZ for suspected drug trafficking, Haiti would need to:
- Contact Bolivia's maritime authority (which has no coast guard, no maritime enforcement capacity)
- Obtain Bolivia's consent to board
- Or invoke a bilateral agreement (none exists between Haiti and Bolivia)
- Flag state responsibility is theoretical. Under UNCLOS, the flag state is responsible for ensuring compliance. But Bolivia has no capacity to enforce anything. Togo's registry is run from Lebanon. Comoros's operator is in Dubai (and EU-sanctioned). The entire system depends on flag states exercising jurisdiction they have no capacity or incentive to exercise.
- The opacity arbitrage. By registering under a flag state that cannot or will not exercise jurisdiction, vessel operators create a legal vacuum. Haiti cannot act (not their jurisdiction over the vessel). Bolivia/Togo/Comoros will not act (no capacity, no incentive). The vessel operates in a zone of effective impunity.
- Exception for narcotics. UNCLOS Article 108 requires all states to cooperate in suppression of illicit drug trafficking. Article 110 permits warship boarding on the high seas for suspected drug trafficking. But in the EEZ, even this exception requires flag state cooperation... which opacity flags are designed to frustrate.
10. CROSS-REFERENCE: ENFORCEMENT BODY FLAGGING
UNODC
- UNODC Global Maritime Crime Programme has specifically identified Bolivia, Vanuatu, and other open registries as having "modest regulatory capacity"
- UNODC's "Combating Transnational Organized Crime at Sea" issue paper documents how FOCs enable maritime crime
- The "constructive presence" doctrine (UNODC Issue Paper 3, 2023) explores legal frameworks for addressing vessels that facilitate crime from beyond territorial waters
Global Financial Integrity (GFI)
- GFI's two-part "Flags of Convenience: A Cloak for Illicit Maritime Activity" series directly documents the link between FOCs and Caribbean maritime crime
- Specifically documents the Norma H II (Togo-flagged) $27M seizure in San Juan
- Concludes that FOC registries "ask few questions" and "allow vessel owners to remain legally anonymous"
US Federal Investigation (2025)
- Federal Register notice (May 22, 2025): "Investigation Into Flags of Convenience and Unfavorable Conditions Created by Certain Flagging Practices"... a formal US government investigation into FOC abuses
RUSI (Royal United Services Institute)
- "Countering Shadow Fleet Activity through Flag State Reform" (2026)... proposes converting flag state responsibility into flag state liability
11. ILE DE LA GONAVE: THE CONVERGENCE POINT
Why Ile de la Gonave?
| Factor | Detail |
| Commercial Port | NONE. Only facility is Carrieres ferry wharf (piles, no cargo handling, no storage) |
| Population | ~80,000 |
| Economy | Agriculture, fishing, livestock |
| Infrastructure | Minimal. No significant industrial or commercial activity |
| Documented Illicit Use | CNN reported La Gonave is "a hub for human traffickers" who buy boats for one-way voyages to the US |
| Geographic Position | Center of Gulf of Gonave, provides concealment from shore-based observation |
The Statistical Argument
The concentration of Togo-flagged vessels (12,062 hours) at Ile de la Gonave... an island with no commercial port and documented human trafficking activity... cannot be explained by legitimate commercial activity. Combined with:
- Bolivia-flagged vessels (10,488 hours)... from a landlocked country with no trade relationship with Haiti
- Vanuatu-flagged vessels (13,344 hours)... a Pacific island flag under criminal investigation for registry fraud
- The Norma H II precedent (Togo-flagged, $27M cash seizure in Caribbean)
- The FMS Eagle precedent (Tanzania-flagged, $165M cocaine in Central America, Feb 2026)
...the pattern constitutes statistical evidence that opacity-flagged vessel concentrations at non-commercial locations in Haiti's EEZ indicate illicit maritime activity.
12. COMPOSITE FLAG OPACITY SCORE
For analytical purposes, we can construct a composite opacity score:
| Flag | ITF FOC | Paris MOU Black | USCG High Risk | Documented Incidents | EU Sanctioned Operator | Opacity Score |
| Comoros | Yes | Yes (High Risk) | Yes | Dark fleet (38%) | YES | 5/5 |
| Togo | Yes | Yes (Medium Risk) | Yes | $27M cash, drugs | No | 4/5 |
| Tanzania | Yes | Yes (Very High Risk) | Yes | $165M cocaine | No | 4/5 |
| Vanuatu | Yes | Yes (Med-High Risk) | Yes | Dark fleet, fraud inquiry | No | 4/5 |
| Bolivia | Yes | N/R | Yes | Landlocked (structural) | No | 3/5 |
| Honduras | Yes | N/R | N/R | Self-closed 1982 | No | 2/5 |
| SVG | Yes | Yes (grey-black) | N/R | Volume flag | No | 2/5 |
Weighted by hours in Haiti EEZ:
| Flag | Hours | % of Total | Opacity Score | Weighted Risk |
| SVG | 19,172 | 7.7% | 2 | 38,344 |
| Vanuatu | 13,344 | - | 4 | 53,376 |
| Togo | 12,062 | - | 4 | 48,248 |
| Bolivia | 10,488 | - | 3 | 31,464 |
| Honduras | 5,331 | - | 2 | 10,662 |
| Tanzania | 3,527 | - | 4 | 14,108 |
| Comoros | 84 | - | 5 | 420 |
| TOTAL | 64,008 | | | 196,622 |
Sources
Bolivia
- [WMU Dissertation: Ship registry and flag state obligations for Bolivia](https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/2272/)
- [Guide to Ship Registries: Bolivia](https://guidetoshipregistries.com/shipregistries-country/bolivia)
- [RIBB Official Website](https://www.ribb.gob.bo/?id=0&lang=en)
- [Bolivia Ship Registration - International Ship Registry](https://intlshipregistry.com/bolivia-ship-registration/)
- [Maritime Executive: Bolivia Authorizes DromonClass](https://maritime-executive.com/corporate/bolivia-authorizes-dromonclass)
- [IndexMundi: Bolivia Merchant Marine](https://www.indexmundi.com/bolivia/merchant_marine.html)
Togo
- [Lloyd's List: Congo, Togo and Comoros are worst-performing flag registries](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1127946/)
- [Lloyd's List: Togo turmoil over flag registry status](https://www.lloydslist.com/LL1143184/)
- [International Registration Bureau - Togo Official Registrar](https://www.togoregistrar.com/)
- [DOJ: $27 Million Seizure - Norma H II](https://www.justice.gov/usao-pr/pr/agents-seize-27-million-us-currency-inside-boxes-bound-st-thomas)
- [CBP: $27 Million Found Inside Boxes Bound to St. Thomas](https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-san-juan-seized-27-million-found-inside-boxes-bound-st-thomas)
- [Maritime Executive: Historic Seizure on Norma H II](https://www.maritime-executive.com/index.php/article/historic-seizure-cbp-finds-27m-in-hard-cash-aboard-freighter)
Vanuatu
- [Vanuatu Commission of Inquiry into Shipping Registry](https://mjcs.gov.vu/index.php/news/168-the-commission-of-inquiry-into-vanuatu-shipping-registry)
- [Maritime Executive: Vanuatu Alerts of False Flag Impostor](https://maritime-executive.com/article/vanuatu-alerts-of-false-flag-impostor-and-starts-investigation)
- [Splash247: Fake Vanuatu registry exposes wider epidemic](https://splash247.com/fake-vanuatu-registry-exposes-wider-epidemic-of-fraudulent-flags/)
- [The Diplomat: How Weak Flag Oversight Undermines Pacific Island States (Jan 2026)](https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/how-weak-flag-oversight-is-undermining-the-legitimacy-of-pacific-island-states/)
- [Windward: Tankers Newly Reflagged to Vanuatu](https://windward.ai/blog/tankers-newly-reflagged-to-vanuatu-show-not-all-sanctions-are-equal/)
Comoros
- [Maritime Executive: EU Sanctions Operator of Comoros and Gabon Registries](https://maritime-executive.com/article/eu-sanctions-operator-of-the-comoros-and-gabon-flag-registries)
- [Windward: Comoros Dark Fleet Purge (60+ false-flagged tankers)](https://windward.ai/blog/comoros-dark-fleet-purge-sees-more-than-60-tankers-listed-as-false-flagged/)
- [Windward: Inside the Dark Fleet - Fraudulent Registries & Flag Hopping](https://windward.ai/knowledge-base/false-flags-fraudulent-registries-and-the-dark-fleet/)
- [SAFETY4SEA: Comoros de-flags vessels linked to shadow fleet](https://safety4sea.com/comoros-de-flags-vessels-linked-to-shadow-fleet-activity/)
- [OpenSanctions: Intershipping Services LLC](https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-cqubDotQ4aopgpxHYPrWkZ/)
Tanzania
- [The Chanzo: Tanzania Confirms Deregistration of Ship Seized with 6.6 Tons of Cocaine (Feb 2026)](https://thechanzo.com/2026/02/27/flag-state-crisis-tanzania-confirms-deregistration-of-ship-seized-in-el-salvador-with-6-6-tons-of-cocaine)
- [PBS: Mexico and El Salvador Make Big Cocaine Seizures at Sea](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/mexico-and-el-salvador-make-big-cocaine-seizures-at-sea-as-lethal-u-s-boat-strikes-continue)
Honduras
- [General Directorate of the Merchant Marine of Honduras](https://merchantmarine.gob.hn/)
- [Wikipedia: Flag of Convenience (Honduras 1982 closure)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flag_of_convenience)
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
- [SVG Maritime Administration](http://www.svg-marad.com/)
- [Guide to Ship Registries: SVG](https://guidetoshipregistries.com/shipregistries-country/st-vincent-grenadines)
- [NGO Shipbreaking Platform: Flags of Convenience](https://shipbreakingplatform.org/issues-of-interest/focs/)
Dark Fleet / Shadow Fleet
- [Windward: What Is the Dark Fleet?](https://windward.ai/blog/what-is-the-dark-fleet/)
- [RUSI: Countering Shadow Fleet Activity through Flag State Reform](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/insights-papers/countering-shadow-fleet-activity-through-flag-state-reform)
- [Atlantic Council: Threats Posed by the Global Shadow Fleet](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-threats-posed-by-the-global-shadow-fleet-and-how-to-stop-it/)
- [Windward: Cameroon Pledges Crackdown on Ship Registry](https://windward.ai/blog/cameroon-pledges-crackdown-on-ship-registry-flagging-13-of-dark-fleet-tankers/)
Jurisdiction / UNCLOS
- [UNODC: Flag State Jurisdiction and Transnational Organized Crime at Sea](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/UNODC-GMCP_Flag_State_Jurisdiction_and_transnational_organized_crime_at_sea.pdf)
- [UNODC: Combating Transnational Organized Crime at Sea](https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/GPTOC/Issue_Paper_-_TOC_at_Sea.pdf)
- [UNODC: Constructive Presence (Issue Paper 3, 2023)](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/UNODC_GMCP_Constructive_Presence.pdf)
Cross-Cutting
- [GFI: Flags of Convenience: A Cloak for Illicit Maritime Activity (Part I)](https://gfintegrity.org/flags-of-convenience-a-cloak-for-illicit-maritime-activity-part-i/)
- [GFI: Flags of Convenience Part Two: Enforcement Gaps](https://gfintegrity.org/flags-of-convenience-part-two-enforcement-gaps-and-a-registry-solution-part-ii/)
- [ITF: Current Registries Listed as FOCs](https://www.itfseafarers.org/en/issues/flags-of-convenience/current-registries-listed-focs)
- [Paris MOU Black List 2025-2026 (PDF)](https://parismou.org/system/files/2025-06/Paris%20MoU%20Black%20List%202024.pdf)
- [Paris MOU White/Grey/Black Lists](https://parismou.org/Statistics&Current-Lists/white-grey-and-black-list)
- [Federal Register: Investigation Into Flags of Convenience (May 2025)](https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/05/22/2025-09236/investigation-into-flags-of-convenience-and-unfavorable-conditions-created-by-certain-flagging-practices)
- [CIA World Factbook: Merchant Marine Comparison](https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/merchant-marine/country-comparison/)
Research compiled 2026-03-20 for BARSS Haiti EEZ Maritime Analysis
All seven flags confirmed ITF Flags of Convenience
Combined: 64,008 hours of opacity-flagged vessel time in Haiti's EEZ
Part IV
Domain Blindness
18 years of international assistance, zero institutional capability
Purpose: Synthesize IHO primary source documents (2008, 2017) with BARSS EEZ/opacity data to extract meta-insights about the relationship between institutional blindness and maritime extraction.
Primary Sources: IHO 2008 Technical Visit Report (31pp), IHO 2017 High-Level/Technical Visit Report (28pp), MACHC16 GOH Paper, Haiti BookletCharts index
Date: 2026-03-21
PART I: THE 18-YEAR TIMELINE OF NOTHING
What Was Supposed to Happen
| Year | Event | What Was Promised | What Actually Happened |
| 2008 | IHO Technical Visit | Haiti requested help. IHO found ZERO capability. Recommended: MSI focal point, Project Leader, National Hydrographic Committee, 2 tide gauges, basic survey equipment ($79K). | Meeting happened. Report filed. |
| 2008 | IHO Membership | Haiti applied via Monaco. 30 states approved. Needed 52. | Process started, never completed. |
| 2009 | Follow-up visit | Review SHOH project progress | Unknown outcome |
| 2010 | Earthquake | 100,000+ dead, 120% GDP losses. "Donors' meeting" at MACHC11 in Suriname. Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Japan, Peru, Netherlands, UK, USA, Venezuela all offered support. | 2-week training course happened (2011). |
| 2011 | Training courses | 17 SEMANAH staff trained in-country (France/SHOM instructors) | Training delivered. No institutional structure to use it. |
| 2012 | IHO membership | 2/3 of IHO states approved Haiti's accession | Haiti never deposited instrument of accession. Still not a member. |
| 2014 | Brazil Cat A course | 2 SEMANAH engineers trained (Matthieu Polyte, Frenold Cheristin) | Graduated. Returned to Haiti. No equipment to use skills. |
| 2014 | US MOU | Formalized hydrographic relationship. NGA = Primary Charting Authority. | MOU signed. Haiti still produces zero charts. |
| 2015 | US internship | Polyte & Cheristin did 1-month NOAA/NGA/Navy internship | Skills practiced. No equipment waiting at home. |
| 2016 | Hurricane Matthew | Destroyed most Aids to Navigation in Haitian waters | Haiti asked for help fixing them. Unknown if fixed. |
| 2017 | IHO Technical Visit #2 | NGA (USA), SHOM (France), DHN (Brazil) all visited. Met Prime Minister. PM declared "maritime development one of their priorities." Announced "National Maritime Surveillance Command Center." | Same findings as 2008. No hydrographic capability. No equipment. No legislation. SHOH still "proposed." Maritime Code still pending Parliament. |
| 2017 | SHOH structure | 4-division org chart drawn (Hydrographic, Oceanographic, Production, Planification). Only first 2 "existing." | Org chart on paper. No evidence of actual operations. |
| 2017-2026 | Nine years of silence | | Haiti is still not an IHO member. SHOH has no evidence of becoming operational. No hydrographic survey has been conducted. |
The IHO's Annual Fee for Haiti: EUR 8,000
One share. That's what it costs. Haiti cannot find EUR 8,000/year to join the organization that would give it access to global hydrographic capacity building. SEMANAH's entire budget in 2016-2017: 143 million Gourdes (~USD 1.5M at the time).
PART II: META-INSIGHTS FROM CROSS-ANALYSIS
Insight 1: The $79,000 That Could Have Changed Everything
The 2008 IHO report (Annex F) lists basic hydrographic equipment at $79,000 total:
| Item | Cost (USD) |
| Single beam echo sounder, 200 kHz | $23,000 |
| Tide gauge | $5,000 |
| Post-process differential GPS | $30,000 |
| Hydrographic software | $10,000 |
| Computers | $6,000 |
| Accessories | $5,000 |
| TOTAL | $79,000 |
For $79,000... less than the price of a single Toyota Land Cruiser used by every NGO in Port-au-Prince... Haiti could have begun mapping its own seafloor. The 2010 donors' meeting included 10 countries (Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Japan, Peru, Netherlands, UK, USA, Venezuela). They funded a 2-week training course. Nobody funded $79,000 in equipment.
Cross-reference with our data: Haiti's EEZ generates ~$0.30/km2. Jamaica generates $741/km2. The revenue gap is ~$94M/year. The equipment to BEGIN closing that gap costs $79,000. The return on investment, at even 1% of the gap, would be 1,200x in the first year.
Insight 2: The Charts Haiti Navigates By Are From the Colonial Era
The 2008 report states: "Haiti has not produced any nautical charts of its waters; shipping relies on nautical charts produced by France, UK and USA containing a non-updated compilation of information of different sources."
The 2017 report confirms NGA is the Primary Charting Authority. The ENC cells listed (21 total) are all US-produced, with publication dates of 2014-2015. But ENC are digital overlays on SOURCE DATA. The question the IHO doesn't answer explicitly but implies: when was the seafloor last surveyed?
The US has served as Primary Charting Authority "for most of the 20th Century." The major hydrographic surveys of Haitian waters were conducted during:
- French colonial period (pre-1804)
- US occupation (1915-1934)
- Sporadic NGA updates (post-earthquake 2010 LIDAR, specific port approaches)
Cross-reference with our data: The 7 BookletCharts cover: Approaches to Cap-Haitien, Cap-Haitien, Plans in Haiti, Baie de L'Acul, Port-au-Prince, Aquin/Jacmel (South Coast), Passages between Acklins Island/Haiti/Caicos. That's 7 PDFs for 1,771 km of coastline. The vast majority of Haiti's coast between these points is uncharted at modern standards.
Insight 3: Zero Tide Gauges in 2008
The 2008 report: "It was reported that there is not a single tide gauge to monitor the variations of the sea level in all Haiti."
By 2017, three tide stations existed: Cap Haitian, Carrefour, Les Cayes. But the 2008 report specifically warned: "to install a network is much easier than keeping it working for long." There is no evidence these stations are still operational.
Cross-reference with our data: Without tide gauges, Haiti cannot:
- Calibrate depth soundings for charts
- Monitor sea level rise (critical for a country at extreme climate risk)
- Provide tidal predictions for navigation safety
- Support any future hydrographic survey work
Insight 4: The University Gap
Both the 2008 and 2017 reports note the same finding: Haiti's university offers zero maritime-related degrees.
2008: "The University in Haiti does not offer any option for its students to follow maritime disciplines, despite the maritime situation of the country."
2017: "There are currently no Maritime Training facilities in Haiti despite Haiti's large Maritime interest within the region."
Cross-reference: This means there is no domestic pipeline for hydrographers, marine scientists, nautical cartographers, maritime lawyers, or blue economy planners. Every expert must be trained abroad (Brazil, France, USA) at enormous per-person cost, then returns to a country with no equipment and no institutional structure to employ their skills.
Insight 5: The Labadee Anomaly
The 2017 report reveals: "Cruise Ship Ports are managed by special agreement with the Ministry of Tourism. One example discussed was the Labadee Cruise Ship Port which is directly managed by the Ministry of Tourism, without any intervention by the APN or SEMANAH."
Labadee is Royal Caribbean's private beach resort on Haiti's north coast. Royal Caribbean conducts its own hydrographic surveys for its cruise ships to dock safely. These surveys are not shared with SEMANAH or NGA. The 2017 IHO team specifically recommended that "guidelines on hydrographic survey specifications may be disseminated to all Haitian administrations and Ministries to be able to collect and safeguard maritime geospatial data acquired according to the IHO Standards."
Cross-reference with our data: This is a micro-extraction pattern. A private corporation surveys Haitian waters for its own profit. The data is proprietary. Haiti gains no institutional knowledge from the survey. The pattern: foreign actors possess more knowledge about Haitian territory than Haiti does.
Insight 6: The Opacity Flags Exploit the Blindness
From the 2008 report: "The absence of definition of the international maritime delimitation... constitutes a limitation that affects [Coast Guard] operations as generates difficulties in the control of activities that take place on the internal waters, territorial waters and waters beyond the territorial waters."
Cross-reference with our opacity flags data:
| Factor | IHO Finding | BARSS Data |
| No AIS network | Confirmed (2008, 2017) | 64,008 hours of opacity-flagged vessels UNMONITORED |
| No maritime boundaries published | Confirmed (2008, 2017) | 4/6 maritime boundaries unresolved |
| 8 patrol boats for 1,535 km | Confirmed (2017: 5 boats, 3 PaP + 1 Cap + 1 Cayes) | Gonave convergence = zero patrol presence |
| No port state control | Observer only (Caribbean MOU) | Ships dock/anchor without inspection |
| No VTS | Confirmed | No vessel tracking at any port |
The opacity flags don't just exploit weak enforcement. They exploit total blindness. Bolivia-flagged vessels spend 10,488 hours in Haiti's EEZ because Haiti literally cannot see them. Togo-flagged vessels concentrate at Ćle de la Gonave because there is no radar, no AIS, no patrol boat, no coast guard base, and no commercial port... it is the darkest spot in a completely dark maritime domain.
Insight 7: The CNIGS Parallel... And Why It Matters
Both reports highlight CNIGS (National Geospatial Information Center) as a functioning institution with GIS capability, trained staff, and a legal framework. The 2008 report recommended nautical chart production be assigned to CNIGS. The 2017 report noted CNIGS has complete LIDAR coverage of Haiti's land area.
The asymmetry: Haiti has mapped its LAND (via CNIGS). It has NOT mapped its SEA (no SHOH). CNIGS was established in 2006 with clear legislation, funding, and a mandate. SHOH was proposed in 2008 and has never been established.
Why? Plausible hypothesis: land mapping was donor-funded for disaster response (earthquake, hurricane preparedness). Sea mapping has no equivalent donor champion. The World Bank, USAID, and EU fund land-based GIS for DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction). Nobody funds maritime GIS because the use case (revenue capture, fisheries management, boundary delimitation) requires a functioning state... which is exactly what extraction prevents.
Insight 8: The Numbers That Connect Everything
| Metric | Value | Source |
| Cost of basic survey equipment | $79,000 | IHO 2008 Annex F |
| IHO annual membership | EUR 8,000 | IHO 2017 |
| Haiti EEZ revenue | ~$30-50M/yr | BARSS EEZ Analysis |
| Revenue gap vs Jamaica model | ~$94M/yr | BARSS EEZ Analysis |
| IUU extraction from EEZ | $10-50M/yr | BARSS EEZ Analysis |
| Opacity-flagged vessel hours | 64,008 hrs | BARSS Opacity Flags |
| Maritime Theta | 0.96-0.98 | BARSS EEZ Analysis |
| Coast Guard boats | 5 (2017) / 8 (reported) | IHO 2017 |
| Trained hydrographers | 2 | IHO 2017 |
| Charts produced by Haiti | 0 | IHO 2008, 2017 |
| Years since first IHO visit | 18 | 2008-2026 |
| SHOH status | Proposed, not established | IHO 2017 |
| IHO membership status | Approved but not deposited | IHO 2017 |
The meta-insight: Haiti cannot see its waters ($79K equipment gap) ā cannot measure what's taken (Maritime Theta 0.96-0.98) ā cannot enforce against opacity flags (64,008 unmonitored hours) ā cannot generate revenue ($0.30/km2 vs $741) ā cannot fund the $79K equipment ā cycle repeats.
This is the Resistance Ratchet applied to maritime governance. The extraction creates the blindness that enables more extraction.
PART III: THE PEOPLE WHO TRIED
The IHO reports name real people who tried to change this:
2008 Contacts
- Azad Belfort (Director, International Organizations, MOFA) - organized the entire visit
- Gina Porcena (Director General, CNIGS) - offered GIS infrastructure for nautical charts
- Marie Jean (Director General, SEMANAH) - confirmed zero capability, committed to SHOH
- Ronald Jabouin (Director, Maritime Safety, SEMANAH) - presented the SHOH pre-project
- Joseph Wagnac (Director, Coast Guard) - identified chart gaps limiting operations
- Hugo Gorziglia (IHB Director, Chilean Navy) - led the visit, wrote 31-page report
2017 Contacts
- DieudonnƩ Bruno (Director General, SEMANAH)
- Serge Mitton (Director, Marine Environment Protection / Hydrography lead)
- Matthieu Polyte (Head of Hydrographic Service, Cat A trained in Brazil 2014)
- Frenold Cheristin (Assistant, Cat A trained in Brazil 2014)
- Fritz Caillot (MTPTC Minister)
- Franz Joseph (Minister's Office expert)
- HervƩ Eveillard (Director General, APN)
- Jack Guy Lafontant (Prime Minister... declared maritime development a "priority")
- Joseph Jean Mary Wagnac (Coast Guard Commandant, same name as 2008)
- Boby Emmanuel Piard (Director General, CNIGS)
These are not anonymous bureaucrats. These are named individuals who sat in meetings, made commitments, and watched nothing happen. The 2008 and 2017 reports read like the same document because the same problems exist, the same recommendations are made, and the same promises are offered.
Wagnac appears in BOTH reports (2008 and 2017). Nine years. Same coast guard. Same request for better charts. Same situation.
PART IV: WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE BUDGET DIVE
If you are analyzing Haiti's budget/development plan and finding it lacks insight... this is the foundation of that lack. The budget planners literally do not know:
- What Haiti's EEZ contains (never surveyed)
- What foreign vessels are doing in Haitian waters (no monitoring)
- What the coastline infrastructure looks like (no inventory)
- What revenue the maritime domain could generate (no baseline)
- What the seafloor looks like (charts from colonial era)
- Where the maritime boundaries are (4/6 unresolved)
- What the continental shelf extends to (CLCS deadline missed)
You cannot budget for what you cannot see. You cannot plan blue economy development when you don't have a single nautical chart you produced yourself. You cannot project fisheries revenue when you've never surveyed fish stocks. You cannot plan coast guard expansion when you don't know where the landing points are.
The budget is bad because the data doesn't exist. The data doesn't exist because the institutions to create it were never funded. The institutions were never funded because the budget is bad.
This is Theta operating at the institutional level.
SOURCES
Primary (Archived in Vault)
- `2. Source Material/IHO_2008_Haiti_Technical_Visit.txt` (77,870 chars, 31 pages)
- `2. Source Material/IHO_2017_Haiti_Technical_Visit.txt` (64,474 chars, 28 pages)
- `2. Source Material/MACHC16_Haiti_Paper.txt` (8,117 chars, 4 pages)
Original PDFs
- [IHO 2008 Technical Visit Report - Haiti](https://iho.int/uploads/user/Capacity%20Building/Reports%20Assessments/2008/8-HAITI.pdf)
- [IHO 2017 Technical Visit Report - Haiti](https://iho.int/uploads/user/Capacity%20Building/Reports%20Assessments/2017/2017-A06-TV-Haiti-Report.pdf)
- [MACHC16 GOH Paper](https://docs.iho.int/mtg_docs/rhc/MACHC/MACHC16/MACHC16-02.1B-IHB-report-GoH-English.pdf)
- [Haiti BookletCharts](https://www.iho-machc.org/haiti_bookletcharts/haiti_bookletcharts.html)
Cross-Analysis compiled 2026-03-21 for BARSS Haiti Maritime Domain Research
Part of Haiti Maritime Extraction case (tree/Haiti_Maritime)
Part V
The Disbursement Gap
$850M-$1B in undisbursed institutional funds
The maritime domain blindness is a symptom of a larger problem: Haiti lacks the implementation capacity to absorb the institutional funding that already exists.
World Bank Haiti Portfolio: Active Projects
| Project | Approved | Amount | Disbursed | Status |
| Second Resilient Productive Landscapes (P182412) | Apr 2025 | $50M | ~3-5% | Successor to P162908 (46.8% disbursed) |
| Public Financial Management (PFM) | 2025 | $70M | ~5% | Almost entirely unspent |
| Agriculture Resilience | 2025 | $50M | ~8% | Early implementation |
| Economic Corridors | 2025 | $70M | ~3% | Early implementation |
IDB Haiti Pipeline
| Category | Active Programs | Estimated Pipeline |
| Infrastructure & Transport | 5+ | $200M+ |
| Agriculture & Rural Development | 4+ | $150M+ |
| Governance & Institutional | 3+ | $120M+ |
| Social Protection | 4+ | $180M+ |
| Private Sector & Trade | 3+ | $120M+ |
| Total | 25+ | ~$770M |
UNDP Haiti
| Fund | Allocation | Status |
| Electoral Basket Fund | $30-40M | Dormant (elections postponed) |
| Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) | $15-20M | Active but slow disbursement |
| Climate/Environment | $10-15M | GCF pipeline |
The implementation gap is the binding constraint. Haiti does not lack donor commitments. It lacks organizations with the technical capacity, compliance infrastructure, and ground presence to move institutional money into programs. The maritime domain is a microcosm: international institutions have offered training, equipment, and technical assistance for 18 years. Nobody has built the institutional architecture to absorb it.
Part VI
Free Data Sources & Surveillance Architecture
What can be built for $0
Purpose: Identify every free, publicly accessible data source that can produce a baseline maritime surveillance product for Haiti's coastline and EEZ at $0 cost.
Assessment Date: March 20, 2026
Relevance: Project Diamond Spear, Grand Blue Line, SAKALA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Six source categories evaluated. Four are immediately actionable within 24 hours. Two require registration (instant to 48hr approval). Total cost: $0.
| Source | Actionable Now? | Registration | Data Quality | Coverage |
| Global Fishing Watch API | YES (after signup) | Free, instant self-service | HIGH | Haiti EEZ full coverage |
| Copernicus Sentinel-1 SAR | YES (after signup) | Free, instant | HIGH | Global, all-weather |
| Copernicus Sentinel-2 Optical | YES (after signup) | Free, instant | MEDIUM | 10m resolution, 5-day revisit |
| OpenStreetMap / Overpass API | YES (no signup) | None needed | MEDIUM | 1,189 maritime features found |
| MarineTraffic | Limited | Free web only | LOW (free tier) | Port-au-Prince area |
| AISHub | NO (requires AIS feed) | Must contribute data | HIGH | Caribbean partial |
What We Can Produce in 24 Hours
- Vessel activity heatmap of Haiti's EEZ (GFW API... fishing effort + vessel presence 2012-present)
- Dark vessel detections around Haiti (GFW SAR dataset... unmatched radar detections 2017-present)
- AIS gap events for vessels operating near Haiti (GFW Events API)
- SAR imagery of Port-au-Prince harbor and key coastline (Sentinel-1, all-weather, day/night)
- Optical imagery of docks, piers, and landing sites (Sentinel-2, 10m, cloud-permitting)
- Complete maritime infrastructure map from OSM (1,189 features already extracted)
SOURCE 1: GLOBAL FISHING WATCH API
Access
- URL: https://globalfishingwatch.org/our-apis/
- API Base: `https://gateway.api.globalfishingwatch.org/v3/`
- Documentation: https://globalfishingwatch.org/our-apis/documentation
- Token Signup: https://globalfishingwatch.org/our-apis/tokens
- Python Client: `pip install gfw-api-python-client`
- R Client: `gfwr` package on GitHub
Authentication
- Bearer token via HTTP header: `Authorization: Bearer `
- Free self-registration, instant token generation
- Non-commercial use only (academic/NGO/public good = fine)
- Confirmed: API returns 401 without token, 403 with invalid token
Available Datasets for Haiti
| Dataset ID | Coverage | What It Shows |
| `public-global-fishing-effort:latest` | 2012 to 96hrs ago | AIS-based fishing hours by grid cell |
| `public-global-presence:latest` | 2012 to 96hrs ago | All vessel presence (not just fishing) |
| `public-global-sar-presence:latest` | 2017 to 5 days ago | SAR satellite vessel detections (sees dark vessels) |
| `public-sar-fixed-infrastructure` | 2017 to 3 months ago | Offshore structures detected by satellite |
Haiti EEZ Query
To query Haiti's EEZ, use the region parameter:
`
region-dataset=public-eez-areas®ion-id=
`
The EEZ ID can be found via the References API:
`
GET /v3/datasets/public-eez-areas/context-layers
`
Or use a custom GeoJSON polygon for Haiti's EEZ boundary.
Key Endpoints
Fishing Effort / Vessel Presence (4Wings):
`
POST /v3/4wings/report
{
"region": {
"dataset": "public-eez-areas",
"id": ""
},
"datasets": ["public-global-fishing-effort:latest"],
"date-range": "2025-01-01,2026-03-20",
"spatial-resolution": "HIGH",
"temporal-resolution": "MONTHLY",
"group-by": "FLAG"
}
`
Dark Vessel Detection (SAR unmatched):
`
POST /v3/4wings/report
{
"datasets": ["public-global-sar-presence:latest"],
"date-range": "2025-01-01,2026-03-20",
"spatial-resolution": "HIGH",
"temporal-resolution": "MONTHLY",
"region": { "dataset": "public-eez-areas", "id": "" }
}
`
Filter SAR detections by matched=false to isolate vessels with NO AIS signal.
AIS Gap Events:
`
GET /v3/events?datasets=public-global-gaps-events:latest&start-date=2025-01-01&end-date=2026-03-20
`
With region filter for Haiti EEZ. Shows when vessels turned off AIS transponders.
Data Formats
- CSV, JSON, TIFF (raster), PNG (heatmap tiles), MVT (vector tiles)
Rate Limits
- 1 concurrent report per user
- 100 second timeout per report
- Reports cached 30 minutes
Strategic Value for BARSS
- Can identify which flag states are fishing in Haiti's EEZ
- Can detect vessels operating without AIS ("dark fleet")
- Can cross-reference with BAM BAM shipping interests
- SAR data sees through weather/night... critical for Haiti
- Historical data back to 2012 enables trend analysis
SOURCE 2: COPERNICUS SENTINEL-1 SAR
Access
- Portal: https://dataspace.copernicus.eu/
- Browser (visual): https://browser.dataspace.copernicus.eu/
- API Docs: https://documentation.dataspace.copernicus.eu/APIs.html
- Auth Endpoint: `https://identity.dataspace.copernicus.eu/auth/realms/CDSE/protocol/openid-connect/token`
Registration
- Free account at dataspace.copernicus.eu
- Email verification required
- Create OAuth client in User Settings for API access
- No credit card required
What Sentinel-1 SAR Provides
- C-band Synthetic Aperture Radar imagery
- Works day/night, all weather (critical for Haiti's cloud cover)
- Resolution: 5m x 20m (IW mode, most common)
- Revisit: ~6 days (with Sentinel-1C added January 2025)
- Archive: Full history available
- Can detect: Vessels as small as ~15m, oil spills, coastal change
Ship Detection Pipeline (Open Source)
| Tool | GitHub | Method |
| SARfish | MJCruickshank/SARfish | Faster R-CNN on S1 VH polarisation, outputs GeoJSON |
| Allen AI Vessel Detection | allenai/vessel-detection-sentinels | S1 + S2 fusion |
| py_cfar | nasir6/py_cfar | CFAR algorithm for vessel detection |
| EODAG Tutorial | eodag.readthedocs.io | Complete tutorial for ship detection |
| SUMO | EU open source | Pixel-based marine object detection |
How to Get Haiti SAR Imagery
`python
import requests
token_url = "https://identity.dataspace.copernicus.eu/auth/realms/CDSE/protocol/openid-connect/token"
token_data = {
"grant_type": "client_credentials",
"client_id": "",
"client_secret": ""
}
token_resp = requests.post(token_url, data=token_data)
access_token = token_resp.json()["access_token"]
haiti_bbox = [-72.45, 18.45, -72.25, 18.65] # Port-au-Prince harbor area
`
Free Tier Limits (Generous)
- 10,000 Sentinel Hub API requests/month
- 10,000 Processing Units/month
- 12 TB download cap (rolling 30 days)
- 4 concurrent connections
- 20 MB/s per connection
Strategic Value
- All-weather surveillance of Haiti's entire coastline
- Can detect vessel concentrations at informal landing sites
- Cross-reference with AIS data to find "dark" vessels
- Historical archive enables change detection at ports
SOURCE 3: COPERNICUS SENTINEL-2 OPTICAL
Access
- Same portal as Sentinel-1: https://dataspace.copernicus.eu/
- Same authentication, same free tier
What Sentinel-2 Provides
- Multispectral optical imagery (13 bands)
- Resolution: 10m (visible + NIR), 20m (red-edge + SWIR), 60m (atmospheric)
- Revisit: 5 days at equator (3 satellites now: 2A, 2B, 2C)
- Limitation: Requires clear sky (Haiti has significant cloud cover)
Can We See Boats?
- At 10m resolution, a single pixel = 10m x 10m
- Large vessels (>20m): YES, clearly visible as bright pixels on dark water
- Medium vessels (10-20m): Marginally detectable, 1-2 pixels
- Small boats (<10m): Generally NOT detectable
- Docks/piers/infrastructure: YES, clearly visible
- Fishing boat concentrations: YES, as clusters of bright pixels
What to Look For
- Port-au-Prince harbor vessel density
- Informal landing sites along north coast (Cap-Haitien to Gonaives)
- La Gonave island coastline (known smuggling route)
- South coast (Jeremie, Les Cayes... ferry terminals)
- Ile-a-Vache, Ile de la Tortue
Sentinel Hub Custom Script for Ship Detection
`javascript
// Ship detection script (Sentinel-2)
// Ships appear as bright pixels on dark water
let water = (B03 - B08) / (B03 + B08); // NDWI
if (water > 0.3) { // It's water
let brightness = B04 + B03 + B02;
if (brightness > 0.5) { // Bright object on water
return [1, 0, 0]; // Red = potential vessel
}
return [0, 0, 0.3]; // Blue = water
}
return [B042.5, B032.5, B02*2.5]; // Natural color for land
`
SOURCE 4: OPENSTREETMAP (OVERPASS API)
Access
- Overpass API: https://overpass-api.de/api/interpreter
- Visual Interface: https://overpass-turbo.eu/
- NO REGISTRATION REQUIRED
- Data Format: JSON, XML, CSV
- Rate Limit: Fair use (~10,000 requests/day)
Haiti Maritime Infrastructure: ALREADY EXTRACTED
Query executed March 20, 2026. Results: 1,189 elements.
| Feature Type | Count |
| Piers (`man_made=pier`) | 169 |
| Rocks/hazards (`seamark:type=rock`) | 90 |
| Ferry terminals (`amenity=ferry_terminal`) | 16 |
| Wrecks (`seamark:type=wreck`) | 15 |
| Landmarks (`seamark:type=landmark`) | 12 |
| Marinas (`leisure=marina`) | 9 |
| Harbours (`harbour=yes`) | 6 |
| Lighthouses (`man_made=lighthouse`) | 6 |
| Docks (`waterway=dock`) | 4 |
| Harbour seamarks (`seamark:type=harbour`) | 3 |
| Light minors (`seamark:type=light_minor`) | 3 |
| Quays (`man_made=quay`) | 2 |
| Anchorages (`seamark:type=anchorage`) | 1 |
Named Ports & Maritime Facilities (with coordinates)
| Name | Type | Latitude | Longitude |
| Port-au-Prince Harbour | harbour, marina | 18.557 | -72.350 |
| Port de Cap-Haitien | harbour | 19.760 | -72.196 |
| Port de Miragoane | harbour, marina | 18.445 | -73.091 |
| Port de Marigot | ferry terminal | 18.229 | -72.322 |
| Port de Jeremie | dock | 18.643 | -74.111 |
| Port de Carries | dock | 18.832 | -72.854 |
| Waf de Cite Soleil | marina | 18.580 | -72.342 |
| Gare Maritime des Cayes | ferry terminal | 18.191 | -73.745 |
| Gare Maritime Madame Bernard | ferry terminal | 18.086 | -73.653 |
| Gare Maritime de Kaykok | ferry terminal | 18.104 | -73.693 |
| Marina Blue | marina | 18.951 | -72.720 |
| Libertalia | marina | 18.548 | -73.796 |
| Port de Petite Riviere de Nippes | marina | 18.477 | -73.246 |
| Gare Maritime de Anse-a-Galets | ferry terminal | 18.832 | -72.853 |
| Gare Maritime de Cariesse | ferry terminal | 18.888 | -72.623 |
| Port de Mouillage des voiliers | dock | 18.864 | -72.948 |
| Kaliko Beach Marina | marina | way | - |
| Labadee Cruiseship Dock | pier | way | - |
| Wharf Cite Cabrit | wharf, dock | way | - |
| Wharf Gabotage de Cite Soleil | pier | way | - |
Overpass Query Used
`
[out:json][timeout:60];
area["ISO3166-1"="HT"]->.searchArea;
(
node["man_made"="pier"](area.searchArea);
way["man_made"="pier"](area.searchArea);
node["leisure"="marina"](area.searchArea);
way["leisure"="marina"](area.searchArea);
node["harbour"](area.searchArea);
way["harbour"](area.searchArea);
node["seamark:type"](area.searchArea);
way["seamark:type"](area.searchArea);
node["waterway"="dock"](area.searchArea);
way["waterway"="dock"](area.searchArea);
node["man_made"="quay"](area.searchArea);
way["man_made"="quay"](area.searchArea);
node["amenity"="ferry_terminal"](area.searchArea);
way["amenity"="ferry_terminal"](area.searchArea);
node["landuse"="port"](area.searchArea);
way["landuse"="port"](area.searchArea);
);
out body;
;
out skel qt;
`
OSM Haiti Completeness Assessment
- Port-au-Prince: well-mapped (post-2010 earthquake volunteer surge)
- Major ports: mapped (Cap-Haitien, Les Cayes, Jeremie, Miragoane)
- Rural coastline: incomplete (25% of cells have any mapped features)
- Informal landing sites: mostly unmapped (this is a gap we can fill with SAR/optical)
- Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) has active Haiti project
SOURCE 5: MARINETRAFFIC (LIMITED FREE TIER)
Access
- Web Map: https://www.marinetraffic.com/ (free, no signup)
- API: https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/p/api-services (PAID ONLY)
What's Free
- Web interface only: View current vessel positions on map
- Click individual vessels for basic info (name, flag, type, speed, destination)
- Port-au-Prince area typically shows 5-20 vessels
- NO API access at free level
- NO historical data at free level
- NO bulk download at free level
What It Costs
- API starts at ~$100/month for basic tier
- Historical track data: premium tier
- NOT cost-effective for this project
Strategic Value: LOW
- Useful only for real-time spot checks
- Cannot build systematic surveillance product
- GFW API provides better data for free
SOURCE 6: AIS DATA (FREE SOURCES)
AISHub (www.aishub.net)
- Model: Data sharing cooperative
- Requirement: You MUST contribute at least one raw AIS feed (NMEA format)
- Quality bar: 10+ vessels average, 90% uptime, <60s downsampling
- If qualified: Free API access (JSON, XML, CSV)
- Problem: We don't have an AIS receiver in Haiti
- Verdict: NOT immediately actionable unless we set up a receiver
NOAA AccessAIS (coast.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/tools/ais.html)
- Coverage: US coastal waters, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories
- Haiti: NOT COVERED (US waters only)
- Format: Clip-and-ship download tool
- Verdict: Not useful for Haiti
UN Global Platform AIS Task Team
- URL: https://unstats.un.org/bigdata/task-teams/ais/
- Purpose: Developing methodologies for AIS-derived statistics
- Data access: Through national statistical offices, not direct public download
- Verdict: Institutional pathway, not immediate data source
OpenAIS (open-ais.org)
- Purpose: Open-source AIS data processing tools
- Data: Does NOT provide data... helps you process data you already have
- Verdict: Useful tooling if we get raw AIS data from another source
Academic Datasets
- Piraeus AIS Dataset: 244M records, Mediterranean only
- Kaggle AIS datasets: Various, mostly European waters
- Caribbean coverage: Limited in academic open datasets
- Best bet: GFW's AIS-derived products (already covered above)
SOURCE 7: PLANET LABS / NICFI (EXPIRED)
Status
- NICFI program ended January 23, 2025
- Replaced by Tropical Forest Observatory (TFO) with paid tiers
- Haiti was within NICFI coverage (Caribbean tropics)
- No longer free as of 2026
Alternative: Sentinel-2
- Sentinel-2 provides 10m optical imagery for free (see Source 3)
- Slightly lower resolution than Planet (3-5m) but sufficient for port surveillance
- 5-day revisit vs Planet's daily... acceptable tradeoff for $0
RECOMMENDED 24-HOUR ACTION PLAN
Hour 0-1: Account Setup
- Register at https://globalfishingwatch.org/our-apis/tokens (GFW API token)
- Register at https://dataspace.copernicus.eu/ (Copernicus account)
- Create OAuth client in Copernicus dashboard
Hour 1-4: Data Collection
- Query GFW 4Wings API for Haiti EEZ fishing effort (2024-2026)
- Query GFW 4Wings API for SAR vessel detections (2024-2026, filter unmatched = dark vessels)
- Query GFW Events API for AIS gap events near Haiti
- Download recent Sentinel-1 SAR scene over Port-au-Prince
- Download recent Sentinel-2 optical scene over Port-au-Prince (check cloud cover)
Hour 4-8: Processing
- Generate fishing effort heatmap from GFW data
- Generate dark vessel detection map from SAR data
- Run SARfish or CFAR on Sentinel-1 scene for ship detection
- Overlay OSM maritime infrastructure on all maps
- Cross-reference GFW vessel data with OSM port locations
Hour 8-12: Product Generation
- Create Datawrapper maps showing:
- Vessel density by grid cell
- Dark vessel hotspots
- AIS gap frequency zones
- Maritime infrastructure inventory
- Generate Brattle-style report with all visualizations
Hour 12-24: Analysis & Publication
- Identify flag states operating in Haiti's EEZ
- Calculate fishing effort trends
- Map dark vessel concentration zones (potential smuggling routes)
- Cross-reference landing sites with known gang territory
- Package as "Haiti Maritime Domain Awareness Baseline Report"
PYTHON QUICKSTART SCRIPT
See: 19. Sorceries/haiti_maritime_baseline.py (companion script)
CONNECTION TO BARSS CASES
| BARSS Case | Maritime Data Relevance |
| Diamond Spear | Dark vessel detection = arms trafficking routes |
| BAM BAM | Bigio/Mevs control port infrastructure; vessel data shows their commercial shipping |
| Liberia Maritime | LISCR-flagged vessels transiting Haiti's EEZ |
| Grand Blue Line | Atlantic coalition MDA capability demonstration |
| SAKALA | Coastal renewable infrastructure siting needs maritime baseline |
Created: 2026-03-20 | Maritime surveillance free data assessment
Related: Project Diamond Spear, Grand Blue Line, SAKALA
Part VII
Satellite Surveillance Cost Analysis
From domain blindness to domain awareness
Purpose: Precise cost estimates for achieving total maritime domain awareness (MDA) of Haiti's 1,771 km coastline, including every informal landing site, dock, and vessel movement.
Date: March 20, 2026
Context: UNODC January 2026 UNSC briefing confirmed traffickers shifting toward "weaker Haitian ports, offshore transfers, and indirect routes." 11 recorded clandestine airstrips identified. Maritime landing sites: number unknown... that is the problem this analysis solves.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE KILL NUMBER
Complete maritime domain awareness of Haiti's entire coastline, updated daily, with AI-flagged anomalies, for one year: $4.2M-$6.8M
| Component | Annual Cost | What It Buys |
| SAR satellite imagery (daily revisit) | $1.2M-$2.0M | All-weather, day/night vessel detection, coastline change detection |
| Optical satellite imagery (weekly high-res) | $0.6M-$1.0M | 30-50cm imagery for dock identification, beach clearing, tire tracks |
| AIS + dark vessel detection | $0.4M-$0.8M | Track all AIS-transmitting vessels + RF detection of dark ships |
| AI analytics platform | $0.3M-$0.5M | Automated anomaly detection, change alerts, vessel classification |
| Maritime Operations Center | $0.8M-$1.2M | Analysts, workstations, fusion with JIATF-South/SeaVision feeds |
| Drone complement (2x ScanEagle systems) | $0.9M-$1.3M | Persistent surveillance of identified hotspots, small boat intercept |
| TOTAL | $4.2M-$6.8M | Eyes on every beach in Haiti, every day, for one year |
For context: The US spends ~$1B/year on Caribbean counter-narcotics via JIATF-South. Haiti's surveillance gap costs multiples of this in trafficking damage. $5M is a rounding error in the MSS budget.
1. SYNTHETIC APERTURE RADAR (SAR) SATELLITE IMAGERY
SAR is the foundation of maritime surveillance because it works through clouds, at night, and in all weather... critical for Haiti where cloud cover averages 60-70%.
Provider Comparison (2025-2026)
| Provider | Best Resolution | Scene Size | Revisit (current) | Key Advantage |
| Capella Space | 0.25m (Spotlight) | 5x5 km | ~6 hours (7 satellites) | Highest commercial SAR resolution; $4.2M DARPA maritime awareness contract |
| ICEYE | 0.25m (Spot) | 5x5 km to 100x100 km | Sub-daily (now 30+ satellites) | Largest commercial SAR constellation; Detect & Classify AI product; pay-as-you-go available |
| Umbra | 0.25m (Spotlight) | 5x5 km | Multiple daily | $60M STRATFI for next-gen maritime SAR; open-ocean search capability |
SAR Pricing (Best Available 2025-2026 Estimates)
SAR imagery pricing is NOT published transparently by major providers. Based on industry sources, reseller pricing (SkyFi, Geopera, UP42), and contract data:
| Mode | Resolution | Typical Price/km2 | Typical Scene Cost | Notes |
| Spotlight (archive) | 0.25-0.5m | $8-$20/km2 | $200-$500 per 25 km2 scene | Best for port/dock analysis |
| Spotlight (tasking) | 0.25-0.5m | $15-$40/km2 | $375-$1,000 per 25 km2 scene | New collection, priority |
| Strip (archive) | 1-3m | $3-$8/km2 | $150-$800 per 100-500 km2 | Good for coastline sweep |
| Strip (tasking) | 1-3m | $5-$15/km2 | $250-$1,500 per 100-500 km2 | Broader coverage |
| Scan (archive) | 5-15m | $1-$3/km2 | $100-$300 per 100-10,000 km2 | Wide-area vessel detection only |
| Scan (tasking) | 5-15m | $2-$5/km2 | $200-$500 per 10,000 km2 | Open ocean search |
Source notes: SkyFi 2025 pricing sheet (skyfi.com/files/SkyFi_Pricing_2025.pdf); Geopera starts from AUD 9/km2 (~$6 USD); Umbra $1,500 for 100 km2 spotlight = $15/km2; ICEYE region-based pricing, contracts immutable per agreement; Capella pricing via direct quote only.
Haiti Coastline SAR Coverage Calculation
- Haiti coastline: 1,771 km
- Coastal surveillance strip width needed: ~10 km inland + 20 km offshore = 30 km total width
- Total coverage area: ~53,130 km2 (1,771 km x 30 km)
- Using Strip mode at 1-3m resolution (sufficient for vessel detection >5m):
- Single pass: $3-8/km2 x 53,130 km2 = $159,000-$425,000 per complete sweep
- Daily coverage for one year (365 passes): Not practical as single-provider tasking
- Realistic approach: 2-3 SAR providers on rotation = every-other-day coverage at ~$80M/year (too expensive for daily Strip)
- Cost-effective approach: Daily Scan mode ($1-3/km2) for vessel detection + weekly Strip for detailed analysis = $1.2M-$2.0M/year
Can SAR Detect Small Wooden Boats (Yoles/Canots)?
This is the critical question. The honest answer: it depends.
| Vessel Type | Length | Material | Radar Cross Section (RCS) | SAR Detectability |
| Metal cargo vessel | >30m | Steel | High (10-40 dBsm) | Reliable at all SAR resolutions |
| Fiberglass speedboat ("go-fast") | 10-15m | Fiberglass | Medium (0-10 dBsm) | Detectable at <3m resolution |
| Wooden fishing boat (large) | 8-12m | Wood | Low (-5 to 5 dBsm) | Detectable at <1m resolution in calm seas |
| Wooden canot/yole | 4-8m | Wood | Very low (-10 to 0 dBsm) | Marginal. Detectable at 0.25-0.5m in calm seas. Sea state 3+ masks signal. |
| Small pirogue | <4m | Wood | Extremely low (<-10 dBsm) | Generally NOT detectable by SAR. Below clutter threshold. |
Key limitation: Wooden boats under ~6m are at the edge of SAR detectability. Their low radar cross-section (comparable to ocean wave returns) makes them difficult to distinguish from sea clutter, especially in rough seas. Metal boats and fiberglass go-fast boats used for major drug shipments ARE reliably detectable. The small wooden canots used for local trafficking and human smuggling are the hardest target.
Mitigation: Combine SAR with optical (for dock/landing site detection) + RF detection (for radio/phone emissions from vessels) + AIS gap analysis.
2. OPTICAL SATELLITE IMAGERY
Optical imagery is essential for identifying physical infrastructure: makeshift docks, cleared beach areas, tire tracks, boat pull-up marks, fuel storage, and changes to coastline.
Provider Comparison (2025-2026)
| Provider | Resolution | Daily Capacity | Revisit | Key Feature |
| Maxar (WorldView Legion) | 30cm (panchromatic) | 1.5M km2/day | Multiple daily (6 satellites) | Best resolution commercially available; new simplified pricing 2025 |
| Airbus (Pleiades Neo) | 30cm (native) | 1M km2/day | Intraday | 6-band multispectral; OneAtlas subscription model |
| Planet Labs (SkySat) | 50cm | Multiple revisits/day | Same-day tasking | Fastest delivery (3 hours from capture) |
| Planet Labs (SuperDove) | 3-5m | Entire Earth daily | Daily | Complete daily baseline of entire Haiti at medium resolution |
Optical Pricing (2025-2026)
| Provider/Product | Archive $/km2 | Tasking $/km2 | Min Order | Notes |
| Maxar WorldView Legion (30cm) | $14-$17 | $29-$45 | 25 km2 | January 2026 LAND INFO pricing; simplified pricing structure |
| Airbus Pleiades Neo (30cm) | ~$18/km2 | $25-$40 | 25 km2 | OneAtlas subscription alternative available |
| Planet SkySat (50cm) | $6/km2 | $12-$40/km2 | 25 km2 | $12 flexible, $40 assured tasking |
| Planet SuperDove (3m) | ~$1/km2 | N/A (monitoring) | Subscription | Annual subscription for area monitoring |
Haiti Coastline Optical Coverage Calculation
Approach 1: Full coastline at 30cm (Maxar/Airbus)
- Coastal strip: 1,771 km x 5 km width = 8,855 km2
- Weekly tasking at $29/km2 = $256,795/pass x 52 weeks = $13.4M/year (too expensive weekly)
- Monthly tasking: $256,795 x 12 = $3.1M/year (high)
- Practical approach: Monthly 30cm for change detection on full coast + weekly 50cm (SkySat) on known hotspots
Approach 2: Hybrid (recommended)
- Planet SuperDove daily monitoring of full coast (~$50K-$100K/year subscription for Haiti AOI)
- SkySat weekly tasking on 50 priority zones (50 x 25 km2 = 1,250 km2 x $12 x 52) = $780,000/year
- Maxar 30cm quarterly full-coast survey (4 x $256,795) = $1.03M/year
- Total optical: ~$600K-$1.0M/year using hybrid approach
Can Optical Detect Landing Site Infrastructure?
Yes. At 30-50cm resolution, the following are detectable:
| Feature | Detectable? | Resolution Needed | AI Automatable? |
| Makeshift wooden docks/piers | Yes | 50cm | Yes (change detection) |
| Cleared beach areas | Yes | 50cm-1m | Yes |
| Tire/vehicle tracks on beaches | Yes (fresh) | 30cm | Partially |
| Boat pull-up marks in sand | Marginal | 30cm | Research stage |
| Fuel drum storage | Yes | 30-50cm | Yes |
| New paths/trails to beach | Yes | 50cm-1m | Yes (change detection) |
| Concrete boat ramps | Yes | 1m | Yes |
| Vessels on beach (hauled out) | Yes | 50cm | Yes |
| Night lighting (new) | No (optical only daytime) | N/A | Use SAR/RF instead |
Critical capability: AI change detection. By comparing monthly baselines, AI can automatically flag new clearings, new structures, new paths, and new vessel activity at any point along 1,771 km. This is how you find EVERY landing site... not by looking for boats in the water, but by looking for the evidence of boat operations on land.
3. AIS (AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM) SATELLITE TRACKING
The AIS Problem for Haiti
AIS compliance for Haiti-relevant vessels is extremely low. Here is why:
- SOLAS requires AIS only for vessels >300 gross tonnage (international) or >500 GT (domestic)
- Small fishing boats, yoles, go-fast boats, and local cargo vessels in Haiti are not required to carry AIS
- Even vessels that have AIS can (and do) turn it off... "going dark"
- Estimated AIS coverage for Haiti-bound small vessel traffic: <5-10%
- AIS is useful for tracking legitimate commercial shipping and identifying which large vessels deviate from normal patterns, but it will NOT detect the small-boat trafficking that is the primary threat
AIS Data Providers
| Provider | Coverage | Refresh Rate | Annual Cost (Caribbean zone) | Notes |
| Spire Global/Kpler | Global | 1 min (coastal), 6 min (open ocean) | $200K-$500K/year | Spire sold AIS business to Kpler (Belgium) for $241M in 2024; 600K+ vessels tracked |
| exactEarth (now Spire) | Global | Near real-time | $150K-$300K/year | Acquired by Spire 2021; 60+ payloads in orbit |
| MarineTraffic | Global | Real-time (terrestrial), satellite | $100-$1,000/year (basic); Enterprise custom | Basic: $10/month; Essential: $100/month; Enterprise: custom |
| ORBCOMM | Global | Near real-time | $200K-$400K/year | Government/enterprise focus |
Dark Vessel Detection (The Real Capability Gap)
Since AIS misses most Haiti trafficking vessels, dark vessel detection is critical:
| Provider | Technology | How It Works | Cost Estimate |
| HawkEye 360 | RF signal geolocation from space | Detects radar, radio, cell phone emissions from vessels regardless of AIS status | ~$500K-$2M/year for Caribbean AOI (based on $98.8M Navy IDIQ for Indo-Pacific) |
| Unseenlabs | RF signal detection (French) | 25-satellite constellation; 300,000 km2 per pass; ~3 hour revisit | ~$300K-$800K/year estimated (no public pricing) |
| Global Fishing Watch | SAR + AIS gap analysis | Cross-references Sentinel-1 SAR with AIS to identify vessels present on radar but not transmitting AIS | Free for non-commercial use; premium analytics via partnership |
| Windward | AI maritime intelligence | Fuses AIS, SAR, dark vessel analytics, behavioral analysis | ~$300K/year per user (government); MIOC services additional |
Recommended stack: HawkEye 360 RF detection ($800K) + AIS feed from Spire/Kpler ($300K) + Global Fishing Watch (free) = $400K-$800K/year for combined AIS + dark vessel coverage.
4. EXISTING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS PLATFORMS
Platforms Available or Potentially Available to Haiti
| Platform | Operator | Available to Haiti? | Cost to Access | Capabilities |
| SeaVision | US Navy/Volpe Center | Yes (120 partner nations, 4,400+ users) | Free (US-funded) | Web-based MDA, AIS visualization, rule-based analytics |
| JIATF-South assets | US DoD | Indirectly (via MSS/USCG cooperation) | Covered by US counter-narcotics budget | Saildrone USVs (20 deployed 2025), satellite imagery, AIS feeds, intelligence fusion |
| Windward Maritime AI | Windward (Israel, NYSE-listed) | Yes (commercial) | $300K+/year per user | AI-powered vessel tracking, dark vessel detection, risk scoring, MIOC service |
| Global Fishing Watch | Non-profit | Yes (free for government/research) | Free | SAR vessel detection, AIS tracking, dark fleet mapping, API access |
| Copernicus Maritime Surveillance | EU/EMSA | Via UNODC partnership | Free (EU-funded for partner nations) | SAR imagery, vessel detection, oil spill monitoring; 3,000+ images/year; <30 min delivery |
JIATF-South: What They Already Cover
Operation Southern Spear (2025): 20 Saildrone Voyager USVs deployed in Caribbean/Pacific. These 10-meter autonomous vessels carry radar and cameras, covering thousands of square miles daily, operating in support of JIATF-South and US Navy Fourth Fleet.
However, JIATF-South's focus is the Maritime Transit Zone (6 million square miles between US and source countries). Haiti's coastal waters get some coverage, but JIATF-South is optimized for open-ocean interdiction, not coastal/beach surveillance. The gap is exactly the near-shore, informal landing site domain.
5. COASTLINE MAPPING: FINDING EVERY LANDING SITE
The Scale of the Problem
| Metric | Value |
| Haiti coastline | 1,771 km |
| Known formal ports | ~15 (Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Les Cayes, Jeremie, etc.) |
| Known clandestine airstrips | 11 (UNODC) |
| Known informal boat landing sites | Unknown... this is the critical intelligence gap |
| Estimated informal landing sites | 100-300+ (based on coastline length, terrain analysis, trafficking route mapping) |
| Key trafficking node | Ile de la Tortue (Tortuga Island) - 1,045 kg cocaine seized July 2025 |
Cost for Complete Coastline Survey
Phase 1: Baseline Survey (one-time)
| Task | Method | Coverage | Cost |
| Full coastline SAR survey | ICEYE/Capella Strip mode, 1m resolution | 1,771 km x 10 km = 17,710 km2 | $90K-$140K |
| Full coastline optical survey | Maxar WorldView Legion 30cm | 1,771 km x 5 km = 8,855 km2 | $130K-$260K |
| Nearshore bathymetry (satellite-derived) | Sentinel-2 + Pleiades Neo | Full coastline | $50K-$100K |
| AI processing and landing site identification | Custom ML pipeline | All imagery | $50K-$80K |
| Phase 1 Total | | | $320K-$580K |
Phase 2: Monthly Change Detection (ongoing)
| Task | Method | Frequency | Annual Cost |
| Full coast SAR comparison | Strip mode, 1m | Monthly | $1.08M-$1.68M |
| Full coast optical comparison | SkySat 50cm | Monthly | $640K-$960K |
| AI change detection processing | Automated pipeline | Monthly | $100K-$200K |
| Analyst review of flagged anomalies | 2-3 analysts | Ongoing | $200K-$400K |
| Phase 2 Total (annual) | | | $2.0M-$3.2M |
AI-Automated Detection Capabilities
Modern AI/ML applied to satellite imagery can automatically detect:
- New beach clearings - Vegetation removal along coastline (change detection from optical baselines)
- New structures - Docks, ramps, sheds appearing between monthly comparisons
- New paths/roads - Trails from roads to beach access points
- Vessel patterns - Repeated small vessel presence at specific coordinates (SAR time series)
- Nighttime activity - SAR detects vessels and infrastructure changes regardless of time of day
- Fuel storage - New containers/drums visible at 30cm resolution
Accuracy: CNN-based coastline detection achieves 85% accuracy and 80% IoU. Change detection at sub-meter resolution can identify features as small as ~1m2 with high confidence.
Platforms: Picterra (GeoAI), Esri Image Analysis, Planet Analytics, 4 Earth Intelligence, EarthDaily Analytics... all offer automated change detection services.
6. DRONE SURVEILLANCE AS COMPLEMENT
Drones fill the gap between satellite passes: persistent surveillance of known hotspots.
Maritime Surveillance Drone Options
| System | Type | Endurance | Range | Unit Cost | Operating Cost/Hr | Key Feature |
| ScanEagle | Fixed-wing, catapult launch | 18+ hours | 100+ km | $100K-$800K/unit | ~$1,000-$2,000/hr (est.) | Most deployed maritime UAS; Colombia using for Caribbean coast 2025; no runway needed |
| RQ-21 Blackjack | Fixed-wing, catapult launch | 16+ hours | 50+ nm | ~$2.25M/unit (5 UAS per system at $11.3M) | ~$2,000-$4,000/hr (est.) | Marine Corps standard; EO/IR + SIGINT payloads |
| Aerosonde | Fixed-wing | 14+ hours | 100+ km | ~$500K-$1M/unit | ~$1,500-$2,500/hr | Insitu product; proven maritime ops |
| Saildrone Voyager | Unmanned surface vessel | 6+ months at sea | Unlimited (wind/solar) | $500K-$1M/unit (est.) | Minimal (autonomous) | 20 deployed for JIATF-South 2025; radar + cameras; persistent |
| Airbus Zephyr (HAPS) | Solar-powered stratospheric | 67+ days (2025 record) | Global | ~$10M+ per system | ~$500/hr | Pseudo-satellite; persistent coverage over single area; 60,000+ ft altitude |
Haiti Drone Deployment Considerations
Legal/Airspace issues:
- Haiti has limited air traffic control infrastructure
- MSS (Multinational Security Support) operates in Haiti... drone operations would need MSS/Haitian government coordination
- No ICAO restrictions on UAS operations per se, but sovereign airspace permission required
- Recommendation: Operate under MSS framework or bilateral US-Haiti agreement
Recommended package: 2x ScanEagle systems
- 2 systems x 4 air vehicles each = 8 ScanEagle drones
- Operating from 2 locations (Port-au-Prince area + Cap-Haitien area)
- 18-hour endurance = near-persistent coverage of 2 coastal sectors simultaneously
- Annual operating cost: ~$900K-$1.3M (including maintenance, operators, fuel, spares)
- Covers the near-shore gap that satellites miss
Satellite vs. Drone Cost Comparison
| Capability | Satellite | Drone (ScanEagle) | Advantage |
| Full coastline coverage | $2-4M/year | Cannot cover 1,771 km | Satellite |
| Hotspot persistent surveillance | Not persistent (revisit gaps) | 18 hrs continuous | Drone |
| Night/all-weather | SAR yes; optical no | EO/IR yes | Tie |
| Small wooden boat detection | Marginal (SAR); visual (optical) | Yes (EO/IR cameras) | Drone |
| Real-time response/cueing | Hours to task | Minutes to redirect | Drone |
| Operating cost per km2 covered | $1-40/km2 per pass | Higher for large area | Satellite |
| Operator risk | Zero | Low (unmanned) but recoverable | Tie |
7. REAL-WORLD DEPLOYMENTS AND BENCHMARKS
EUNAVFOR MED IRINI (Mediterranean)
| Metric | Value |
| Annual common budget | EUR 16.35M ($17.8M) for 2025-2026 |
| Satellite image requests | 250+ per year to EU Satellite Centre |
| Coverage area | Central Mediterranean |
| Assets | Aerial, satellite, maritime |
| Mandate | UN arms embargo enforcement (Libya) |
| Satellite surveillance share of budget | ~EUR 3-5M estimated (20-30% of common costs) |
Australia Pacific Maritime Security Program (PMSP)
| Metric | Value |
| Total program | AUD 2 billion over 30 years (~$67M/year) |
| Aerial surveillance increase (2024-25) | AUD 477M ($310M) total allocation |
| Patrol boats | 24 Guardian-class, $1.3B total |
| Satellite surveillance | Quad Indo-Pacific MDA partnership (Phase 1 funded 2024) |
| Coverage area | 36 million km2 of Pacific EEZs |
| Per-km2 annual cost | ~$1.86/km2/year (using $67M over 36M km2) |
US Counter-Narcotics (JIATF-South / Caribbean)
| Metric | Value |
| Coverage area | 6 million square miles (Maritime Transit Zone) |
| Saildrone deployment | 20 Voyager USVs (2025, Operation Southern Spear) |
| 2024 seizures | 106.3 metric tons of cocaine |
| Annual budget (estimated) | $800M-$1.2B (across all agencies) |
| HawkEye 360 contract | $98.8M IDIQ (Navy, Indo-Pacific focus, renewed 2025 for 4th year) |
| India HawkEye 360 FMS | $131M (includes SeaVision + training) |
EMSA/Copernicus Maritime Surveillance (EU)
| Metric | Value |
| Annual SAR images delivered | 3,000+ |
| Delivery time | <30 minutes from satellite acquisition |
| Participating states | 34 coastal states |
| Cost to participating states | Free (EU Copernicus funded) |
| UNODC partnership | Active... UNODC uses Copernicus for partner nation surveillance |
Colombia ScanEagle Deployment (2025)
Colombia's Navy (Armada de Colombia) actively uses ScanEagle drones for Caribbean and Pacific coast maritime surveillance as of 2025 (ExpoDefensa 2025 confirmation). Catapult launch from shore or vessel, 18-hour patrols covering both coasts. Directly analogous to Haiti use case.
8. INTEGRATION COSTS
Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Setup
Based on industry benchmarks (Wartsila, ABB, Elbit, L3Harris coastal surveillance systems):
| Component | Cost | Notes |
| Physical facility (renovation/construction) | $200K-$500K | Can use existing HNP/MSS facility |
| Display wall + workstations (6 positions) | $150K-$300K | Large-format displays, GIS workstations |
| Server/networking infrastructure | $100K-$200K | Data storage, processing, secure comms |
| Software licenses (GIS, analytics, fusion) | $150K-$300K/year | Esri, Windward, custom dashboards |
| SeaVision integration | Free | US-provided, web-based, 120 partner nations |
| Secure communications (JIATF-South link) | $50K-$100K | Encrypted data sharing |
| Setup total (one-time) | $650K-$1.4M | |
| Annual operating (licenses, maintenance) | $200K-$400K/year | |
Analyst/Operator Staffing
| Role | Number | Annual Cost (local + intl) | Notes |
| International maritime analyst (mentor) | 2 | $300K | Train Haitian counterparts |
| Haitian maritime analysts | 4-6 | $120K-$180K | $20K-$30K/year local salary |
| IT/systems administrator | 1 | $40K-$60K | |
| Drone operators (ScanEagle) | 4-6 | $120K-$180K | 2 per system, shifts |
| MOC manager | 1 | $80K-$120K | |
| Annual staffing | 12-16 people | $660K-$840K | |
Training
| Training | Duration | Cost | Provider |
| SeaVision operator training | 1 week | Free (US Navy/Volpe) | Standard for partner nations |
| SAR image analysis | 2-4 weeks | $30K-$60K | ESA, commercial providers |
| AIS/MDA analysis | 1-2 weeks | $20K-$40K | IMO, UNODC GMCP |
| ScanEagle operations | 4-6 weeks | $100K-$200K | Insitu/Boeing |
| AI analytics platform | 1-2 weeks | $10K-$20K | Platform vendor |
| Total training (one-time) | | $160K-$320K | |
9. THE KILL QUESTION: TOTAL ANNUAL COST
Option A: Minimum Viable MDA ($2.8M-$4.2M/year)
| Component | Annual Cost |
| SAR: ICEYE/Capella Scan mode, every-other-day + monthly Strip | $600K-$1.0M |
| Optical: Planet SuperDove daily + SkySat monthly on 30 priority zones | $300K-$500K |
| AIS: Spire/Kpler Caribbean feed | $200K-$300K |
| Dark vessels: Global Fishing Watch (free) + Windward basic | $300K |
| AI analytics: Change detection pipeline (open-source + cloud) | $100K-$200K |
| MOC: 6-person team, existing facility, SeaVision | $400K-$600K |
| Drones: 1x ScanEagle system | $450K-$650K |
| Contingency (15%) | $370K-$530K |
| Total Option A | $2.8M-$4.2M |
Option B: Full Coverage MDA ($4.2M-$6.8M/year) -- RECOMMENDED
| Component | Annual Cost |
| SAR: Multi-provider daily Scan + biweekly Strip + quarterly Spotlight on hotspots | $1.2M-$2.0M |
| Optical: SuperDove daily + SkySat weekly on 50 zones + quarterly Maxar 30cm full coast | $600K-$1.0M |
| AIS + Dark vessel: Spire/Kpler + HawkEye 360 RF detection | $600K-$1.0M |
| AI analytics: Windward + custom change detection + vessel classification | $300K-$500K |
| MOC: 12-person team, dedicated facility, full integration | $800K-$1.2M |
| Drones: 2x ScanEagle systems (north + south coast) | $900K-$1.3M |
| Training (Year 1 only, amortized) | $100K-$200K |
| Contingency (15%) | $630K-$1.0M |
| Total Option B | $4.2M-$6.8M |
Option C: Maximum Capability ($8M-$12M/year)
Add to Option B:
- HawkEye 360 dedicated Caribbean tasking ($1.5M-$2M)
- Airbus Zephyr HAPS for persistent single-area coverage ($2M-$3M)
- Dedicated Saildrone Voyager fleet (4 units) ($2M-$3M)
- Full Windward MIOC with embedded analyst ($500K)
Year 1 Setup Cost (one-time, add to annual)
| Item | Cost |
| MOC facility setup | $650K-$1.4M |
| Baseline coastline survey (Phase 1) | $320K-$580K |
| Training | $160K-$320K |
| ScanEagle procurement (2 systems) | $1.6M-$3.2M |
| Year 1 additional | $2.7M-$5.5M |
Year 1 total (Option B): $6.9M-$12.3M
Year 2+ (Option B): $4.2M-$6.8M/year
10. THE DEFENSIBLE LINE
"$5M/year buys you eyes on every beach in Haiti."
This is defensible because:
- $5M is the midpoint of Option B ($4.2M-$6.8M), which provides daily SAR coverage, weekly optical on priority zones, RF dark vessel detection, AI-flagged anomalies, a manned operations center, and drone coverage of hotspots.
- For comparison:
- US spends ~$1B/year on Caribbean counter-narcotics (JIATF-South)
- Australia spends AUD 67M/year ($44M) on Pacific maritime surveillance
- EUNAVFOR MED IRINI common costs: EUR 16.35M/year ($17.8M)
- HawkEye 360 alone: $98.8M Navy contract (Indo-Pacific)
- MSS Haiti budget: ~$600M/year kinetic operations
- $5M is 0.83% of the MSS kinetic budget
- What $5M actually delivers:
- Identification of an estimated 100-300 informal landing sites along 1,771 km of coastline
- Daily vessel movement tracking for all AIS-equipped vessels + RF detection of dark vessels
- Monthly change detection to identify NEW landing sites as they emerge
- Real-time drone surveillance of the top 10-20 trafficking hotspots
- AI-automated anomaly alerts: "New clearing detected at coordinates X,Y" or "Unusual vessel cluster at 0300 at location Z"
- Fusion with existing JIATF-South/SeaVision feeds (free)
- What it does NOT cover (limitations to disclose):
- Small wooden boats (<5m) remain difficult to detect by SAR alone
- Cloud cover limits optical imagery (mitigated by SAR)
- Landing sites deep in mangrove channels may require ground-truth verification
- Requires sustained political will and operational continuity
- Does not include interdiction costs (patrol boats, coast guard operations)
11. PROCUREMENT PATHWAY
Free/Existing Resources (Start Immediately)
| Resource | Provider | Cost | Action |
| SeaVision access | US Navy/Volpe Center | Free | Request partner nation access for Haiti |
| Global Fishing Watch | Non-profit | Free | Register for API access, Caribbean dark vessel data |
| Copernicus Maritime Surveillance | EU/EMSA | Free (via UNODC) | Request UNODC GMCP to activate for Haiti |
| Sentinel-1 SAR archive | ESA | Free | Download and process for baseline coastline mapping |
| Planet NICFI tropical baselines | Planet/Norway | Free | Monthly 4.77m resolution for tropical countries |
Phase 1: Quick Wins ($500K, 3 months)
- Activate SeaVision + Global Fishing Watch + Copernicus (free)
- Conduct baseline optical + SAR survey of full coastline ($320K-$580K)
- Run AI landing site identification on baseline imagery ($50K-$80K)
- Produce first-ever complete map of Haiti informal maritime landing sites
Phase 2: Operational Capability ($2.5M, 6-12 months)
- Establish MOC with 6-person team
- Begin monthly change detection cycle
- Deploy 1x ScanEagle system
- Integrate AIS feed + Windward analytics
Phase 3: Full MDA ($5M+, 12-18 months)
- Scale to daily SAR + weekly optical
- Add HawkEye 360 RF detection
- Deploy 2nd ScanEagle system
- Train Haitian operators for sustainability
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY
Pricing Methodology
All pricing estimates are based on:
- Published reseller pricing (SkyFi 2025 pricing sheet, LAND INFO January 2026 pricing, Geopera pricing, Planet published pricing)
- Government contract disclosures (HawkEye 360 $98.8M Navy IDIQ, Umbra $60M STRATFI, Spire EUR 8.4M EMSA contract)
- Industry analyst estimates (Statista, Geoawesome, ongeo-intelligence)
- Direct comparison with analogous programs (EUNAVFOR MED, Australia PMSP, JIATF-South)
Where provider pricing is not public (Capella, ICEYE enterprise, HawkEye 360), estimates are derived from contract values, reseller margins, and industry benchmarks. All estimates should be validated with direct provider quotes before budgeting.
Key Sources
- UNODC, "Explainer: Organized crime and gang violence in Haiti" (January 2026)
- UNODC, "Haiti's Criminal Markets: Mapping Trends in Firearms and Drug Trafficking" (2023)
- UNODC, UN Security Council Briefing on Haiti (January 21, 2026)
- SkyFi, "Imagery Pricing 2025" (skyfi.com/files/SkyFi_Pricing_2025.pdf)
- LAND INFO, "Imagery Pricing, $ USD per km2 January 2026" (landinfo.com)
- Planet Labs, published pricing (planet.com/pricing)
- Geopera, pricing (geopera.com/pricing)
- HawkEye 360, US Navy IDIQ renewal ($98.8M, December 2025)
- HawkEye 360, India FMS ($131M, May 2025)
- Spire Global, EMSA contract (EUR 8.4M, February 2024)
- Umbra, STRATFI agreement ($60M, 2024)
- EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, Council mandate extension (March 2025)
- Australia PMSP, Defence Activities (defence.gov.au)
- Saildrone, Operation Southern Spear (February 2025)
- CBO, "Usage Patterns and Costs of Unmanned Aerial Systems" (2021)
- EMSA, CleanSeaNet/Copernicus Maritime Surveillance service documentation
- Global Fishing Watch, Dark Vessels research project documentation
Analysis prepared for BARSS/Project Diamond Spear
"$5M/year. Eyes on every beach in Haiti. That is less than 1% of the kinetic budget."
Prepared by:
Wesley Bertil, BARSS LLC — Forensic Economics & Maritime Intelligence
Dr. Mac Archer, PhD — Field Research, Port-au-Prince
wbertil@barssofrhait.com • (302) 559-8019
BARSS-2026-HTI-MARITIME • March 2026